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1
Introduction: Weighing Affect 
in Medieval Christian Devotion
“Take a corpse, and place it where you like. You will see that it puts up no 
resistance to motion, nor does it grumble about its position, or complain 
when it is put aside. If it is propped up on a throne, it does not raise its head 
up, but rather looks down. If it is clothed in purple, it will look twice as 
pale. This is the truly obedient one, who does not judge why he is moved, 
and does not care where he is placed.” According to his thirteenth-century 
hagiographers, the Umbrian saint Francis of Assisi responded with these 
words to a group of followers asking for spiritual instruction by offering, as 
an example of true obedience, a dead body (exanime corpus, literally, a body 
without a soul).1
This story, especially in the context of the vitae of St. Francis, illus-
trates what students of medieval Christianity have long known: The saintly 
body, in its wonderful and pitiful conformity to Christ’s body, played an 
exemplary role in the Passion-centered piety of late-medieval Europe. 
But this curious pedagogical scene, which is found throughout the early 
Franciscan hagiographical tradition, presents the holy body as something 
more (or less) than simply a vehicle for cruciform suffering. Why was a 
dead body a spiritual exemplar? What else were holy bodies capable of 
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besides  (alongside of ) suffering? As this episode demonstrates, the body, 
in its most fundamental capacity to be moved by an external force, served 
as a source of instruction and site of desire for the late-medieval Christian 
devotional imagination. The pliant body of Francis’s macabre exemplum 
is no particular body—a nameless corpse—but in the vita of Francis, the 
corpse casts its shadow forward over Francis’s own body. The earliest leg-
ends of Francis’s holiness recount his angelic vision near the end of his life 
that left him branded with the wounds of Christ’s passion. In what became 
the offi cial account of Francis’s life, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio’s longer 
Life of St. Francis (the Legenda Maior) depicts Francis’s body transformed 
by the ardor of his love, pierced by joy and grief at the sight of a six-winged 
Seraph affi xed to a cross. But he is not just transformed by the vision—he 
is incapacitated by it. Unable to walk, Francis has to be carried through the 
streets, while still living, like the corpse he would soon become. By the end 
of his life, Francis has become the yielding body that he had earlier offered 
to his followers as an example.
Another pedagogical scene, framing and refl ecting the fi rst: this time 
Francis himself is the exemplum, and Bonaventure is the teacher. In a ser-
mon given at the Franciscan house in Paris on the feast day of Francis of 
Assisi in 1262,2 Bonaventure explains the signifi cance of the fi gure of the 
Seraph that appeared to Francis shortly before his death and branded him 
with the marks of Christ’s passion:
Why do we, being so wretched, have such cold hearts that we will not 
endure anything for the sake of our Lord? Our hearts do not burn or 
boil with love. For just as heat is a property of the heart, and when this 
heat is greater a person’s actions are stronger and more robust, so too 
one who has more of the heat of love or charity in their heart is for this 
reason able to perform more virtuous deeds. Do you want to imprint 
Christ crucifi ed in your heart? Do you wish to transform yourself into 
him so much that you burn with charity? Just as iron, when it is heated 
to the point of melting, can be imprinted with any form or image, 
so too a heart burning with the love of Christ crucifi ed is imprinted 
with the crucifi ed Christ or the cross, and the lover is carried over or 
transformed into the Crucifi ed, just as the blessed Francis was. Some 
people are amazed that a Seraphim was sent to him when the stigmata 
of Christ’s passion were to be imprinted upon him. Surely, they say, no 
Seraphim was crucifi ed! No, but the Seraphim is the spirit whose name 
means “ardor,” which signifi es that Francis was burning with charity 
when the Seraphim was sent to him. And the cross or the sign of the 
cross imprinted upon his body signifi es the affection which he had for 
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the crucifi ed Christ, and that, from the ardor of his love, he was wholly 
transformed into Christ.3
The sermon is an exegesis both of Francis’s vision and Matthew 24:30: 
“Then the sign of the Son of Man will appear in heaven.” In the moral 
sense, Bonaventure explains, the verse refers to stigmata that Francis re-
ceived; he is the “heavens” upon which the sign of the Son of Man ap-
pears. Through this tropological identifi cation, Francis’s stigmatized fl esh 
becomes the scriptural text of the homily: An eschatological and cosmic 
message is legible on his branded body.4 The sermon takes the form of 
an extended comparison of Francis to the celestial sphere—its beauty is 
refl ected in Francis’s purity, its orderly movement is modeled in Francis’s 
obedience, its universal expanse is measured in Francis’s limitless love, and 
its mysteries are intimated in Francis’s ecstatic contemplation. In this con-
text, the appearance of the Seraph is not out of place. The heavens are not 
a void dotted with spinning orbs, but a dynamic hierarchy of angelic pres-
ences. The fi gure of the Seraph indicates that Francis’s love is as expansive 
as the heavens and as ardent, even self-immolating, as the fi ery creatures 
who fl ank God’s throne. But if the celestial body of Francis suggests cosmic 
splendor, the image of a softened heart evokes a more intimate devotion. 
Infl amed with love, Francis’s heart is supple.5 The marks on his body bear 
witness to a heart melted by love, whose receptivity to divine wounding 
made possible the physical impression. Love makes the body pliable, and a 
pliable body is the physical manifestation of love.
This scene, like the fi rst, addresses the question of what the devotional 
body can do. Here, pliability, imprintability, and mobility are capacities of 
the ardent body—that is, a body infl amed with love. Amor as fi re is both 
spiritual and corporeal, the substance that effects the transfer of spiritual 
ardor into bodily marks, and Bonaventure’s sermon presents two embodi-
ments of this love: the impressionable body of Francis and the pliable body 
of iron. The latter becomes the example of the former, and both exemplify 
the quality of amor that is the focal point of the sermon. Amor is the princi-
ple of pious devotion to the Passion and of purifying and perfecting union 
with God: The warm, tender love that Bonaventure urges his audience to 
feel for the sufferings of the crucifi ed Christ is at the same time the angelic 
charity that lifts up and divinizes. In his sermon, Bonaventure registers 
the shock of this coincidence of opposites in the third person: “Surely, 
they say, no Seraphim was crucifi ed!” The Incarnation itself—Word made 
fl esh—is the ultimate and paradigmatic coincidence of opposites, but the 
image of the Seraph dying on a cross is represented as a further scandal, an 
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impossible violation of the cosmic hierarchy. If literally impossible, how-
ever, this image nonetheless organizes the affections proper to Franciscan 
devotion: compassion for the pathetic body of Christ crucifi ed and wonder 
at the grandeur of the divinely ordered cosmos. Refl ection on the cruci-
fi ed Seraph intensifi es and perfects the soul’s affective capacity—that is, its 
capacity to be moved, transformed, and united to God.
These two images—the pliable corpse and the cruciform Seraph—ad-
umbrate the central argument of this book: that the medieval devotional 
techniques aimed at inciting and intensifying affective response (usually of 
compassion, pity, and grief ) to Christ’s passion found their complement in 
scholastic refl ection on the nature of the affectus and its relationship to the 
space and time of the soul’s return to God. As has been well-studied, an-
other affective turn was taking place in the Parisian schools in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries: a revival of theological interest in the sixth-
 century Syrian ascetic known as Dionysius the Areopagite, whose brief 
but extremely infl uential corpus detailed, among other things, the ninefold 
angelic structure of the heavens and the means by which the mind could 
ascend this cosmic ladder to a union with God beyond knowledge. For a 
number of commentators, notably the Victorines Hugh of St. Victor and 
Thomas Gallus, the Dionysian itinerary of mystical ascent to unknowing 
was the realization of an affective union higher than and exclusive of the 
activities of the intellect. As I will discuss in Chapter 1, Bonaventure found 
in this reading of Dionysius not simply an affi rmation of love’s superior-
ity to knowledge, but a conception of psychic and celestial hierarchy that 
revealed the cosmic signifi cance of Francis’s affective transformation.
Each of these two “affective turns”—devotional programs based on 
compassionate identifi cation with Jesus’s suffering and the “affective” in-
terpretation of Dionysian mystical theology—has been well-observed by 
historians, literary scholars, and theologians. But the question of their 
coincidence and coimplication has remained largely unexamined. This 
book takes up that question by examining a fi gure who was, more than any 
other medieval author, central to both of these developments, and argues 
that a common theory of the nature and role of affectus animates both of 
these “turns.” As regent master of the Franciscan school at Paris begin-
ning in 1254 and then minister general of the order from 1257 until his 
death in 1274, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio produced university texts such 
as commentaries and disputed questions as well as meditations intended 
for broader mendicant audiences of men and women. Across these genres, 
Bonaventure developed a program of ascent to divinizing union rooted in 
and realized through the soul’s innate affective orientation toward God. 
F6909.indb   4 10/7/16   1:41:33 PM
Introduction 5
For him, the Passion-centered piety of Francis of Assisi and the cosmic 
speculations of Dionysius were intertexts that interpret one another and 
together inform the soul’s natural affective inclination toward God.
The nature of this innate affective inclination (which Bonaventure iden-
tifi es variously as the natural affectus or the scholastic concept of syndere-
sis), and its role and fate in the soul’s union with God, are at the heart of 
this book’s inquiry. While the chapters that follow attend closely to these 
issues within Bonaventure’s own writings, they aspire to an argument with 
a more far-reaching application: that meditational techniques and writ-
ings that scholars identify as “affective” must be examined in conversa-
tion with medieval theological sources on the nature and signifi cance of 
affectus. Making this argument does not require subscribing to the limiting 
interpretive model, critiqued by Thomas Bestul and others, that sees cleri-
cal Latin works as a theoretically inexhaustible “background” that guar-
antees the meaning and import of popular vernacular texts.6 Nor does it 
require, for that matter, much faith in the difference between “scholastic” 
and “devotional” literature. To be sure, a commentary on Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences arose out of and answered to different generic and institutional 
demands than a vita of a popular saint. But in the case of a fi gure like Bon-
aventure, whose work spans these and other popular genres, it is possible 
to see the working out, in diverse textual forms, of a set of related theologi-
cal and practical questions regarding the nature and destiny of the cosmos 
and the place of human beings within it. As Bonaventure himself has it, 
the Dionysian universe not only provides a scheme for understanding the 
spiritual signifi cance of Francis; but Francis’s own life interprets the corpus 
of Dionysius as well. Understanding the role of affect in Bonaventure or 
any other medieval thinker requires navigating these intertextual dynamics 
in multiple directions.
These dynamics are evident in Bonaventure’s treatment of the climactic 
episode of Francis’s life, his vision of the cruciform Seraph on Mount La 
Verna. As I will argue in Chapter 1, while Bonaventure is not the fi rst to 
introduce the image of the Seraph into the legend of Francis’s reception of 
the stigmata, he exploits its Dionysian resonance in a new way. The Seraph 
is of the highest rank of angels fl anking the divine. Dionysius associates the 
Seraphim with fi re and warmth, and later commentators associate them 
further with ardent love. In Bonaventure’s writings, the Seraph of Fran-
cis’s vision alludes to the drama of the soul’s hierarchical ascent to affective 
union with God beyond the intellect. And yet, at the same time, the scene 
of Francis being moved to ecstatic joy, pity, and desire by the sight of the 
crucifi ed Seraph is itself a scene of affective piety. Bonaventure depicts 
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Francis as the exemplary (and extraordinary) Passion meditant, his gaze 
fi xed on the awful sight of Jesus’s suffering, his affections excited with the 
appropriate responses, and his body overwhelmed by the experience.
Scholars of medieval history and literature typically use the term “af-
fective piety” or “affective devotion” to refer to a family of meditational 
texts that explicitly seek to stimulate the reader’s affections through vivid 
depiction of Jesus’s human sufferings at the events of his crucifi xion. The 
narrative of a broad shift in European Christian devotional practice (at the 
hands of Anselm of Canterbury and twelfth-century Cistercian authors, 
above all) toward the cultivation of self-knowledge on the one hand and 
tender compassion toward Jesus on the other received its classic formu-
lation in Richard Southern’s 1953 The Making of the Middle Ages: “The 
theme of tenderness and compassion for the sufferings and helplessness of 
the Saviour of the world was one which had a new birth in the monasteries 
of the eleventh century, and every century since then has paid tribute to 
the monastic inspiration of this century by some new development of the 
theme.”7 Textual witnesses of this new birth include both the emotion-
ally performative (and performable) fi rst-person prayers of authors such 
as John of Fécamp and Anselm of Canterbury, and also graphic guided 
meditations on the scenes of Christ’s life and death intended to stimulate 
compassion for his pains and for Mary’s sorrow. Canonical examples of the 
latter genre include the fourteenth-century Meditations on the Life of Christ, 
James of Milan’s Stimulus of Love, and Bonaventure’s On the Perfection of Life 
Addressed to the Sisters.
Pliable as it is, the coherence of “affective piety” as a category describ-
ing a historical shift or movement in the later middle ages is debatable; 
 Anglo-Saxonist scholars have amply demonstrated that Anselm and his 
contemporaries had a long tradition of highly wrought, affective prayers 
and devotions to draw on.8 Moreover, the characterization of particular 
forms of devotion as “affective” risks both redundancy (what would non-
affective devotion look like?) and question-begging, leading us to ignore 
or de-emphasize aspects and functions of devotional texts other than those 
aiming at the intensifi cation or direction of affective response.9 Yet few 
would argue with Southern’s basic premise that a change—in style, empha-
sis, and sheer volume— occurred in the devotional literature and practices 
of Western Christian devotion sometime around the eleventh century.
Scholarly treatments of affective piety, in fact, often open onto larger 
questions about historical change. The development of affective medita-
tion has long been crucial to the way historians and literary scholars have 
narrated the development of lay piety, vernacular spirituality, women’s 
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religiosity, and even the very emergence of late medieval society out of 
feudal Europe.10 It is as if affectus marks in medievalist historiography the 
privileged site of transformation that it represented on a spiritual level for 
many medieval writers. For medieval writers and their modern interpret-
ers, affect is axial.
In her monumental study of the change in devotional attitudes from the 
ninth through the twelfth centuries, Rachel Fulton warns against a ten-
dency to discuss this shift as an “emergence” in the historiographical ether 
of cultural mentalities, and seeks instead to trace the development of Pas-
sion devotion through specifi c historical catalysts and actors (even as she 
also addresses herself to “a whole imaginative and emotional climate”).11 
Fulton tells a complex story involving the development of Eucharistic the-
ology, post-millenial apocalyptic disappointment, and bridal mysticism. 
Key actors for Fulton are the Benedictines John of Fécamp and Anselm of 
Canterbury, and twelfth-century Cistercians, especially Bernard of Clair-
vaux, fi gures long central to the narrative of affective devotion emerging 
from new monastic technologies of the self developed in eleventh- and 
twelfth-century religious reform movements and spreading, via the Fran-
ciscans above all, to the laity. As Southern puts it, “With St. Francis and 
his followers, the fruits of the experiences of St. Anselm and St. Bernard 
were brought to the market place, and became the common property of 
the lay and clerical world alike.”12 Sarah Beckwith follows the lineaments 
of this narrative in her study of the role of Christ’s body as social medium 
in late medieval Europe. In the anguished, excited meditations on Christ’s 
human and divine body of Anselm and Bernard, Beckwith sees tools for 
the fashioning of a new, refl exive subjectivity whose self-reformation aims 
both to intensify and resolve the divisions of fl esh and spirit, human and 
divine, desire and fulfi llment, within the self. These new disciplinary prac-
tices organized around Christ’s body had far-reaching implications: “The 
reformist understandings of affective theology developed a set of inter-
pretive strategies which disciplined the way in which they were utilized 
and understood within the institutional setting of the monastery. But the 
infl uence of these texts was felt far beyond the walls of the monastery.”13 
Crucial to the extension of this infl uence, Beckwith argues, were the Fran-
ciscan devotional texts that opened the reform program of subjective for-
mation around the body of Christ to lay audiences.14 As she writes, “Fran-
ciscanism described the gestural techniques of affectus in its development 
of imitative and meditational schema for the production of contrition.”15 
Thus, whether as innovators or popularizers, the Franciscans have long 
held a preeminent place in narratives of the development of affective piety. 
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Thomas Bestul claims that Franciscans “carried devotion to the suffer-
ing humanity of Christ to new heights.”16 For Bestul, Bonaventure’s works 
represented the highest of these new heights and a model for later Passion 
meditation literature, much of which circulated under Bonaventure’s au-
thority in the fourteenth century.17
In a thorough revision of this standard Anselmian-Cistercian-Franciscan 
narrative of affective devotion, Sarah McNamer contends that the genre of 
Passion meditation and its techniques for the literary production of affect 
were not the innovation of a handful of male theologians, but rather in the 
fi rst instance developed in women’s religious communities. Like Fulton, 
McNamer seeks to ground the narrative of affective devotion in specifi c 
historical actors and motives. For McNamer, this motive was less theologi-
cal than social and legal: Passion meditation was a technique for the pro-
duction of compassion, the presence of which functioned as a guarantee of 
religious women’s status as brides of Christ (sponsae Christi).18 In particular, 
McNamer disputes claims for Bonaventure’s originality and signifi cance 
for the tradition of Passion meditation, and even seeks to distinguish his 
devotional writings from the affective meditations that circulated in his 
name. For example, she argues, in contrast to the Pseudo-Bonaventuran 
Meditations on the Life of Christ, in Bonaventure’s Lignum vitae “affective 
response is assertively situated within a framework of speculative theology; 
thus the texts seek to engage the reader’s intellect more than the heart, and 
the apprehension of theological truth is the ultimate aim.”19 In both the 
Lignum vitae and the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, then, the elaborate theo-
logical allegorizations work against affective response, mediating and con-
taining it. The allegorical layering of the Passion narrative in these works 
obscures, in McNamer’s view, the human, suffering body of Christ, as con-
fronted so frankly in texts that refl ect women’s meditational practices.
In her study of the role of imagination in Passion meditations, Michelle 
Karnes offers a very different construal of the relationship between theo-
logical refl ection and corporeal sensation. Like Bestul, she sees Bonaven-
ture as determinative for the tradition of meditation on Jesus’s suffering 
humanity, but for different reasons. Correcting the tendency of scholars 
to overemphasize affect and neglect other stylistic features and theological 
functions of meditations on the life and death of Christ, Karnes argues that 
these texts should be seen as tools for the cultivation of the imagination. 
As the cognitive bridge between sensory perception and intellection, me-
dieval imagination was positioned on the boundary of fl esh and spirit, and 
thus served as path by which the meditant progressed from meditation on 
the human, bodily sufferings of Jesus to contemplation of Christ’s divin-
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ity. Indeed, for Bonaventure, who, Karnes argues, “fi rst applied scholastic 
philosophy of imagination to medieval meditations on Christ,” every act of 
intel lect is incarnational, insofar as it unites the sensory with the spiritual.20 
In Bonaventure’s hands (and also in the literary tradition he infl uenced) the 
purpose of imagining Jesus’s sufferings was not simply to produce emo-
tional fervor, but to be united, in contemplation, to Christ.
Karnes skillfully and persuasively traces the intimate link that Bonaven-
ture’s works draw between devotion to Christ’s humanity and the soul’s 
union to God. Yet her deliberate focus on the more recognizably Aristote-
lian aspects of Bonaventure’s psychology leaves a sustained consideration 
of his mystical theology outside the purview of her study. While Karnes 
recognizes that Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophy are “interwoven” 
in scholastic thought, she maintains that “the fault lines between them are 
always visible. They never merge into syncretic union.”21 I do not wish 
to argue the contrary. Yet even the disavowed possibility of syncretism 
suggests a boundedness to both Neoplatonism (which is, from the fi rst 
instance, already “Aristotelian”) and medieval Aristotelianism that risks an 
overly schematic reading of scholastic texts—a risk nevertheless avoided 
in Karnes’s own lucid and nuanced readings of Bonaventure and the medi-
tational texts he inspired. Tracing the Augustinian and Aristotelian infl u-
ences in Bonaventure’s thought, Karnes illuminates the devotional and 
theological goals of his account of imagination and cognition, and in turn 
offers a convincing account of the theological complexity and depth of 
medieval devotional literature and practices.
The present book seeks to build especially on this aspect of Karnes’s 
work, by giving sustained attention to the complex theorizations of affectus 
that animate the context of late-medieval devotional practices studied un-
der the banner of “affective devotion.” In particular, I suggest that the place 
of affect in medieval Christian devotion cannot be understood outside of 
its role in the Neoplatonic cosmos and the program of ascent that medieval 
theologians in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries found—and substan-
tially expanded and reimagined—in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius.
What follows, however, is not a comprehensive study or survey of the 
concept of affectus in the Bonaventuran corpus.22 Nor is it an attempt to de-
fi ne the boundaries of affective piety or re-narrate its history. Instead, this 
book advances an interpretation of Bonaventure’s writings on the soul’s 
capacity for and path to affective union with God that sees the cosmic 
and mystical dimensions of affectus as crucial for the practice of affective 
meditation. In particular, I focus on Bonaventure’s account of the innate 
affectus that inclines the human person to God. Referring variously to apex 
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affectus, synderesis, a natural instinct, or, most revealingly, the weight ( pon-
dus) of the soul or will (concepts I will discuss at length in what follows), 
Bonaventure works out an incarnational understanding of the soul’s affec-
tive capacity in the context of a mystical itinerary that is profoundly—and 
paradoxically—embodied. In other words, I argue that for Bonaventure, 
devotion is essentially an ecstatic enterprise, integrally involving but ulti-
mately abandoning intellect as the soul moves toward affective ecstasy in 
God. This enterprise is organized around and oriented toward the body 
of Christ and the body of Francis. As I will argue, the itinerary of ascent 
begins in the soul’s innate affective orientation toward God and culminates 
in the becoming-body of the soul—its transformation as exemplifi ed by 
the Christic body of Francis.
The present book is organized according to this same trajectory. Chap-
ter 1 begins with a historical and theological refl ection on the Seraph, 
the image through which Bonaventure connects the exemplary love of St. 
Francis with the Dionysian program of ascent beyond knowledge. The 
fi gure of the Seraph—glossed according to its post-Dionysian association 
with fi ery love—provides for Bonaventure an interpretive key through 
which to read the life of St. Francis as a Dionysian ascent toward affective 
transformation through an innate affective capacity in human beings in 
which is located the possibility of ecstatic union.
After exploring some of the explicitly Dionysian infl uences on Bonaven-
ture in the fi rst chapter—with special attention to the Victorine Thomas 
Gallus— Chapter 2 turns to another important and often overlooked source 
for understanding how affectivity works in Bonaventure’s thought: the con-
cept of synderesis, an infallible tendency of the soul toward the Good that 
he understands as affective. On his account, synderesis marks the place of 
the soul’s most immediate and innate relationship to God. By locating that 
relationship in a capacity that is entirely exterior to cognition (i.e., syndere-
sis), I show how Bonaventure offers a precise (though not uncomplicated) 
psychological account of the soul’s capacity for affective ecstasy and union. 
Ecstasy (ecstasis) is an inherent tendency within the soul, a capacity for be-
ing drawn to the good that is neither truly active nor simply passive. Rather, 
ecstasy (dis)locates the soul’s desire for the good outside of itself.
Furthermore, as I argue in Chapter 3, by identifying the natural motion 
of the will as the soul’s “weight” (pondus), Bonaventure links the scholastic 
debates on synderesis both to an Augustinian motif of love as a spiritual 
force and to an Aristotelian physics of elemental motion and natural place. 
In Aristotelian physics, there is an ambiguity regarding the agent of natural 
motion: Is it a capacity inherent in bodies (a body’s desire for its natural 
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place) or a force that the object of desire exerts on simple bodies? Bon-
aventure, I argue, does not simply inherit this philosophical ambiguity. 
Rather, he exploits it so as to attribute the ascent of the soul to God’s 
grace, while still locating this ascent in a natural capacity of human beings. 
Desire, then, holds a privileged place in Bonaventure’s thought. It is the 
absolute coincidence of nature and grace in the creation of the cosmos and 
its consummation in the return of all things to God.
In two subsequent chapters, I read a pair of Bonaventure’s works that 
were extremely infl uential for later medieval Christian piety: The Soul’s 
Journey Into God (Itinerarium mentis in Deum) and the Life of St. Francis 
(Legenda Maior). I approach these two texts as works that, in Ann As-
tell’s formulation, are mutually interpreting.23 Thus, I argue in Chapter 4 
that the Itinerarium charts the intensifi cation of desire through a series 
of ecstatic transformations culminating in the abandonment of intellect. 
Likewise, Chapter 5 traces the transforming effects of that desire on and 
through the body of the saint in the Legenda. Just as the Seraphic progres-
sion of the Itinerarium ends in death, so too does Francis’s Seraphic vision 
render him a living corpse. Through three series of exempla (the pliability 
of the inanimate body, the affection of the animals attracted to Francis, 
and the vulnerable compassion of the saint), the Legenda materializes the 
dynamics of affectus that Bonaventure elaborates more systematically in 
other genres. These exempla graphically illustrate the paradox of affectiv-
ity: As the soul is consumed progressively by desire for God, its activity is 
increasingly conceived in physical terms; spiritual progress is, ultimately, 
the becoming-body of the soul.
Therefore, as I argue in a brief Conclusion, Bonaventure’s stages of as-
cent chart a transformation of soul into body—that is, into the body of 
Christ and the body of Francis, no longer possessed of intellect or will. As 
Bonaventure writes in the seventh chapter of the Itinerarium, this trans-
formation is “mystical and most secret.” That is, the natural inclination to 
the good that Bonaventure locates in synderesis and that is transformed 
into God, cannot as such be reduced to a cognition of God. This is clear 
both in the constitution of synderesis as simply innate and affective and 
in the fi nal transfer of affect that takes place in the complete darkening 
of the intellect. Yet if the secret of affect cannot be told, affectus can be 
witnessed in the silent, stigmatized body, the exanime corpus, which offers 
no resistance to the movement of desire. The “spiritual martyrdom” of 
Francis is, paradoxically, the becoming-body of his desire.24 Francis there-
fore embodies for Bonaventure the perfect example of this natural  affective 
tendency in the soul. For Bonaventure, the ascent of the soul in union with 
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God is the becoming-body of spiritual desire. This entails not simply the 
exteriorization of an interior capacity, but the coincidence of absolute in-
terior and absolute exterior that takes place, for essential reasons, beyond 
knowledge. Finally, I suggest, this same dynamic animates and organizes 
the devotional program of the extended treatise on Passion meditation that 
Bonaventure addressed a community of Poor Clares (On the Perfection of 
Life Addressed to the Sisters). Here it becomes evident that the program of 
meditating on the human sufferings of Christ and cultivating compassion 
is a mystical iterinary.
Becoming and Embodiment
A reader might well suspect that in this alignment of the middle ages, 
mysticism, affectivity, and the body, the outline of a familiar and stultify-
ing caricature is taking shape— one that many would recognize as that of 
 Teresa of Avila as depicted by Gian Lorenzo Bernini: passive, eyes closed, 
doubled over by affective ecstasy. The dichotomy of “speculative” and “af-
fective mysticism” (wherein the latter is characterized by an ecstatic, desir-
ous union with God in which the passive soul is stripped of its intellectual 
capacities) shaped early twentieth-century studies of mysticism and con-
tinues today to infl uence scholarly and popular conceptions of medieval 
Christian spirituality.25 Most perniciously, affective mysticism has been 
associated with femininity, and the writings of medieval religious women 
such as Hadewijch and Marguerite Porete have far too often been assumed 
to be the unrefl ective and unmediated transcriptions of an embodied, af-
fective experience (an unwholesome contrast to the more writerly theolog-
ical expositions of, for example, Meister Eckhart or Jan Van Ruusbroec). 
Charlotte Radler’s work on Meister Eckhart has forcefully challenged this 
dichotomy of speculative and affective mysticism by illuminating the cen-
trality of love to the mystical theology of Eckhart—a theologian who has 
frequently been characterized as privileging the intellect and ontology 
over affective experience.26 As Radler points out, characterizations of Eck-
hart’s theology as rigorously intellectual are bound up with claims to his 
thoroughgoing Neoplatonism. The speculative-affective binary in studies 
of medieval mysticism, then, rests on a characterization of medieval Chris-
tian Neoplatonism itself as entirely intellectualizing, a characterization 
this book works to correct by examining the deeply Dionysian infl uences 
on Bonaventure’s conception of natural affectus.
In examining the affective dimensions of Eckhart’s theology, Radler 
builds on the work of Bernard McGinn and Amy Hollywood, who, in 
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demonstrating the infl uences of beguine women on Eckhart’s thought, 
under mine the caricature of women’s spirituality as ecstatic and affective in 
contrast to the intellectual and speculative mysticism of university-trained 
male theologians. In the last twenty years, a number of feminist scholars, 
including Hollywood, have further complicated this caricature, and in the 
process have deepened and expanded our understanding of the rhetoric of 
gender and embodiment in medieval texts by both men and women.
In drawing attention to the complex and highly constructed relation-
ships between the body, textuality, authorship, and experience in the 
writings of medieval religious women, feminist scholars have helped to 
illuminate the original theological interventions of texts whose disclaim-
ers to any speculative intentions have too often been taken at face value.27 
And in the process, these scholars have developed a more complex under-
standing of the role of the body in mystical texts and devotional practices. 
Caroline Walker Bynum, whose wide-ranging studies of medieval women’s 
spirituality defi ned a fi eld, has argued that later medieval women authors 
were “more apt to somatize” their religious experiences than men.28 How-
ever, Hollywood’s work on fi gures such as Marguerite Porete, Angela of 
Foligno, Beatrice of Nazareth has demonstrated that medieval spiritual 
writers, female and male, held widely variant and highly complex views 
about the value and role of the body in devotional practice; thus what it 
means for religious experience to be somatized is not at all self-evident or 
straightforward.29
Patricia Dailey echoes Hollywood’s claims when she cautions that “we 
cannot presume to know to what medieval mystical texts refer when they 
call attention to the body.”30 In her book Promised Bodies, Dailey compel-
lingly demonstrates that the textual mediation of “bodily experience” in 
women’s visionary and mystical writing is textually mediated not simply by 
virtue of its being written down; rather, mediation is integral to the com-
plex theological poetics and incarnational hermeneutic the texts advance. 
Indeed, in the case of the thirteenth-century Flemish beguine Hadewijch, 
it is integral to experience as such, as it is fashioned in her texts. Therefore, 
Hadewijch’s visions should not be read as reports of experience that has 
already taken place; rather, they articulate experience—at once textual and 
affective—as the suffering at, and desire for, the postponement of the full 
inhabitation of her body.31
My reading of Bonaventure affi rms and seeks to build on Dailey’s con-
tention that embodiment in medieval Christian mystical texts was con-
ceived and written not as a static given nor as an unmediated experience of 
the fl esh, but as what she calls a “transformational process”: The body of 
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the medieval Christian mystic is always, in some sense, futural.32 Dailey’s 
elucidation of the poetics of lichame (the perfected or spiritual body) in 
Hadewijch’s visions attests to the presence of the paradoxical “embodi-
ment of the soul” in vernacular mystical texts that I examine in Bonaven-
ture’s corpus.33 Where Dailey traces the development of what she sees as a 
Pauline and Augustinian thematic of “inner and outer persons,” I suggest 
that for Bonaventure, an Aristotelian physics of natural motion undergirds 
a Dionysian dynamic of ascent that culminates in the coincidence of inner 
and outer, soul and body.
Far from recurring to a now dismantled caricature of medieval “affec-
tive mysticism,” then, my own reading of Bonaventure is deeply indebted 
to, and seeks to build upon, the work of these scholars in a number of 
other ways. First, I provide further evidence, if any were needed, that any 
straightforward association of affective, excessive mystical experience with 
the feminine in medieval Christian texts is undercut by the complexity of 
the textual evidence. While Bonaventure wrote to communities of men and 
women, he did not restrict exhortations to affective devotion to women, 
nor did he go out of his way to code ecstasis or desiderium as a literally or 
fi guratively feminine experience in the texts written for friars of his own 
order. Second, against the stubborn persistence of the dichotomy of affec-
tive experience and theological refl ection, I demonstrate that the program 
of affective devotion leading to the death of the soul in union is rooted in a 
detailed scholastic psychology—though one not without its own internal 
tensions.
Affective experience was anything but unrefl ective in medieval mystical 
texts, a point that becomes abundantly clear when we read Bonaventure’s 
scholastic commentaries alongside his devotional guides such as the Itine-
rarium. The language of affectus was a profound theological and rhetorical 
tool for describing the ineffable union of human and divine. Crucially, I 
am not claiming, however, that Bonaventure encouraged affective excess 
itself as a tool to be employed by the rational will, or that affect constituted 
for Bonaventure an alternative form of knowledge or cognition. On the 
contrary, affectus provides in Bonaventure’s texts a means of describing an 
experience that is beyond description; it represents the unrepresentable, 
and so, for Bonaventure (the university master no less than the Franciscan 
hagiographer), affectus marks the place, textually, of an impossibility. Affect 
is thus the mode in which the human being exceeds herself in a union that 
is unknown to the structures of cognition, including deliberative rational 
thought, free choice, and speech. Accordingly, the language of affect pro-
vides a medium for testifying to that which is, fundamentally and fi nally, 
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not an object of cognition. Drawing on terms whose medieval and modern 
resonances I will elaborate in the course of subsequent chapters, the affec-
tive marks for Bonaventure the place of a testimony in secret.
Yet such a place is foreclosed when we rush to assimilate affectus to the 
structures and aims of knowledge. To be sure, Bonaventure does theorize 
the relationship between affectus and intellectus, and much of what he writes 
on the subject traces their interpenetration. As Karnes notes, “affect and 
intellect are proportionate and interdependent, and the accord between 
them is well demonstrated by Bonaventure himself.”34 I am not insisting to 
the contrary on an absolute split between the affective and the intellective 
in Bonaventure’s thought. However, I am calling attention to a distinction 
that Bonaventure himself appears to take very seriously and that forms 
the basis for his understanding of how the soul acts and is acted upon. I 
agree with Karnes that “to oppose affect to intellect entire is to distort 
the sources.”35 But it would also be a distortion to ignore the painstaking 
analytical effort that Bonaventure put into distinguishing them. Thus, we 
should not overlook the fact that differentiating affect and intellect was a 
worthwhile task for medieval Christian authors such as Bonaventure—
that the difference, or differences, mattered. Understanding why requires 
more, not less, attention to the ways in which Bonaventure sought to dis-
tinguish them. As Dailey argues, warning against an uncritical association 
of affectivity with excess, “If affect is merely categorized as excessive and 
irrational, or a sign of ‘feeling’ without any theological connotation, we in 
turn become ‘illiterate’: unable to decipher the elaborate theological mech-
anism at work or to understand the subtle textures invoked in the mystic’s 
text and life.”36 In many key texts of Bonaventure’s corpus, I will argue, 
this elaborate theological mechanism functions precisely to dissociate af-
fect from the structures of deliberative rationality—and this dissociation 
also needs to be understood in order to make affect legible in the texts of 
medieval devotion.
The Tropics of Affect
While the category of “affective devotion” may be so broad as to risk mean-
inglessness or redundancy, I nonetheless retain the term in discussing Bon-
aventure’s writings to underscore the work certain texts do to highlight 
the affective aspect of the soul and the pedagogical strategies that pertain 
distinctively to that aspect. Though Bonaventure divides the powers of 
the soul in various ways, as discussed in this book, the most fundamental 
distinction he draws is between the soul’s cognitive and affective parts.37 
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Though not essentially distinct, there are good pedagogical reasons for 
heeding the difference between them because these two parts represent 
two different capacities for being moved and for acting—and activating 
them requires rhetorical and argumentative strategies suited to each. As 
Bonaventure explains in his Breviloquium, or little compendium of theol-
ogy, the aim of scripture is not to impart speculative knowledge but to 
bring about an affective inclination in the reader. This is why scripture 
does not read like a university textbook. Similar to Augustine’s argument 
in De trinitate that the low style of scripture aims to humble the vanity of 
readers accustomed to the sophisticated literary and philosophical works 
of the pagans, Bonaventure’s accessus to scripture works to demonstrate that 
the sacred writings fi t their style perfectly to their aim, for “the affect (af-
fectus) is moved more by example than by argument, more by promises 
than proofs, more through devotions than defi nitions.”38 If the phrase is 
redundant, the idea of “affective devotion” indicates what to Bonaventure 
is a distinct pedagogical strategy: Devotion stands alongside example and 
promise, orienting a whole spatio-temporality of affective transformation. 
As Francis’s own imitatio Christi illustrates, devotion to the exemplar trans-
forms the devotee into the example—thus likeness is the fulfi llment of the 
promise. Such an orientation casts the spiritual journey itself, then, as the 
movement of the affectus through that time and space.
Ancient and Early Medieval Articulations of Affectus
The concept of affectus as the dynamic principle of movement within the 
soul has deep roots in early Christian thought and in the Latin and Greek 
rhetorical and philosophical traditions that infl uenced it. In his study of 
the roots of the twelfth-century Cistercian concept of affectus, Damien 
Boquet identifi es two seemingly opposed but intertwined tendencies in 
early Christian elaborations of the concept. The fi rst tendency treats af-
fectus as a morally neutral term for the dispositions of the soul, something 
like what Quintilian identifi es as the qualitas mentis that the rhetor seeks to 
infl uence or bring about through his art. At the same time, this sense of 
affectus could be used interchangeably with amor to denote in general the 
soul’s attachment to an object.39 In both cases, the ethical value of affectus 
is indeterminate.
The second tendency in ancient philosophical refl ection on affectus, 
which Boquet fi nds especially in the writings of Cicero and Seneca, is to 
identify affect with the passions—the potential or actual susceptibility of 
the soul to the perturbations of grief, joy, fear, or desire. Out of this com-
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plex ancient semantic fi eld, Boquet argues, a new Christian conception 
of affectus emerges in the fourth and fi fth centuries, one that is neither 
morally neutral nor seen simply as a problem to overcome. For Lactantius, 
affectus refers to the inclinations that can either cause the soul to err or can 
lead the soul to the Good. For Ambrose, affectus is a natural power of the 
soul, counterposed and cooperating with reason, which innately tends to-
ward the Good but is accidentally prone to disorder in its fallen state. As a 
principle of movement in the soul toward good or ill, affectus becomes the 
stage on which the drama of spiritual and moral transformation is enacted. 
Accordingly, late ancient theologians did not abandon the Stoic theory of 
the passions so much as they integrated it into a broader affective dynamic. 
With Augustine, all of the ancient valences of affectus—attachment, power, 
inclination, instinct, passion, perturbation—are drawn up into a scale of 
movements of the soul, more or less voluntary, but all subsumed under the 
category of the will. And yet, in linking affectus both with the movements 
of the rational will and with the unruly impulses of the sensitive appetite, 
Augustine doubly (and confusingly) determines affectus as both voluntary 
and corporeal. As Boquet summarizes, “In elaborating the concept of affect 
on the ruins of the ancient notion of passion, the Latin fathers of the fourth 
and fi fth centuries imputed both the faintest and the most commanding 
impulses of the soul to the heart of the will.”40 Late ancient theologians 
thereby imparted to medieval Christianity a comprehensive if somewhat 
confused conception of affectus.
While the narrative Boquet tells of the “emancipation” of medieval af-
fect from its ancient roots may at times be overly linear, his survey helpfully 
maps the semantic overdetermination of the term and its ambivalences. In 
early Christian usage, affectus may be involuntary or willed, rational or op-
posed to reason; it sometimes refers exclusively to love or attachment and 
sometimes to a whole range of affective states; it is both an active force 
within the soul and an external stimulus to which the soul is passive. These 
antinomies only become sharper in the later middle ages, and especially in 
the Cistercian writings of the twelfth century (what Jean Chatillon called 
the “siècle des affectus”).41 In his study of the spiritual senses, Gordon Rudy 
remarks on the range of meanings that Bernard of Clairvaux attaches to 
the term, meanings that resonate in Bonaventure’s writings: Affectus “refers 
most basically to a transforming infl uence on the order of grace, and also 
the human capacity or faculty for that infl uence . . . Bernard usually uses it 
to refer to our active capacity to desire and love, and our passive capacity 
to receive love.”42 Bernard McGinn points out that Bernard, like Anselm of 
Canterbury and many ancient authors, makes a distinction between affectio 
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and affectus. For Bernard, affectio is an active stimulus that produces an ef-
fect (i.e. an affectus) in a passive recipient of that stimulus. But as McGinn 
notes, there are sound theological reasons for the confusion between the 
active and passive senses: “Because the affectus given us by God’s prior love 
is the source of our own various affectiones, Bernard, William of St.  Thierry, 
and other Cistercians often used the terms interchangeably.”43 As Michael 
Casey observes, “Bernard used affectus equally for the fundamental dy-
namic principle within the human being and for the range of emotions and 
activities in which this underlying reality fi nds expression.”44 Casey sug-
gests that Bernard tended more toward descriptions of affective experience 
than toward technical accounts of the psychological dynamics of the soul. 
By contrast, many Cistercian authors devoted treatises to expounding the 
nature and capacities of the soul. Bernard’s friend William of St.  Thierry 
(d. 1148) wrote one of the several Cistercian treatises entitled De anima, 
and there and in other works, he gives detailed attention to the nature and 
dynamics of affectus. (I discuss one of these treatises, On the Nature and 
Dignity of Love, in Chapter 3.) For William, affectus has both human and di-
vine aspects: In human beings it tends toward goodness, while in its divine 
aspects it is the Holy Spirit working within the soul. The transformation 
of the soul into the unitas spiritus in which the human will is conformed to 
God’s is, as Thomas Davis notes, affectus.45 Yet affectus can also refer to the 
virtues or various faculties of the soul, “a movement of piety, or percep-
tion, or faith, or hope, or love, or thought, or will, and so on.”46
Like the category of affective devotion, then, the medieval concept of 
affectus may seem so elastic, so capable of covering even contradictory 
psychic and spiritual phenomena, as to stretch beyond meaningfulness or 
analytical value. For medieval Christian authors, however, the opposite 
was true. The very ambiguities of the concept pointed to its dynamism 
and thus placed it at the center of twelfth-century spiritual arts. Between 
wickedness and beatitude, passion and action, the body and the intellect, 
affectus provided an explanatory mechanism and a practical means for the 
interior and communal transformations at the heart of twelfth-century re-
ligious reforms.
In this way, the semantic overdeterminations of medieval affectus wit-
ness the equally overdetermined ontology of the concept that the term 
seeks to represent; but this may suggest the way to approach it as a subject 
of historical and theological inquiry. In short, there is no simple answer to 
what affect is. Not only will no single model or defi nition of affect cover 
all cases, but any single defi nition will be inadequate to the ambiguities 
involved in any particular instance of the concept in medieval Christian 
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literature. Rather than offering a singular defi nition, then, I instead want 
to consider what work the discourse of affectus performed for medieval au-
thors. What I will suggest is that from the thirteenth-century, for inter-
preters of Dionysius and authors of meditational treatises (and those who, 
like Bonaventure, were both), affectus provided a means of representing the 
limits of human agency, cognition, and representation itself. My reading of 
Bonaventure contends that for medieval devotional and mystical texts, the 
resistance of affect to defi nition is constitutive of the rhetorical, theoreti-
cal, and theological work that it does.
Modeling Affect in Medieval History
To approach medieval Christian articulations of affectus as resistant to defi -
nition is to quit the search for an appropriate “model” through which to 
constitute affect and emotion as objects of historical inquiry. Historians 
and anthropologists in the past twenty years have sought better models by 
which to account for emotions not as transhistorical givens but as socially 
and culturally contingent, learned habits that change over time. William 
Reddy’s 2001 study, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of 
Emotions, offers just such a model—a programmatic statement about how 
to read expressions of emotion and analyze “emotional regimes” in their 
historical and cultural specifi city.47 For Reddy, however, the ability to his-
toricize particular emotional regimes depends on recourse to “universal 
features” of human emotion. He thus positions his framework as a correc-
tive to what he sees as the excesses of social constructionist explanations 
of emotion.48 “If emotional change is to be something other than random 
drift, it must result from interaction between our emotional capacities and 
the unfolding of historical circumstances.”49 Those capacities include, ac-
cording to the anthropological and psychological research that Reddy crit-
ically appropriates, the “overlearned cognitive habits” by which individuals 
coordinate effort toward particular goals.50 Crucial for Reddy’s theoretical 
model is an understanding of emotion as a domain of effort for individu-
als in any society: the management of emotions is central to the project 
of the self. Identifying emotions as a project allows Reddy to distinguish 
mental states and habits from the tools by which one manages those states. 
Among those tools are what he terms “emotives”—speech acts that are 
both descriptive and performative. This concept of emotives avoids both 
a credulous expressionism (wherein textual and cultural traces are read as 
self-interpreting expressions of interior states) and a fl attening construc-
tionism that, in Reddy’s view, surrenders the political ground from which 
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particular emotional regimes might be evaluated and critiqued. In other 
words, emotives are linguistic tools that describe emotions even as they 
produce and shape them.
In Reddy’s hands, this framework for reading emotives and chronicling 
historical change proves to be a powerful and supple tool when employed 
in his analysis of Revolutionary France. An understanding of emotions as 
a domain of effort and cultivation would seem similarly well-suited to the 
study of medieval Christian mysticism, and in particular what Niklaus Lar-
gier has called (albeit according to a different theoretical framework) the 
art of sensory and emotional stimulation developed in medieval devotional 
literature.51 Sarah McNamer’s study discussed earlier, for example, follows 
the outlines of Reddy’s approach. Compassion in the context of meditation 
on Christ’s passion, McNamer argues, served a very specifi c social func-
tion, providing religious women with a tool for achieving recognition in 
their vocation. McNamer’s intervention is therefore organized around the 
search for a motive for the cultivation of particular emotional complexes 
as a corrective to a historiographical naivety that accepts emotional utter-
ances in texts as straightforward expressions of interiority.52
Analysis of the social, rhetorical, and performative dimensions of com-
passion in medieval texts is helpful insofar as a rigorous theorization of 
performativity offers a way in which to understand the means by which 
signs (here including emotions and devotional acts) may circulate without 
imputing those signs to intentional subjects or to an uncritical notion of 
rational agency. McNamer’s phrase for the affective techniques of late me-
dieval Passion devotion, “intimate scripts,” suggests the ways in which reli-
gious emotions were both interiorly felt and simultaneously determined by 
a larger matrix of culture, language, and gender expectations in medieval 
European society.53
In her 2002 essay “Worrying About Emotions in History,” the medie-
valist historian Barbara Rosenwein extends the cognitive and anthropolog-
ical approaches on which Reddy draws in order to expose the persistence of 
what she calls the “hydraulic” model of emotions—a nineteenth-century 
view of emotions as a kind of undifferentiated substance that must be either 
released or repressed.54 While acknowledging that this model has roots in 
medieval theories of the humors, she pins the persistence of the hydraulic 
model in modernity primarily on Freud, as well as on Darwin. In this pro-
grammatic essay and in her further research into what she calls “emotional 
communities” in medieval European culture, Rosenwein works to disman-
tle the stubborn characterization of the middle ages as an unenlightened 
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age of unchecked emotion—the prejudice that medieval affect was both 
purer and more puerile than its modern counterpart.
The work of Reddy, Rosenwein, and others working within the para-
digm of the “history of emotions” has initiated a greater critical awareness 
of the historical specifi city of emotion— one that understands affectivity 
not as a physiological given, but as a contextually specifi c medium of so-
cial politics for the varied performance of gendered, cultural, and religious 
identifi cations. Yet in arguing for the historical specifi city of particular 
emotional complexes, the “history of emotions” risks losing sight of the 
historical variability of the very concepts of “emotion” and “affectivity” 
themselves. A model that understands emotions as “among the tools with 
which we manage social life as a whole” has the advantage of analytical 
fl exibility: These tools can function differently in different contexts, and as 
responses to particular social and historical exigencies.55 But the assump-
tion that emotions are tools or strategies may be primarily refl ective of 
contemporary concerns about the rational effi cacy of emotions, and may 
thus risk failing to attend to the complex ways that affectivity has been un-
derstood and embodied historically in different cultural situations. When 
a historical emotion is explained by way of concrete motive, the concept 
of performativity as a lens through which to understand the overdetermina-
tion and circulation of particular emotional regimes is in danger of collaps-
ing into a simple notion of performance, wherein emotions become means 
of exercising rational agency toward a determinate goal.
Surveying and critiquing recent theoretical efforts to “recuperate” emo-
tion as a valuable means of social and political intervention, Sara Ahmed 
writes, “Within contemporary culture, emotions may even be represented 
as good or better than thought, but only insofar as they are re-presented as 
a form of intelligence, as ‘tools’ that can be used by subjects in the project 
of life and career enhancement. If good emotions are cultivated, and are 
worked on and towards, then they remain defi ned against uncultivated or 
unruly emotions, which frustrate the formation of the competent self.”56 
Bringing Ahmed’s point to bear on the historiography of medieval emo-
tion, we might ask if the project of exposing the social and political func-
tions of historical emotions participates (albeit from a very different per-
spective) in the same framework of “good” and “bad” emotions by which 
earlier generations of scholarship disparaged the emotionalism of medi-
eval cultures. Rosenwein’s essay roundly rejects the enterprise of sorting 
out salubrious and destructive emotions in medieval history, and argues 
against the periodization of Western history on the basis of an emotional 
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 maturation at a societal level. Nevertheless, distinguishing between good 
and bad models of emotion (wherein the good model is informed by con-
temporary anthropology and cognitive science) would seem to recapitulate 
the triumph of modern rationality over medieval emotionalism. Here, a 
modern theory of emotion reveals a truth that medieval understandings of 
affect obscure. Medieval emotions can accordingly be regarded as “good” 
only when they are construed as rational, strategic, goal-oriented activity.
Yet, as Thomas Dixon has demonstrated in his history of the concept 
of emotion, the English-language term is of relatively recent coinage.57 
It emerged, Dixon argues, in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century and 
came into widespread use in the second half. For moral philosophers and, 
later, evolutionary psychologists, the term “emotion” was useful as a prop-
erly secular alternative to a wide array of then-current terms such as “pas-
sions,” “affections,” “sentiments,” and “appetites”—all of which, Dixon 
maintains, carried religious and theological baggage that threatened the 
scientifi city of the emerging fi eld of psychology in the late nineteenth 
century. Similarly, Michel de Certeau traces the exile of the “passions” 
from social and scientifi c discourses and their relegation to the literary 
sphere in the same period.58 If this historical genealogy is correct, then us-
ing “emotion” as the lens through which to analyze premodern Christian 
texts in historical terms carries with it a number of disadvantages. In the 
fi rst place, we fl atten a complex and highly developed vocabulary into a 
single, imprecise term. And second, we run the risk of naturalizing “emo-
tion” as a transhistorical given. As Kurt Danzinger observes with respect 
to the historical use of psychological categories, “The use of contemporary 
terms [to analyze premodern texts and practices] strongly suggests that 
the objects of current psychological discourse are the real, natural objects 
and that past discourse necessarily referred to the same objects in its own 
quaint and subscientifi c way.”59 Moreover, taking the category of emotion 
as the lens through which to examine premodern Christian texts and prac-
tices may participate in, or reinscribe, the secularization of affectivity that 
Dixon traces. As a historiographical lens, emotion would then be a tool for 
ignoring what is irreducibly religious about religious affects, functioning 
as what Dipesh Chakrabarty analyzes as the scientifi c “higher language” 
that is presumed in every case to mediate historically contingent and cul-
turally specifi c idioms.60
If Dixon is right that the emergence of the category of emotion repre-
sented a secularizing strategy of the nineteenth century, then it is perhaps 
especially ill-suited as an analytical category for the project of understand-
ing medieval religiosity— or for understanding the theological genealogies 
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of secular scientifi c concepts. Late medieval Christian writers may have 
had nothing to say about “emotion” as such, but they wrote and refl ected at 
length on “affectus”—a complex term with deep psychological, physical, 
and theological resonances that still sound in contemporary invocations 
and experiences of affect and emotion alike.
In its efforts to rehabilitate affectivity from the judgment of irrational-
ity, the study of medieval emotion has disregarded an aspect of how affec-
tivity has been conceived in most periods of Western thought— one that 
is often considered painfully obvious. For from the standpoint of medieval 
writers, no less than in the routine confessions of contemporary clichés 
(the now-inert distillations of centuries of experience and refl ection), af-
fections such as love and fear are what move us—they push and pull us to 
act, make us cling to what we love and fl ee from what we fear. Affection 
is a word that describes the way things are affected—not just the way we 
touch others but also the ways we are touched, acted, and impinged upon. 
To undertake the historiography of medieval affectivity from the assump-
tion that emotions are only tools for managing individual, collective, and 
political life is not merely anachronistic; it misses what makes the affective 
so unsettling and so potent for medieval Christian practice and theological 
refl ection on that practice.
Representing Affect
The perceived need to attend to the “more” of affect—affect as autotelic 
excess, non-conscious force, and asignifying intensity—has animated a 
number of philosophers and cultural and literary theorists over the past 
twenty years, often under the (suspiciously singular) banner of what is gen-
erally termed “affect theory.” Writers taking up the mantle of affect theory 
position themselves variously as participating in a departure from several 
late-twentieth-century intellectual occupations: the arrest of play in struc-
turalist analyses, the fi xed and reductive narratives of psychoanalytic the-
ory, the exhaustion of the humanities in the critique of ideology, and the 
supposed oblivion of materiality in poststructuralist critiques within which 
everything collapses into discourse.
In the two sprawling volumes of their Capitalism and Schizophrenia proj-
ect, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seek to redeploy the Spinozist con-
cept of affect as an increase or decrease in a body’s capacity for action 
(or passion). Spinoza defi nes affect, at once corporeal and ideational, as 
that which is always determining anew (without closing) the question of 
what a body can do. For Brian Massumi (Deleuze and Guattari’s English 
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translator), attending to and reanimating this corporeal and dynamic con-
cept of affect for cultural and literary studies means keeping it rigorously 
distinct (at least analytically) from the concept of emotion. If affect is a 
non-subjective, pre-personal intensity, by contrast, “an emotion is a sub-
jective content, the sociolinguistic fi xing of the quality of an experience 
which is from that point onward defi ned as personal.”61 Thus emotion is 
the qualifi cation of—that is, the subjective appropriation of and assigning 
of signifi cation to—intensity. As Massumi puts it, emotion is “intensity 
owned and recognized.”62 This distinction between affect and emotion is 
both real and analytical for Massumi, insofar as distinguishing the terms 
allows him to account more precisely for the emergence of emotion from 
that which always exceeds and escapes it.
In this way, for Massumi and the many theorists infl uenced by him, affect 
comes to mark the place of the immanent other of consciousness, cognition, 
and volition. As Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg defi ne it, “affect, at 
its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces—visceral 
forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious  knowing, vital 
forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward move-
ment, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if 
in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that 
can even leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.”63 
In light of such declarations, it is not surprising that critics (most notably, 
Ruth Leys) have charged affect theory with depending on a crude dual-
ism that pits cognition, signifi cation, and language against affect, intensity, 
and viscerality—and that champions the latter set as somehow in itself 
politically and ethically salutary.64 Such a move, it has been argued, reifi es 
a disembodied notion of cognition and results, ironically, in a static and 
homogenous view of affect.
More recently, Eugenie Brinkema, while embracing “the passions of af-
fect studies,” criticizes the tendency of affect theory to fl atten the varied and 
particular ways affects function at a formal level in fi lm and texts, reducing 
this diversity to nothing more than a “vague, shuddering intensity.”65
There is a formula for work on affect, and it turns on a set of shared 
terms: speed, violence, agitation, pressures, forces, intensities. In other 
words, and against much of the spirit of Deleuze’s philosophy, which 
celebrated the minor, the changeable, and the multiple, Deleuzian 
theories of affect offer all repetition with no difference. When affect is 
taken as a synonym for violence or force (or intensity or sensation), one 
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can only speak of its most abstract agitations instead of any particular 
textual workings.66
Responding to an anti-formalism in fi lm theory that has styled itself as a 
“turn” to affect, Brinkema offers the sustained and persuasive rejoinder 
that turning to affect need not (and should not) mean turning away from 
careful attention to form. Her intervention extends itself beyond fi lm 
studies to other fi elds within the humanities. At the outset, she poses a 
series of rhetorical questions: “Insofar as affect has been positioned as what 
resists systematicity and structure, has it in fact been able to recover no-
tions of contingency, possibility, and play? Has the turning toward affect 
in the theoretical humanities engendered a more complex understanding 
of texts? Have accounts of affects produced more nuanced, delightful in-
terpretations of forms in texts—and have they recovered the dimension of 
being surprised by representation?”67
The presumptive answer to each of these questions is no. Or, at least, 
not yet, as the rest of the book makes the case for (and productively em-
ploys) practices of close reading and formal analysis to nuance and inform 
theories of affect. The work of attending to specifi c affective forms, to ac-
counting for the various permutations of particular affects and emotions, is 
no doubt ongoing, and we should expect it to be inexhaustible. In analyz-
ing affects as something other than expressions of subjective interiority, 
Brinkema carries on the work that Massumi and others sought to initiate 
by way of positing a distinction between affect and emotion. However, 
her project also self-avowedly breaks with Massumi’s, insofar as the latter 
remains dependent on a visceral embodied subject capable of registering 
affective intensities, whereas Brinkema seeks to attend to affects as them-
selves representational forms.
As in Leys’s critique, then, for Brinkema, affect theory is errant insofar 
as it turns on an absolute separation of affect from signifi cation, one that 
renders the theory incapable of providing textured accounts of particular 
affects. And indeed it is diffi cult to understand what Massumi’s “asignifying 
philosophy of affect” would mean (presumably, it would mean nothing, or 
would prefer not to mean).68 At the very least, there is surely a tension in 
the point at which Massumi, on a single page, both declares that “intensity 
is the unassimilable” and advises that “much could be gained by integrat-
ing the dimension of intensity into cultural theory.”69 Yet, while the inte-
gration of the unassimilable would seem to be a defi nitionally impossible 
task, the challenge has been taken up, more or less explicitly, by literary 
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and cultural theorists such as Lauren Berlant and Kathleen Stewart—to 
take two of the most luminous examples.70 In these works, affect theory 
becomes an occasion not for fl ights of theoretical fancy but for developing 
new modes of observation and description. For example, Stewart describes 
her “fi cto-critical” experiment as an attempt “to slow the quick jump to 
representational thinking and evaluative critique long enough to fi nd ways 
of approaching the complex and uncertain objects that fascinate because 
they literally hit us or exert a pull on us. My effort here is not to fi nally 
‘know’ them—to collect them into a good enough story of what’s going 
on—but to fashion some form of address that is adequate to their form; to fi nd 
something to say about ordinary affects by performing some of the inten-
sity and texture that makes them habitable and animate.”71 Stewart’s book 
is a proleptic “yes” to Brinkema’s questions as to the creative effi cacy of 
affect theory. As if responding to Massumi’s call for a “cultural-theoretical 
vocabulary specifi c to affect,”72 Stewart seeks a new form of analysis for 
that which resists analysis. The wager is that the move to distinguish affect 
from signifi cation might be generative of new forms of signifi cation proper 
to affect. And as Stewart’s textured and surprising vignettes demonstrate, if 
shifts in affective intensity are somehow unknowable per se, they neverthe-
less form part of the structure of everyday perception and action and thus 
may yield to properly attuned observation and description. The integra-
tion of affect into literary, cultural, and anthropological analysis begins 
with the recognition of a something that resists assimilation to knowledge 
even as that “something” is a condition of possibility for knowledge.
Likewise, a tactical distinction between affect and emotion, such as that 
which Massumi draws, may help to enrich explorations into the medieval 
representations of emotions by calling attention to the rhetorical dynamics 
of affect that are missed when one’s analysis focuses narrowly on particular 
emotion-words or emotional presentations in medieval texts. And this is 
all the more the case when the concept of “emotion” in view assumes the 
unity of the cognizing and volitional self that mystical texts aim to dis-
rupt and transform. Yet defi ning affect against emotion risks reforging the 
link between the latter term and subjectivity that the theorization of affect 
works to unseat. Rei Terada critiques modern instances of the assump-
tion that emotion “requires”—i.e., can only be understood as a function 
of—the self-presence of conscious intentionality. Like Brinkema, Terada 
works to develop, through close readings of Jacques Derrida and Paul de 
Man, a theory of affectivity as a textual effect rather than as an expression 
of a subject. Though Terada takes up the term “emotion,” she seeks to 
redraw its semantic scope in relation to its other, affect (or feeling). Not-
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ing the emphasis on the ideational and judicative functions of emotion in 
Anglo-American philosophy since 1950, Terada shows how the distinc-
tion between affect (the empirically observable, nonconscious effects of a 
stimulus in or on a body) and emotion (the intentional articulations of a 
subject) is in many ways a transposition of Edmund Husserl’s distinction 
between indicative and expressive signs. Where indication is only an exter-
nal mark or a trace—a pawprint in the sand, a scar on fl esh—an expres-
sion is a meaningful, volitional utterance of an idea formed and intended 
in the interior nonspace of a self-present subject. As Terada notes, though 
Husserl does not develop a “theory of emotion” as such, “emotions ap-
pear to be exemplary inner contents” because theories of emotion have 
long relied on a concept of expression, “with the result that emotions have 
had to become ‘cognitive’ in order to fi t those theories.”73 Terada thus 
extends Derrida’s reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena to offer her 
own critique of expressive theories of emotion. In Derrida’s reading of 
Husserl, soliloquy—the inner voice representing itself addressing itself—
is the fable that embodies the reality of self-presence: The experience of 
subjective interiority is an effect of the non-identity of the self to itself. 
Feeling (or emotion) is possible only because of the impossibility of imme-
diate self-presence: “Emotion demands virtual self-difference—an extra 
‘you.’ ”74 As an effect of representation, emotion can therefore never be 
simply an object of representation. Through a reading of Derrida’s reading 
of Rousseau (too intricate to retrace here), Terada develops a conception 
of emotion as “the difference between subjective ideality and the external 
world, appearing within experience.”75 Emotion is never just a mark, not 
simply or fully a corporeal effect; in Husserlian terms, emotion is no more 
an indication than it is an expression. Terada thus rejects the dichotomy 
between affect (as external, nonconscious, corporeal trace) and emotion 
(as intentional, ideational content) in favor of an understanding of affec-
tive experience as difference. Terada’s term for this Derridean account of 
emotion is “textuality”—the representation of emotion by “traces in a dif-
ferential network.”76
While Terada goes on to critique Deleuze’s account of affect as dis-
pensing altogether with experience, her reading of Derridean emotion-as-
textuality has affi nities with aspects of Massumi and Stewart—insofar as 
affect functions not so much as the proper name of an ineffable, visceral 
quantum, but rather to describe the play of differences between representa-
tion and its object, marking the inadequacy of representation. Yet where 
the post-Deleuzian celebration of affect as nonconscious intensity risks 
leaving intact the subjective concept of emotion (emotion as “intensity 
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owned and recognized,” to recur to Massumi’s formulation), Terada’s Der-
ridean reading offers an alternative to the depth model in which affect is 
the corporeal substrate of a personal, subjective experience (emotion).
I contend that such an account of affective experience— one that does 
not assume a unifi ed, self-transparent subject—is a useful interpretive 
idiom through which to approach the seemingly paradoxical experience 
of dispossession that medieval mystical texts describe. The analyses of the 
following chapters draw on this idiom to offer an interpretation of Bona-
venture’s place within the history of Christian mysticism. The school of 
mystical theology associated with Bonaventure has sometimes been seen as 
an attempt to domesticate the radicality of Dionysian apophasis by re intro-
duc ing knowledge, under a different name, into the darkness of union. 
This book advances a different view: affectus for Bonaventure structures a 
rhetorical strategy of unsaying that marks the place of an immanent excess 
in language and thereby attempts to account for human beings’ capacity to 
experience an unknowable God.
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c h a p t e r  1
The Seraphic Doctrine: 
Love and Knowledge 
in the Dionysian Hierarchy
Contemporary debates about the autonomy of affect resurrect medieval 
questions about the relationship of the faculties of intellect and affect. 
Then as now, thinking people disagreed about the degree to which af-
fect operated independently of cognition, and the relative value of each 
to the examined life. Then as now, the disagreements could become acri-
monious.1 The nature of affect and its relationship to the intellectual fac-
ulty was a primary concern for the medieval interpreters of the corpus 
of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whose writings were formative for 
medieval mystical thought and practice. Dionysius’s small but infl uential 
corpus discusses the inadequacy of all forms of address to the divine be-
yond being and language, describes the ascent of the mind beyond knowl-
edge in union with God, and advances a hierarchical cosmology of nine 
ranks of angels mirrored in the ranks of ecclesiastical offi ces. The twelfth- 
and  thirteenth-century Latin interpretations of these works, especially 
the program of ascent in the Mystical Theology and the angelic specula-
tions of the Celestial Hierarchy, are rich sources for examining the place 
of affect in later medieval Western Christian devotion and mysticism. Yet 
these sources have been largely neglected in recent studies of late medieval 
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 affective  meditation, the literary and spiritual practices of popular Chris-
tian devotion seemingly far removed from the esoteric mystical theology 
and angelology of Dionysius. But it was through this theological frame-
work that devotional writers theorized the practices that their texts pre-
scribed. Because the celestial hierarchy was understood to be mirrored in 
the visible realm, Dionysius’s seemingly obscure speculations on the ranks 
of angels in fact revealed for medieval Christians the nature of the mate-
rial world and humans’ place within it. For the Dionysian interpreters of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, above all Bon a ven ture, the Seraph, 
the six-winged angel who occupied the highest and most intimate place 
in the hierarchy and who came to be associated with ardent love, was a 
crucial interpretive topos in debates about the value of affect and intellect 
in the devotional life and path to union with God.
This chapter provides historical context for the readings of Bon a ven-
ture to follow in subsequent chapters by narrating Bon a ven ture’s role in 
the development of what has been referred to as the affective misreading of 
Dionysius—an understanding of mystical theology based on the writings 
of Dionysius the Areopagite that privileges unitive love over intellectual 
activity through an association of the Seraph with love. Though Bon a-
ven ture’s debts to Dionysius are frequently noted, he receives surprisingly 
little attention in broader histories of medieval Latin Dionysius scholar-
ship.2 Unlike Hugh of St. Victor, Thomas Gallus, Robert Grosseteste, 
Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, Bon a ven ture did not produce 
commentaries on the Dionysian texts. Yet the cosmology and mystical 
theology of Dionysius (as refracted chiefl y through the commentaries of 
the Victorine Thomas Gallus) were so integral to Bon a ven ture’s thought 
that he deserves to be counted among the most important proponents of 
Dionysian theology in the thirteenth century. And if, as I will argue in 
Chapter 5, Bon a ven ture’s vita of Francis itself is thoroughly marked by his 
understanding of Dionysian ascent, then, given the widespread infl uence 
of that text for later medieval mysticism, Bon a ven ture occupies a crucial 
place in the history of later medieval piety, translating a program of mysti-
cal ascent through unknowing into an embodied example of ecstatic piety 
in imitation of Christ. Placing Bon a ven ture within this interpretive tradi-
tion allows us to see Bon a ven ture’s account of the soul’s movement toward 
and union with God as a theologically rigorous claim about the nature of 
love. This requires not simply parsing the relevant terms (affectus, intel-
lectus, cognitio, et al.) but also asking what work the distinctions between 
various modes of union and aspects of the soul perform.
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The Seraph in the Dionysian Hierarchy
While the writings of Dionysius were not entirely unknown to Latin theo-
logians in the early middle ages, they were not available in Latin until the 
ninth century, when the abbot Hilduin translated the corpus given by the 
Byzantine emperor to Louis the Pious in 827. In the translation and com-
mentary of the ninth-century theologian John Scotus Eriugena, and again 
in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century schools through the translation of 
the Victorine John Sarrazen, the Dionysian corpus exercised a profound 
infl uence on medieval Christian thought in the West. Drawing deeply on 
the language of scripture and the fi fth-century Neoplatonist philosopher 
Proclus, Dionysius describes the ascent of the mind to God and the draw-
ing of all things into God by the means of a hierarchy of ecclesial and ce-
lestial ranks. Of particularly wide infl uence was Dionysius’s conception of 
a ninefold angelic hierarchy by which all things are purifi ed, illumined, and 
perfected so that they come to resemble God as closely as possible.
By the thirteenth century, many readers would fi nd in the Latin transla-
tions of Dionysius’s writings a program of ascent through contemplation 
that culminated in a loving intimacy with God that penetrates deeper than 
knowledge. Such a conception is not to be found explicitly in the Diony-
sian corpus. But the traditional association of the Seraphim (who occupy 
the most intimate position to God in the Dionysian celestial hierarchy) 
with love or affection provided a crucial exegetical hinge. With this post-
Dionysian association of the Seraphim with love, the Dionysian ascent to a 
state beyond knowing could be seen to culminate in a divine union charac-
terized by the sharing of love between God and the soul.
Dionysius’s own writings, however, never associate the Seraph specifi -
cally with love. In the Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius gives the etymology of 
the term “Seraphim” as “carriers of warmth” (thermainontēs) and explains 
that the name signifi es
a perennial circling around the divine things, penetrating warmth, the 
overfl owing heat of a movement which never falters and never fails, 
a capacity to stamp their own image on subordinates by arousing and 
uplifting in them too a like fl ame, the same warmth. It means also the 
power to purify by means of the lightning fl ash and the fl ame. It means 
the ability to hold unveiled and undiminished both the light they have 
and the illumination they give out. It means the capacity to push aside 
and to do away with every obscuring shadow.3
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For Dionysius, the fi re that characterizes the Seraphim is the dynamism 
of hierarchy: Burning, it purifi es; fl ashing, it illuminates; and heating, it 
unites and perfects. All three of these Seraphic operations are ordered to-
ward the goal of every hierarchy: “to enable beings to be as like as pos-
sible to God and to be at one with him.”4 The Seraphim, who with the 
Cherubim and the Thrones enjoy the closest likeness and proximity to 
God, conform and unite beings to God in the manner of a purifying and 
elevating fi re.
Though all orders of angels purify, illumine, and perfect (and in this 
way unite all beings to God), Dionysius suggests that the characteristics 
of Seraphic fi re are somehow exemplary of the hierarchic operations as 
a whole. The properties of fi re, at least, provide a fi tting solution to the 
exegetical problem presented by the biblical appearance of the Seraph in 
Isaiah 6:6. In this passage, the Seraph is depicted as touching the prophet’s 
lips with a live coal plucked from the burning altar. It was on the basis of 
this passage that the Seraph was understood to purify, and the live coal 
helped to cement the association of the Seraph’s purifying activity with 
fi re. But at the same time, the scene seems to violate the hierarchic order, 
insofar as the highest order of intermediaries, rather than one of the lower 
ranks of angels, appears to a human being.
The author considers a number of credible solutions to the problem. 
It is possible, he writes, that by the term “Seraphim” the scriptures mean 
only to signify the purifying operation by means of fi re—and that the an-
gel who visited the prophet was in fact of a lower order. He goes on then 
to consider another, more profound explanation. In this case, the quali-
ties of Seraphic fi re are taken to explain the nature of the entire celestial 
hierarchy. What a hierarchy is, according to this explanation, is a series of 
refl ections and transmissions of the light and warmth of the highest order, 
just as “the rays of the sun pass easily through the front line of matter since 
it is more translucent than all the others.” But the subsequent layers of 
matter are more opaque and thus transmit less and less of the sun’s light: 
“Similarly, the heat of fi re passes more easily into those entities which are 
good conductors, more receptive and in fact quite like it.”5
Yet this is not a mere simile for Dionysius, but an instance of the “har-
monious law that operates throughout nature” and that reigns in the ce-
lestial hierarchy just as it does in the material realm. What every inter-
mediary mediates is, in fact, the light and warmth of God.6 Because this 
light and warmth is most fully refl ected and absorbed in the highest 
order of the Seraphim, its manifestation in the lower orders of the hier-
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archy is identifi ed most fully with those beings of the highest ranks. In 
an extraordinary ascent of contemplation, then, Isaiah was able to see, in 
a manner of speaking, the highest orders of angels through the transpar-
ency of the hierarchy and the immediate presence of God throughout 
that hierarchy. And Isaiah’s “vision” occurred both because of the self-
 diffusive nature of the light and warmth of God and the uplifting power 
of fi re—whereby the Seraphim make all things godlike through an “end-
less, marvelous upward thrust toward God,” signifi ed by the beating of 
their intermediate wings. Thus, in Dionysius’s own cosmology, the Ser-
aphim enjoy a preeminent position not just in the angelic ranks but in 
the deifying thermodynamics of hierarchy. For Dionysius, the prophet’s 
uplifting is intellectual: “the sacred theologian was uplifted to a concep-
tual knowledge [noētēn] of the things seen.”7 Explicitly connecting this se-
raphic uplifting to Dionysius’s erotic cosmology would be the work of later 
interpreters.
Dionysius in the West
As Paul Rorem has shown, the increasing emphasis on the role of affectiv-
ity in Dionysian union among a number of twelfth- and thirteenth- century 
theologians was not the result of a single interpretive decision.8 The asso-
ciation of the Seraphim not only with fi re broadly conceived, but more 
specifi cally with the fi re of love, appears in Christian literature throughout 
late ancient and early medieval Christian writings. Long before the Diony-
sian corpus found its way to the Frankish court and into Latin translation, 
theologians in the west already knew the name of Dionysius and had some 
exposure to his celestial hierarchy. Though he likely had no direct knowl-
edge of the corpus,9 Gregory the Great’s homily 34 on Luke 15 includes a 
discussion of the angelic ranks—and a nod to Dionysius—that exercised 
a great infl uence in later medieval angelology. There Gregory gives an 
extended refl ection on the fi ery and desirous nature of the Seraphim.10 
However, he does not impute love to the Seraphim to the exclusion of 
the other orders. The distinction between Seraphim and Cherubim is not 
based on the distinction between love and knowledge (a distinction that 
Gregory took pains to complicate), but rather on different modes of love. 
Citing Romans 13:10 (“love is the fullness of the law”), Gregory offers an 
etymology for the term “Cherubim” as meaning “fullness of knowledge” 
(plenitudo scientiae) and notes that the Cherubim are “full of love [dilectione] 
for God and their neighbor.”11
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This passage would seem to be the source for Bernard of Clairvaux’s 
discussion of the angels in his nineteenth sermon on the Song of Songs. 
Concerning the Seraphim, Bernard writes:
God, who is love, has so drawn and absorbed them into himself, and so 
seized for himself their ardor of holy affection, that they seem to be one 
spirit with God, just as, when fi re infl ames the air and imprints all of 
its own heat, the air assumes the color of the fi re so that it appears not 
just to be ignited, but to be fi re itself. The Cherubim love especially to 
contemplate God’s knowledge which is without limit, but the Sera-
phim love the charity that never passes away. Hence they derive their 
names from that in which they are seen to be preeminent: “Cherubim” 
denotes the fullness of knowledge, but those called “Seraphim” are 
burning or enkindled.12
The association of the Seraphim with ardent love echoes Gregory’s homily, 
and Bernard’s list of the nine angelic ranks is identical to the one Gregory 
supplies. Yet with Bernard’s homily, the distinction between the Seraphim 
and the Cherubim begins to harden along the axis of love and knowledge. 
Of the Cherubim, Bernard mentions only their self-suffi ciency in gazing 
on the wisdom and knowledge of Christ. Where the Cherubim look upon 
God with knowledge, the Seraphim adhere to God as one spirit in love.13
Even so, it would be easy to overstate the distinction Bernard makes 
here between knowledge and love, as the lesson of the sermon is that the 
righteous love of the angels of every rank is grounded in knowledge. He 
glosses the “young maidens” (adulescentulae) of Song of Songs 1:2 as those 
human beings who are fi lled with love for God, because they have just 
begun to receive God’s “outpouring” or infusion of love. By contrast, the 
nine angelic orders love God according to their modes of understanding 
and according to their more perfect knowledge of him. Far from a hymn 
to Seraphic love beyond knowing, Bernard’s sermon draws a reproachful 
contrast between well-ordered angelic love based on knowledge and the 
misguided zeal of effusive love that causes new recruits to religious life, the 
adulescentulae, to err in intemperate self-sacrifi ce. Thus his description of 
the Seraphic “ardor of affection” is put to the service of cooling the fi res 
of ecstatic love in his listeners. Yet Bernard, too, would be cited in support 
of the “affective reading” of Dionysius intent on stoking those same fi res. 
It is a witness to the complexity and the fl uidity of the medieval Christian 
concept of affectus that Bernard’s use of Seraphic imagery to condemn in-
temperate fervor among spiritual beginners became an auctoritas for a de-
scription of loving union with God from which knowledge was excluded.
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The Dionysian Revival at St. Victor
If there was a Dionysian renaissance in twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
Paris, the abbey school of St. Victor was its cradle. Among the works on 
Dionysius by fi gures associated with the school, none were perhaps as fate-
ful as Hugh of St. Victor’s commentary on Eriugena’s translation of the 
Celestial Hierarchy. Hugh offers an explication of Dionysius’s anagogy ac-
cording to a scholastic organization of knowledge that recalls his own Di-
dascalicon. And he interprets Dionysius’s refl ections on clothing of divine 
truth in symbols according to his own distinction between the work of 
creation (opus conditionis) and the work of restoration (opus restaurationis).14 
In discussing the ranks of angels, Hugh interprets the preeminence of the 
Seraphim over the Cherubim as an affi rmation of the superiority of love 
to knowledge in union. Hugh so orders love and knowledge hierarchically 
on the basis of Eriugena’s comment that the motion of the Seraphim is 
warm because it is infl amed with charity.15 Around the same time as Hugh 
produced his gloss on the Celestial Hierarchy, John Sarrazen, also a Vic-
torine, made a new and complete translation of the Greek corpus, upon 
which the commentaries of Thomas Gallus (d. 1246)—a regular canon 
who taught at St. Victor in the fi rst quarter of the thirteenth century—are 
based.16 Though Gallus did not produce his commentaries while in Paris, 
the school of St. Victor was a major center of textual production for the 
reception of Dionysius in the West, and Gallus’s study of Dionysius surely 
began there.17
Whether all of these works bear enough in common theologically to 
qualify as a discretely “Victorine” phenomenon is another question. Csaba 
Németh argues that Gallus’s take is suffi ciently different from Hugh and 
Richard’s as to constitute a new tradition of Latin Dionysian thought rather 
than a development of the fi rst.18 Yet however one carves up the terrain, 
Gallus is a central fi gure in the intellectual landscape of thirteenth-century 
mystical theology. New research on and editions of Gallus’s work continue 
to revise our understanding of his signifi cance for later medieval mysticism 
and readings of Dionysius in particular. In 1219, Gallus left St. Victor to 
found the Abbey of St. Andrew at Vercelli in northern Italy— of which he 
would later become abbot and where he would, in the last decade of his life, 
produce his most important commentaries on the Dionysian corpus. At a 
minimum, these include the Extractio (an abridgment and paraphrase that 
Gallus composed in 1238 and which was subsequently included in most 
of the manuscripts of the Dionysian corpus that circulated in thirteenth-
century Paris19) and the longer Explanatio, an extensive gloss on Sarrazen’s 
F6909.indb   35 10/7/16   1:41:34 PM
36 The Seraphic Doctrine
translation of the corpus that Gallus produced between 1241 and 1244.20 
The sheer breadth of Gallus’s work secures his singular place in the history 
of Dionysian scholarship, but it is the depth and novelty of his reading of 
Dionysian ascent as an affective transformation toward union that left a de-
cisive mark on later Christian mystical theology, a mark perhaps nowhere 
more clearly legible than in the writings of Bon a ven ture. In the concept 
of an innate affective power by which the soul exceeds its own capacities 
(which Gallus and Bon a ven ture call synderesis), and in the association of 
this power with the rank of the Seraphim, Thomas Gallus furnished Bon-
a ven ture with the hermeneutical key to reading the exemplary life, vision, 
and embodied piety of Francis of Assisi.
Though the association of the Seraphim with ardor and with charity 
long preceded Thomas Gallus, he was, nevertheless, the fi rst to gloss the 
Dionysian state of unknowing explicitly as affective. As Boyd Coolman 
has observed, with the Extractio, “the very text of The Mystical Theology 
acquires an affective dimension” when Gallus writes that Moses was united 
to God through a union of love (per unitionem dilectionis).21 Yet Gallus is not 
attempting to deprecate knowledge as such. Ironically, by glossing the state 
of unknowing as affective, Gallus reintroduces knowledge into the Diony-
sian darkness, calling this loving union “effective of true cognition.”
In his Explanatio on the Mystical Theology, Gallus brings further specifi c-
ity to the ascent toward God by describing the capacity in the human soul 
for affective union—what he calls the principalis affectio, or the “spark of 
synderesis [scintilla synderesis] which alone is able to be united to the divine 
spirit.”22 He explains the spark of synderesis or the “principalis affectio” 
to be higher than the intellect, the highest cognitive force (summam uim 
cognitiuam). Gallus refers the reader to his gloss on Isaiah 6—where he 
identifi es the highest part of the soul, synderesis, with the fi gure of the 
Seraph. As the next chapter discusses more fully, Gallus’s notion of syn-
deresis as an affective capacity for ecstatic union plays an important role in 
Bon a ven ture’s psychology and account of union, even as Bon a ven ture sets 
this conception within a somewhat different context of ethical questions 
about conscientia and the will.
The affective associations of the Dionysian Seraph were crucial to the 
new interpretations of his corpus developed in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. But interest in the Seraph was by no means limited to the Dio-
nysian commentary tradition. Jacques de Vitry’s vita of the early Beguine 
Marie D’Oignies recounts that the holy woman, hating the wretchedness 
of her fl esh, cut out a piece of her body: “She had been so infl amed by an 
overwhelming fi re of love that she had risen above the pain of her wound 
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and, in this ecstasy of mind, she had seen one of the seraphim standing 
close by her.”23 Almost twenty years before Francis’s death, this episode 
from the life of Marie D’Oignies associates ecstasy, wounds, burning love, 
and a vision of the Seraph. While there is no fi rm evidence of infl uence on 
the Franciscan tradition, this episode clearly anticipates not only the later 
legend of Francis’s wounding, but also Bon a ven ture’s interpretation of it in 
terms of the branding “fi re of love.”24
Though Bon a ven ture—known since the fi rst half of the fourteenth 
century as Doctor Seraphicus25—does more to exploit the image of the Ser-
aph as a model of Franciscan devotion than anyone before him, he was not 
the fi rst to do so.26 The association of the Seraph with Francis’s stigmata 
has a long history in the legends of Francis’s life prior to Bon a ven ture’s 
account. It has traditionally been held that Francis’s vision was attested as 
early as the announcement of his death. However, as this source cannot be 
reliably dated to the year of Francis’s death in 1226, Wayne Hellmann has 
argued convincingly that Thomas of Celano’s Vita Prima (completed in 
1229) provides the earliest known mention of the Seraph’s appearance in 
Franciscan legend.27 Unlike later versions of the story, however, Thomas’s 
does not make the Seraph the agent of Francis’s wounds. In fact, the fi gure 
he describes is not really a Seraph, but a man with six wings “like a Ser-
aph.”28 In a later passage, Thomas returns to the six-winged fi gure of the 
Seraph, this time as a model of Franciscan piety: “We too can undoubtedly 
reach these things, if we extend two wings over our heads, as the Seraph 
did; that is to say, by having a pure intention and right conduct in all good 
works, according to the example of the blessed Francis . . .”29 The middle 
wings, outstretched, are the “twofold duty of charity” to one’s neighbor—
“refreshing his soul with the word of God and . . . sustaining his body 
with earthly help.”30 The lower wings, contrition and confession, clothe 
the body with restored innocence. In all of this, Thomas writes, the Se-
raphic model is Francis, who “bore the image and form of the Seraph” and 
“merited to fl y away to the sublime order of the spirits.”31
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a number of treatises on con-
templation found in the six-winged Cherub a convenient organizational 
scheme for the stages of ascent. These include Richard of St. Victor’s 
 Beniamin Maior and the anonymous De sex aliis cherubim, traditionally at-
tributed to Alan of Lille. Thomas’s transposition of the allegory from the 
Cherub onto the Seraph has little signifi cance insofar as the creature func-
tioned simply as a mnemonic or organizing device for a six-fold spiritual 
lesson.32 But by invoking the Seraphim, Thomas introduced into the story 
of Francis’s vision a Dionysian vision that Thomas himself left unexplored, 
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and which Bon a ven ture is the fi rst to fully develop. By making explicit the 
Dionysian resonances of Francis’s Seraphic vision (and the particular ways 
the Dionysian Seraph resonated in thirteenth-century Paris), Bon a ven ture 
gives fl esh to Dionysius’s mystical itinerary through love (eros, amor) to a 
union beyond knowledge in the exemplary life of the saint. While Bon a-
ven ture was not the fi rst to understand Dionysian union as a function of 
the affectus, he deploys and develops a conception of affectus that grounds 
Dionysian anagogy within the faculty psychology of the thirteenth-cen-
tury schools and provides the rationale for a program of imitation of and 
ascent to Christ through the exemplar of Francis.
At the culmination of that program of imitation and ascent, as Bon-
a ven ture describes it in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, the relationship 
between the intellect and affect emerges most pointedly as a problem. As 
I discuss further in Chapter 4, Bon a ven ture positions the Itinerarium as a 
kind of exegesis of Francis of Assisi’s vision of the Seraph, and describes 
six ascending illuminations on the way to divine union, a progression that 
mirrors the six wings of the Seraph. The Itinerarium becomes, then, for 
its reader, a visitation of the very Seraph who appeared to Francis. The 
fi nal, seventh chapter of the Itinerarium attempts to describe the union that 
succeeds the six illuminations, and reads, in part, as a gloss of Dionysius’s 
Mystical Theology. Here Bon a ven ture scripts his reader to pray, “with Dio-
nysius,” his prayer to the unknowable Trinity. Bon a ven ture then follows 
Dionysius’s change of address, from God in prayer to his friend Timothy 
in spiritual instruction, advising the reader directly through the words of 
Dionysius: “having completed the journey, abandon both the senses and 
intellectual operations, both sensible and invisible things, all that exists 
and does not exist, and, insofar as it is possible, be restored, unknowing 
(inscius), to the unity of the one who is beyond all essence and knowledge 
(essentiam et scientiam).”33
To the reader who wants to achieve this state (“If you ask how this 
comes about . . . ”) Bon a ven ture offers an explanation of what he calls the 
soul’s transitus (“passing over,” and also, literally, “death”) and excessus men-
tis (ecstasy or exceeding of the soul) into God: “For this passing over to be 
complete, all intellectual operations must be abandoned, and the height of 
the affect [apex affectus] must be completely carried over and transformed 
into God. This is mystical and very secret; no one knows [novit] it but the 
one who receives it, and no one receives it but the one who desires [deside-
rat] it, and no one desires it unless they are infl amed to the marrow with 
the fi re of the Holy Spirit.”34
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No other single passage of Bon a ven ture’s writings has inspired so much 
scholarly commentary and debate. At stake, it seems, is how to classify 
Bon a ven ture with respect to the intellectual changes taking place in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth century—does Bon a ven ture represent the cul-
mination of an older monastic tradition in which intellectual speculation 
and affective fervor are intertwined? Or is he the forerunner of the so-
called affective mysticism of late-thirteenth- and fourteenth-century au-
thors, such as Hugh of Balma and the anonymous author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing, who grow increasingly suspicious of intellectual effort in the 
devotional life? On the one hand, Bon a ven ture makes some kind of claim 
for union as a state of knowing when he states, in language drawn from 
the book of Revelation, that “no one knows [novit] it [this mystery] ex-
cept one who receives it.” Whatever Bon a ven ture is describing, notitia and 
experientia—knowledge and experience—are not entirely inappropriate 
terms for it (though, at least in the Itinerarium, the term scientia—certain 
knowledge—is rejected). And yet he draws a sharp contrast between the 
darkness of the soul’s fi nal excessus mentis and the illuminations that pre-
ceded it. The transitus of the soul in divine union is the death of the soul: 
What kind of knowledge could take place here?35 The question, rather, is 
what the love that characterizes ecstatic union is in the soul, and why it is 
privileged in the excessus mentis.
In his 1924 study of Bon a ven ture’s thought, Etienne Gilson insists that 
the abandonment of knowledge is the essential point of Bon a ven ture’s mys-
ticism, affi rming that the soul cannot fully grasp or see God in this life. But 
where the intellect cannot by its very nature go, he writes, the faculty of 
love pursues further, to touch and know God experientially.36 In doing so, 
the intellect is not so much abandoned as drawn up into and concentrated 
in the faculty of love because for Bon a ven ture the faculties are ultimately 
identical to the soul itself in substance. Thus on Gilson’s reading, the mens 
is exceeded in a way that includes the intellect within the faculty of affect. 
To say that intellect is abandoned simply means that the soul has no repre-
sentation of God, but instead enjoys immediate contact with its object.
Gilson’s reminder of the essential identity of the faculties with the soul is 
apposite because for Bon a ven ture mental ecstasy occurs at a point beyond 
the ordinary functioning of the faculties. Yet this alone does not explain 
why Bon a ven ture insists that the intellect is abandoned while the affect is 
transformed and carried into God. George Tavard, by contrast, convinc-
ingly argues that ecstasy in Bon a ven ture exceeds all faculties of the soul 
because it occurs beyond the distinction of the faculties in the undifferenti-
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ated substance of the soul. Thus, he concludes, ecstasy may be considered 
either in terms of love or knowledge. Nevertheless, Tavard concludes, love 
is the more appropriate term since synderesis is affective.37
Joseph Ratzinger is less equivocal, suggesting that in Bon a ven ture’s vi-
sion, ecstatic union with God is totally free of knowledge. This view was 
conditioned, he writes, not only by Bon a ven ture’s Dionysian infl uences but 
also by a “Franciscan view which attributed a higher value to the affectus 
rather than to the intellectus.”38 Yet because Bon a ven ture not only received 
but also helped to create the “Franciscan view” in question, Ratzinger’s 
explanation would seem only to defer the question of what Bon a ven ture 
means by the abandonment of intellectual operations in ecstasy. And even 
if one wished to speak of a more or less unifi ed “Franciscan view,” the 
characterization of this view as valuing affectus over intellectus is too simple. 
 Affective and intellectual operations are crucial for the formation and spiri-
tual progress of the believer. The question here is precisely what role affect 
plays in the excessus mentis. Is it possible to give a positive characterization 
of this state as something other than a deeper form of knowing?
Desire (desiderium), Bon a ven ture explains, can be activated even in the 
absence of certain knowledge.39 It is not a consequence of or response to 
scientia, but a receptive capacity for spiritual movement, cohesion, and 
transformation. Thus, when it is a question of union, affect serves better 
than intellect as an explanatory mechanism for the relationship between 
God and the soul. For Bon a ven ture, affect is not simply the other of intel-
lect, nor is it a modifi cation or deepened form of knowledge (where that 
term is determined by analogy to intellectual activity). Rather, affect is 
privileged as the highest point of encounter possible in this life—not be-
cause it is more powerful than or superior to knowledge, or more like God 
than intellect, but because the nature of affection is to cleave and unite: af-
fection is movement and touch. And the affectus names the capacity for that 
movement and contact in the soul. This is evident in the movements of 
physical objects, and it is no less literally true for spiritual beings. Natural 
motion is not a convenient metaphor for ascent; it is a divinely implanted 
means of return to God. When Bon a ven ture writes that at the highest 
stage, all intellectual operations are abandoned and the height of the affect 
is carried over into God, he is working out more fully the implications of 
a theological anthropology and cosmology derived from Thomas Gallus’s 
reading of the Dionysian corpus.
As Coolman writes, refl ection on the role of affectus in the interpretation 
of Dionysian ascent “is not merely an interpolation of love into The Mysti-
cal Theology, but also a conviction regarding how human beings are most 
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basically constituted and how they relate most fundamentally to God.”40 
These convictions about the constitution of human beings in relation to 
God carried with them related assumptions about how creation as a whole 
was ordered by and to its Creator. According to Gallus in the Explanatio 
to the Divine Names, love (amor) names the “ineffable, harmonious com-
pact between the creator and the created universe,” evident throughout 
all levels of being, known in part even to the pagan philosophers, but per-
fected in the Incarnate Word.41 For Bon a ven ture, too, the constitution of 
affectivity—by which all things revert to their source—is more basic than 
the distinction between humans and nonhumans or animate and inanimate 
beings. Concomitant with the analogical structure of the universe (a struc-
ture that is more fundamental than the distinction between the bodily and 
the spiritual) is a similarly continuous understanding of affect—a single 
principle of movement that orders the physical world and governs the 
soul’s wayfaring through the sensible and intelligible worlds and its jour-
ney into God.
It is a mistake to characterize the privileging of affect in Gallus’s and 
Bon a ven ture’s readings of Dionysius as “anti-intellectual.” But it is equally 
misleading to attempt to rescue these theologians from the charge of anti-
intellectualism by hastening to understand affect as only another form of 
knowledge. To reduce affect to knowledge is to miss the force of affect 
in a spiritual and corporeal economy. Bon a ven ture’s development of the 
concept of affectus itself is deeply embedded in the Dionysian universe, 
and draws, implicitly and explicitly, on the conception of eros/amor as a 
capacity to effect a unity that Dionysius describes in the Divine Names.42 
Bon a ven ture, while heavily indebted especially to Gallus’s interpretive in-
terventions, carries through these insights about the force of eros into a 
program of Christian devotion organized around the exemplary body of 
Francis.
In Denys Turner’s formulation, eros is the key to Dionysius’s ecstatic meta-
physics: God’s ecstasy of eros creates the cosmos and through ecstatic eros 
all creation returns to God.43 For Dionysius, eros is the affi rmation that all 
things are in God, for “all things must desire, must yearn for, must love, 
the Beautiful and the Good.”44 And in this way the Beautiful and the Good 
are the source of all movement, both the movement of the soul and the 
movement in the “realm of what is perceived.” Eros is that which “binds 
the things of the same order in a mutually regarding union. It moves the 
superior to provide for the subordinate, and it stirs the subordinate in a 
return toward the superior.”45 In other words, eros orders the cosmos to 
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God and holds it together in hierarchy. And since it is hierarchy through 
which all things fl ow from God, return to God, and are ultimately united 
with God, eros is ecstatic union.46 As Dionysius writes, “The divine eros 
brings ecstasy so that the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved.”47 
This conception of eros— God’s providence for creation, the movement 
of creation toward its end, and the dispossession of the soul in God—
resonates with Bon a ven ture’s understanding of the place of affectus in the 
soul and in the role of desiderium in the consummation of creation in God. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, Bon a ven ture cites the Divine Names on this 
very point: “We call love the unitive force.”48 And he places amor at the 
heart of Dionysius’s theology in his Commentary on the Gospel of Luke: “For, 
as Dionysius says, the whole of mystical theology, ‘what is hidden in mys-
tery,’ consists in excessive love according to a threefold hierarchic force: 
purgative, illuminative, and perfective.”49 What Bon a ven ture derives from 
Dionysius’s corpus—and not only from the identifi cation of the Seraph 
with charity—is that love means a modality of union, one that is the end 
of the soul in its relation to her Beloved and the end of all things in relation 
to their creative source.
The abandonment of intellectual operations that Bon a ven ture describes 
in the fi nal stage of the itinerarium, however, is not a simple passage from 
knowledge to love. In the fi rst place, the force of amor is present through-
out the journey as that by which each stage exceeds itself, and by which the 
soul is drawn into and out of itself. In addition, to describe the mystical 
transitus as a passage from knowledge to love is to miss what is for Bon-
a ven ture a more fundamental transformation. To put it in the simplest 
terms—terms whose inadequacy will become evident throughout the rest 
of my analysis—it is a transformation from moving to being moved. This 
distinction is more fundamental than the distinction between love and 
knowledge; or rather, it is on the basis of the distinction between moving 
and being moved that Bon a ven ture’s use of love and knowledge terminol-
ogy must be understood.
In the seventh of his Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, Bon a-
ven ture makes this distinction between modes of movement explicit. There 
he argues that Christ’s (human) soul had a comprehensive knowledge of 
the fi nite created things which were in the Exemplar. But the infi nity of 
things expressed in the Exemplar could not be comprehended by any fi nite 
soul. Therefore, Bon a ven ture concludes, Christ knew the infi nity of the 
expressive exemplar not with a comprehensive knowledge, but by an “ex-
cessive” or “ecstatic” knowledge— one that, rather than grasping things 
completely, is instead “taken captive [capitur] by them.” So he explains, 
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“I call this an ecstatic mode of knowing [excessivum modum cognoscendi], 
not because the knower exceeds what it knows, but because the knower is 
drawn toward an object that exceeds it in an ecstatic way that raises the soul 
above itself.”50 This kind of knowing, Bon a ven ture notes, is what Diony-
sius describes in the Mystical Theology as a union exceeding the nature of the 
intellect. This capacity for knowledge was perfect in Christ, but it is also 
possible for all souls, both in via and in heaven, depending on the measure 
of grace they receive.
Bon a ven ture distinguishes these two modes of knowledge in a number 
of ways. First, “in the comprehensive mode, the knower takes captive what 
it knows, but in the ecstatic mode what is known takes the knower captive.” 
Second, comprehensive knowledge “terminates in the gaze [aspectus] of the 
intelligence, while ecstatic knowledge fi nds its goal in an appetite of the 
intelligence.”51 When the soul knows something fi nite, it takes in the ob-
ject and conforms it to itself. But when the soul knows the infi nite, it is the 
soul which is drawn up and transformed into the object. As Bon a ven ture 
explains, the fulfi llment of this latter type of knowledge is not vision, but 
desire. Though classed here as a mode of knowledge, this transformation, 
which “totally deifi es” the soul, is described just as the mystical excessus 
mentis of the Itinerarium. Whether or not it goes by the name of knowl-
edge, the movement of ecstasy is a movement and transformation of the 
soul into God. Ecstatic knowledge is nothing the soul does, but something 
that happens to the soul. And the language for this kind of movement is 
the language of affectivity, not cognition. Ecstatic knowing is realized in 
appetitus, not aspectus.
This passage suggests that the transformation that occurs in the soul’s 
exceeding of itself is, most fundamentally, a transformation of the soul’s 
mode of moving. To know God ecstatically means to be drawn out of 
oneself and into God. Another name for the soul’s motion toward its ob-
ject is amor. Thus, one could say that to love God is to know God in an 
ecstatic way— or, conversely, that to know God ecstatically is love. The 
crucial distinction is that union with God is a state in which the soul is 
seized, taken captive, and transformed into its object. This is why ordinary 
 knowledge—in which the soul takes hold of its object—can have no place 
in the soul’s intimacy with God, according to Bon a ven ture. In this way, 
amor names an even closer intimacy with God than sapientia, which Bon a-
ven ture characterizes as a movement of a thing toward the soul.52 By a con-
trary motion, love carries the soul towards the thing it loves. Love is still 
defi ned here in opposition to knowledge, but in Bon a ven ture’s distinction, 
amor is not simply a more perfect or deeper cognitio. Love and knowledge 
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are two different forms of movement and contact between the soul and 
its object. As the next two chapters discuss, what here goes by the name 
of love or ecstatic knowledge operates in Bon a ven ture’s other writings as 
natural motion. And following and building on Gallus, Bon a ven ture calls 
the capacity for this supremely simple motion synderesis: The apex of the 
soul is above intellect and unaffected by knowledge. The inclination by 
which the soul is moved in ascent belongs to the affectus.
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c h a p t e r  2
Affect, Cognition, and the 
Natural Motion of the Will
As the highest point of the soul and the principle of mystical ascent, the 
now-obscure concept of “synderesis” provides a focused lens through 
which to view the interpenetration of scholastic theology and devotional 
practice. Medieval theologians held sharply divergent theories about the 
nature and operations of the apex mentis, divergences that were implicated 
in very different approaches to the devotional life and mystical theology. 
This chapter examines Bon a ven ture’s account of synderesis as wholly affec-
tive, an interpretation that distinguished him from many of his scholastic 
predecessors and contemporaries and that presents a number of theoreti-
cal diffi culties. Bon a ven ture’s account of synderesis reveals the diffi culties 
inherent in attempting to articulate affect as something that is at least theo-
retically distinct from language, cognition, and judgment. The fact that 
he attempted it suggests the importance of the distinction between affect 
and intellect for his understanding of Dionysian mystical theology and the 
devotional program that it organizes. For Bon a ven ture, humans’ ability 
to be restored to their original rectitude and united with God depends on 
there being an aspect of the soul that desires God (at least theoretically) 
independently of the mind’s cognitive deliberations.
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The emergence in medieval theology of the concept of synderesis—
the innate “spark of conscience” by which humans naturally apprehend or 
desire the good—was both fortuitous and overdetermined.1 The scholas-
tic debates about synderesis concerned fundamental theological questions 
about the original constitution of human nature, the corruption of the soul 
through sin, and the possibility and components of moral action in the 
state of fallenness. The question of synderesis was essentially the question 
of how humans were created to seek and to fi nd righteousness. Such ques-
tions, of course, exceed the semantic fi eld of the term “synderesis” and 
predate its emergence. A number of scriptural authorities, for example, 
refer to some kind of desire for the Good naturally implanted in the soul 
or to a natural and universal knowledge of the law.2 Such ideas inevitably 
gave rise to speculation about the nature, operations, and limits of these 
innate endowments.
The converging of these questions around the concept of synderesis, 
however, appears to have been the result historically of what Jacques de 
Blic characterizes as a “happy accident.”3 In this case something was gained 
in the translation of the Greek syneidesis (as in, for example, 2 Corinthians 
1:12) as conscientia in the Latin of the Vulgate, and particularly in Jerome’s 
discussion of the term in his commentary on Ezekiel. In that commentary, 
Jerome considers a novel interpretation of the four fi gures of Ezekiel’s vi-
sion (a man or angel, a lion, an ox, and an eagle), which already by the 
fourth century were commonly understood to refer allegorically to the 
four Evangelists. He reports that some commentators, “following Plato,” 
read Ezekiel’s vision as a reference to the logikon (the man), thumikon (the 
lion), and epithumetikon (the ox)—the rational, irascible, and concupiscible 
parts of the soul discussed in the fourth book of the Republic.4 But Jerome is 
most interested in the way these Platonizing exegetes square the tripartite 
structure of the soul with the fourfold fi gure of Ezekiel’s vision by positing 
a fourth power above the other three:
The Greeks call it syneidesin—the spark of conscience [scintilla con-
scien tiae], which, even in the sinner Cain, after he was thrown out of 
paradise, was not extinguished. Through it we feel ourselves to sin [nos 
peccare sentimus] when, deceived by a likeness of reason, we are con-
quered by pleasures and furor. And they properly consider it to be the 
eagle, since it is not mixed up with the other three but corrects them 
when they err. And meanwhile, we read in scriptures that it is called the 
spirit which “intercedes for us with ineffable groans.” For no one knows 
[scit] what is in human beings except the spirit within them, which Paul, 
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writing to the Thessalonians, implored them to preserve together with 
body and soul. And yet, following what is written in Proverbs (“The 
wicked one esteems it lightly when he goes to the depths of sin”), we 
can see that in the wicked it falls and loses its place, since they have no 
embarrassment or shame in their delights, and thus deserve to hear: 
“Your face has become that of a prostitute, for you do not even know 
that you should blush.”5
This already enigmatic passage, here translated from the modern critical 
edition, was further complicated for medieval readers by the subsequent 
fate of Jerome’s text. Medieval manuscripts of Jerome’s commentary ren-
dered the Greek term in question as synderesis or synteresis. This mistran-
scription left medieval readers with an entirely unattested term that even-
tually came to be regarded as distinct from conscientia.6 The strange term, 
which Jerome’s commentary furnished with a sequence of interpretive 
problems, provided a fruitful locus of theological speculation for medieval 
Christians concerning the extent and nature of sin’s corruption of the soul, 
the capacity of the soul to recognize this corruption, and the presence in 
the soul of a motivation for moral action.
In other words, Jerome’s commentary framed for theologians of the 
twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries a nexus of questions about 
the relations between the intellectual and affective or motive parts of the 
soul. Jerome describes synderesis as that by which humans feel shame and 
embarrassment at their sin. But he also attributes to synderesis the power 
to correct, and calls it the spirit that knows the soul interiorly, suggest-
ing a cognitive or intellectual faculty. Given the ambiguity of the passage 
on this point, then, it is no surprise that the question of the intellectual 
or affective nature of synderesis produced perhaps the greatest variance of 
opinion among the theologians and canon lawyers who gave accounts of 
this obscure concept. Theological refl ection on synderesis thus generated 
complex, confl icting, and often highly nuanced explanations of the respec-
tive roles of cognition and affect in human beings’ pursuit of the good.
When Bon a ven ture began lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in 
1250 or 1251, a tangle of confl icting opinions on the nature of synderesis 
preceded him. Bon a ven ture, like several of his Franciscan predecessors at 
Paris, advances a notion of synderesis as a wholly affective and inexorable 
tendency to motion toward the good. His account stands out in the history 
of discussions of synderesis, however, for the thoroughness of its attempt 
both to work out the implications of positing such a tendency in the soul 
and also to account for the relation of this affective capacity to conscience 
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(conscientia), which he places in the cognitive part of the soul. Bon a ven ture’s 
effort to account for this relationship, I argue, is signifi cant above all for the 
diffi culties he encounters in describing the function of synderesis in delib-
erative moral action—diffi culties that his account does not fully resolve 
and which I believe echo throughout his later works. In Bon a ven ture’s early 
account of synderesis, we see the productive tension between the soul’s 
natural and inexorable affective movement toward the good and the circu-
itous paths traced by the deliberative motions of the soul acting as a whole. 
It is one of the central arguments of this book that this very tension rever-
berates throughout Bon a ven ture’s subsequent writings on the spiritual life, 
and thus constitutes one of the animating forces of Bon a ven ture’s “mysti-
cal theology”—that is, his interpretation of the Dionysian ascent to union 
with God as uniquely revealed through the life of Francis of Assisi.
My focus on the irresolvable diffi culties that Bon a ven ture’s account of 
synderesis produces is not an attempt to fi nd fault, but rather to offer an al-
ternative to the overwhelming emphasis on synthesis and integration as the 
primary hermeneutic lenses through which Bon a ven ture has been read by 
modern theologians and historians. In this vein, Douglas Langston high-
lights the cooperation and interpenetration of the cognitive and affective 
to be one of Bon a ven ture’s signal contributions to the medieval theory of 
conscience and synderesis. “Bon a ven ture,” Langston writes, “while plac-
ing synderesis and conscience in different parts of a human being, does not 
isolate them. On the contrary, he views conscience as driven by synderesis 
and at the same time directing synderesis.”7 Langston elaborates this view 
elsewhere: “Although some might see in this interpenetration of the ratio-
nal and the affective orders untidiness, in fact it is a sign of sophistication 
for it escapes the tendency to identify particular human functions with 
particular parts of the human being.”8
In regard to Bon a ven ture’s broader aims in delineating the respective 
functions of conscience and synderesis, Langston’s conclusion is entirely 
convincing and thoroughly supported by Bon a ven ture’s text. Bon a ven ture 
does describe the interpenetration and mutual dependence of conscience 
and synderesis, and he frequently warns against overly reifying the dis-
tinctions among the soul’s parts.9 But despite Bon a ven ture’s emphasis on 
integration, his attempt to reconcile this interpenetration with Jerome’s 
claim that synderesis is “not mixed up in the errors” of the other faculties 
results in an ambiguous account of the nature of synderesis and its place 
and function in the execution of moral acts. How can synderesis be both 
inextricably involved in the operations of the other powers and remain 
aloof from their errors?
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I am by no means the fi rst to see such enduring tensions and ambiguities 
in this notion of synderesis. In his critical survey of medieval theories of 
conscience, Timothy Potts concludes that Bon a ven ture fails to adequately 
distinguish between conscience and synderesis, thereby rendering the lat-
ter concept useless as an explanatory mechanism for moral action, and thus 
unhelpful for a modern analytic approach to conscience.10 And with regard 
to Christian conceptions of conscience more generally, Joseph Ratzinger 
has argued that the distinction between two levels of conscience is vital, 
but dismisses the particular concept of synderesis as “unclear in its exact 
meaning,” and thus “a hindrance to a careful development of this essential 
aspect of the whole question of conscience.”11 The target of Ratzinger’s 
critique is not medieval discussions of synderesis, but the modern notion 
of conscience as “subjective certitude,” which would make the individual 
infallible.12 For Ratzinger, what is needed is not a recovery of the medi-
eval concept of synderesis, but a new way to articulate the notion of a 
higher level of conscience, for which he suggests the term anamnesis: the 
innate and universal ability to recognize the truth of authoritative teach-
ing (thus undermining the notion of conscience as a resource for faithful 
dissent from the magisterium). Signifi cantly, Ratzinger identifi es anamnesis 
both as a “primordial knowledge” and as the natural love of God—both 
cognitive and affective—thereby sidestepping medieval debates about the 
precise nature of this “spark” in the soul and avoiding the diffi culties of 
maintaining that synderesis is wholly affective.
I agree with Potts and Ratzinger that the concept of synderesis, espe-
cially as articulated by Bon a ven ture, is an ambiguous one. But I do not 
agree that this ambiguity is grounds for dismissal. On the contrary, as I will 
suggest, the diffi culties raised by positing an inexorable affective tendency 
to the good are extremely useful for historians and theologians insofar as 
they throw into relief some crucial contours of the complex landscape of 
affectivity in medieval Christian theology and devotion. If there is an en-
during obscurity in Bon a ven ture’s account of synderesis, it is not due to 
the “untidiness” of Bon a ven ture’s thought, but rather, I will argue, to the 
very intractability of affect, the limits of reducing it in an account, and 
the ways in which the distinction between the cognitive and the affective 
pushes, pulls, and twists (yet never fully breaks) Bon a ven ture’s theological 
synthesis.
In this chapter, then, I will trace the distinctive moves by which Bon-
a ven ture realigns the commonplace arguments about the nature of syn-
deresis with attention to the contexts of that realignment. First, I will 
examine some of the views of Bon a ven ture’s immediate predecessors, in 
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the context of which the novelty of Bon a ven ture’s contribution appears 
more clearly. Then, I turn to another important context of his treatment 
of synderesis—his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Book Two, 
Distinction Thirty-Nine, in which his most extended exploration of the 
concept occurs. Bon a ven ture’s introduction of synderesis into this context 
was not original; it was commonplace for lecturers on the Sentences to dis-
cuss conscience and synderesis at this point. The placement is nevertheless 
signifi cant: For synderesis, as Bon a ven ture defi nes it, echoes and fulfi lls 
the main subject of the work that he outlines in his prologue—the original 
rectitude of human beings lost in the Fall—and thus reveals the crucial 
signifi cance of synderesis for Bon a ven ture’s larger themes in the com-
mentary.  Orienting Bon a ven ture’s discussion of synderesis in this context, 
then, will in turn set the stage for analysis of how Bon a ven ture relates 
synderesis to conscience, and the limits of integration that he encounters 
in this project.
Background
By the time Bon a ven ture began lecturing on Lombard’s Sentences in 1250 
or 1251, the main lines of scholastic debate on synderesis and conscience 
had been drawn. A number of questions, derived from Jerome’s commen-
tary, were commonplace in these debates: If synderesis is unerring, is it 
then extinguished in grave sinners and the damned? What is its relation-
ship to the sin that human beings perform? Insofar as it is good, does it 
confer merit to the soul? But perhaps the most fundamental question—
and one about which no consensus emerged—had to do with its nature: 
Exactly what is synderesis in the soul and “where” does it reside? Writing 
in the fi rst years of the thirteenth century, Alexander Neckam (d. 1217) 
surveyed the variety of opinions on this point: Some equate synderesis 
with Augustine’s ratio superior (this was the opinion Alexander himself fa-
vored), or along similar lines refer to it as the “spark” of superior reason.13 
But others, Alexander observes, “say that synderesis is a natural affect by 
which the mind always desires the good and tends to that good whose 
image it carries in itself.”14 That is to say, for some, synderesis is a capac-
ity that reveals or illuminates what should be done, while for others, it is 
the stimulus that motivates action toward the good. Roland of Cremona 
(d. 1259), fi rst to hold the Dominican chair at Paris, argues that Ezekiel’s 
vision identifi es synderesis with the face of the eagle because its function is 
to see or to discern; thus he defi nes synderesis as an intellectual capacity.15
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More infl uential, however, were those commentators who saw syndere-
sis as pertaining, in some way, to both the cognitive and affective parts 
of the soul. In the fi rst extended treatment of conscience and synderesis, 
Philip the Chancellor (named for the offi ce he held at Notre Dame de 
Paris from 1217 until his death in 1236) staked out what might be called 
a moderate voluntarist position on synderesis. Philip defi nes synderesis as 
a potentia habitualis, a power perfected by a habit, i.e., a capacity of the 
soul that is naturally informed by a disposition for a particular end.16 As 
such, it pertains both to “apprehension” and “desire,” but more properly 
to desire.17 Philip is also among the fi rst to distinguish conscientia as a dis-
tinct phenomenon from synderesis. In earlier treatises, when conscientia was 
mentioned at all, it was used more or less interchangeably with synderesis. 
But with Philip the two concepts become distinct, even if only partially: 
Philip defi nes conscience as the conjunction of synderesis and free choice 
(liberum arbitrium).18 Philip’s defi nition of synderesis as a power informed 
by a habit appears in several subsequent treatments of the subject, as in 
the Summa of Bon a ven ture’s teacher and predecessor, Alexander of Hales 
(d. 1245).19 Alexander attributes synderesis to the cognitive aspect of rea-
son. It is natural rather than deliberative, and belongs to practical reason—
that is, reason concerned with moral action. But for Alexander, synderesis 
can also be called motive, owing to the overlap of the cognitive and motive 
powers.20 Conscience, too, belongs both to the cognitive and the motive 
aspects of the soul, and is situated, as it were, below synderesis but above 
reason.21 Thus, Alexander notes, it is not inappropriate simply to call syn-
deresis the higher part of conscience.22 In this way, Alexander’s account 
proves to be ambiguous. But this ambiguity refl ects a concern to avoid 
drawing the lines between faculties—especially between the cognitive and 
affective faculties—too sharply.
Like Alexander, Bon a ven ture’s Franciscan teacher Odo of Rigaud (d. 
1275) regards the cognitive and motive parts of the soul as two aspects of 
reason. Because synderesis belongs to natural reason, he concludes, the 
name synderesis could be applied, substantially speaking, to a cognitive 
habit as much as to a motive habit. But more strictly speaking, synderesis 
names a power of the natural will determined to the natural law. And, fol-
lowing Philip’s account, Odo identifi es conscientia as the conjunction of 
synderesis with free choice (liberum arbitrium). “Whence,” Odo explains, 
“conscience is related to synderesis and to free choice, so that conscience 
in acting is, as it were, a medium between knowledge of universals and 
knowledge of particulars.”23 As for Alexander, the substantial unity of the 
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cognitive and affective aspects of reason forbids any absolute distinction 
between conscience and synderesis. And more signifi cantly, Odo’s analogy 
indicates that synderesis, though properly called motive, still must func-
tion as knowledge (of an innate and general kind) in order for conscience 
to carry out its operation. For Odo, it seems, synderesis supplies the gen-
eral principles that conscience applies to particular situations. The act of 
free choice is the result of all of these capacities working in concert. Or, as 
Odo puts it in another analogy, synderesis is the light that illuminates the 
vision of conscience.
Each of these authors deserves a more thorough treatment than I can 
give here. Yet even a brief examination is suffi cient to demonstrate that 
Bon a ven ture was not the fi rst medieval Christian thinker to suggest some 
interpenetration between the cognitive and affective components of moral 
action. Indeed, while he upholds the substantial unity of the intellect and 
will, Bon a ven ture, I argue, revises the tradition of Philip the Chancellor—
and does so precisely in ways that sharpen rather than attenuate the distinc-
tion between the cognitive and judicatory functions of conscience on the 
one hand and the affective motion of synderesis on the other. This revision 
testifi es not to a gradual ossifi cation of the “faculties” in later thirteenth-
century scholastic theology, but instead represents a specifi c and careful 
effort by Bon a ven ture to account for human beings’ desire for the Good in 
ways that do not reduce that desire to a deliberative operation.
In the early years of the thirteenth century, a very different conception 
of synderesis was elaborated by Thomas Gallus, the Victorine scholar and 
Dionysian commentator discussed in the previous chapter. As noted by 
Declan Lawell, who has examined Gallus’s use of the term “synderesis” 
in painstaking detail, “synderesis” appeared in Gallus’s writing as early as 
his 1218 Commentary on Isaiah.24 There Gallus describes synderesis as a 
power of the soul (vis animae) above the sensitive appetites and even above 
ratio. The power of synderesis reaches out for God’s grace, which Gallus 
describes as a “fi ery river” that fl ows into the affectus rather than the intel-
lectus. In one of his fi nal works, an extended commentary on the Diony-
sian corpus, Gallus describes the principalis affectio of the mind, which, he 
writes, “exceeds the intellect no less than the intellect exceeds reason, or 
reason exceeds the imagination.” And this affectio is “the spark of synderesis 
which alone is capable of union with the divine spirit.”25
Gallus’s treatment of synderesis ignores many of the questions raised 
by Jerome’s commentary that other masters discussed. But his association 
of synderesis with the soul’s union with God, and his placing of syndere-
sis above ratio, exercised a great infl uence on Bon a ven ture’s discussion of 
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the term, both in the Itinerarium and in the discussion of synderesis and 
conscientia in his Sentences commentary. Thus, in the case of Bon a ven ture, 
Lawell’s caution that Thomas Gallus’s unitive sense of synderesis must 
be “distinguished from the use it acquired in ethics to designate a kind 
of perception of moral truths or an inclination towards moral goodness” 
does not apply.26 What is most distinctive about Bon a ven ture’s account 
is his attempt to integrate Gallus’s affective understanding of synderesis 
into previous debates about the term. For Bon a ven ture, synderesis as the 
capacity of the soul to be carried into union with God and synderesis as the 
infallible inclination towards goodness are one—and thus the latter sense, 
as I will argue, cannot be understood except with reference to the former. 
Indeed, the concept of synderesis serves as an index of the ways in which 
Bon a ven ture’s understanding of natural law and moral action are rooted in 
a devotional program of affective union. Because the ascent to God is ul-
timately a passage beyond knowledge, the principle or agent of that ascent 
must itself exceed knowledge and stand apart from it.
Bon a ven ture on Conscience
All medieval discussions of synderesis were in some sense a gloss on Je-
rome’s Ezekiel commentary. But for Bon a ven ture and many of his scholas-
tic contemporaries and predecessors, the concept of synderesis helped to 
explain a problem posed in the second book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences. 
The question Peter frames in the thirty-ninth distinction of that book is 
how the will, if it is a natural good inhering in the human soul, can ever be 
called wicked. As Ambrose affi rmed in the fourth century, human beings, 
even while slaves to sin, always will the good by nature. Peter interrogates 
the sense of nature intended in this affi rmation: “For some hold there to be 
two motions: one by which we will the good naturally. But why ‘naturally’? 
And why is it called ‘natural’? Because this was the motion belonging to 
human nature in its fi rst condition, in which we were created without vice, 
and which is properly called nature. For humans were created with an up-
right will.”27 And human beings were also endowed with free choice by 
which they sin, “not by necessity, but by their own will.” The will is called 
a sin, then, according to this view, insofar as it freely chooses an evil act. 
But as a natural gift it is only and necessarily good, and Peter identifi es 
this aspect with the scintilla of Jerome’s Ezekiel commentary: “Therefore 
it is said rightly that human beings naturally will the good, since they were 
created with a good and upright will. For the superior spark of reason, 
which, as Jerome said, could not be extinguished even in Cain, always 
F6909.indb   53 10/7/16   1:41:35 PM
54 Affect, Cognition, and Natural Motion
wills the good and hates evil.”28 The will is thus called good because of its 
 natural  righteousness, which remains in the soul as the “spark of reason” 
and which, distinct from free choice, cannot be corrupted.
As Bon a ven ture glosses it, Peter’s question concerns two issues: the 
“cause of corruption in the deliberative will” and “the rectitude of the hu-
man will as it is moved through the mode of nature.”29 Bon a ven ture is 
primarily concerned here with the latter issue—how are human beings 
created to desire the good naturally? The answer is twofold: through the 
“natural judge” of conscience and the “spark of reason or conscience” 
known as synderesis.30 Yet in the three articles he devotes to the subject, 
conscience turns out to be more complex than simply a natural judge. In-
stead, he defi nes conscience as a cognitive habit perfecting the practical 
intellect. Each component of this defi nition requires elaboration.
The initial question on conscience is devoted primarily to clarifying the 
fi rst aspect of the defi nition: whether conscience belongs to the intellect 
(intellectus, or potentia cognitiva), or to the affect (affectus, potentia affectiva, 
or, sometimes, pars motiva). Bon a ven ture—through the initial supporting 
arguments or fundamenta, and through his own conclusion and response—
primarily establishes the cognitive nature of conscience by appeal to its 
function (per actum). Conscience judges, testifi es, argues, rules, and directs, 
and these are clearly cognitive operations.31 Further support for this posi-
tion is found in Ecclesiastes 7, which attributes knowledge to conscience 
(“Scit conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro maledixisti aliis”). And it is self-
evident, according to these initial arguments, that “all knowledge (scientia) 
is from the part of the intellect,” and “all that belongs to conscience is 
knowledge (omnis conscientia est scientia).”32 Thus the noetic nature of con-
science is obvious (to a Latin reader) even from the form of the word.
The prefi x, however, suggests an important infl ection to the kind of 
knowledge that belongs to conscience. Conscience is not concerned with 
knowledge in general, but with knowledge directed to works. And so con-
science belongs to the practical intellect, which Bon a ven ture defi nes as the 
intellect “as it is joined, in a certain way, to affection and operation.”33 Ac-
cordingly, the “con” of conscience signifi es this conjunction, and this prac-
tical orientation. It is concerned not with speculative knowledge, such as 
geometrical principles, but with moral imperatives, such as the honor and 
obedience due to God and one’s parents. Thus, conscience is distinguished 
from the affective power not by reason of its object (which is the good, or 
the performance of good works), but by its function. Still, we should note 
that Bon a ven ture’s explanation of this conjunction refl ects some concern 
about the interpenetration of cognition and affect (or intellect and will), 
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insofar as he is at pains to reaffi rm the distinction of the powers: “ ‘For the 
speculative and practical intellect are the same power, differing only by 
extension,’ as the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] says. Nor should it in any 
way be understood that the practical intellect is an appetite or will; even 
the Philosopher himself denies this.”34
In this way, Bon a ven ture cites Aristotle in support of an un-Aristotelian 
scholastic distinction of powers. This ambivalent Aristotelianism is also 
evident in his characterization of conscience as a habitus. By naming con-
science a habit, Bon a ven ture distinguishes it both from a determinate ob-
ject of knowledge (in this case, the principles of the natural law) and from 
a power or potentiality of the soul, which is in itself undetermined toward 
a number of possible objects (and which, therefore, may resolve itself to-
ward right or wrong).35 As a habit, conscience is neither fully determinate 
nor fully indeterminate. Rather—and in an Aristotelian sense—it is an 
acquired disposition that informs or “perfects” the practical intellective 
power. That is, through the acquisition of good (or bad) conscience, the 
practical intellect acquires a particular character, a trained readiness to 
act in a certain way.36 (Analogously, speculative knowledge is a habit that 
perfects the speculative intellect.) But habits, unlike the principles of the 
natural law, vary from person to person—a habit can dispose the practical 
intellect to good works or to sin.
Or at least this is the case insofar as the habit of conscience is acquired 
through repeated actions and experience (such actions and experience be-
ing the source of habitus in the Aristotelian sense). Bon a ven ture recognizes 
another sense in which conscience inheres as a habit of the intellect, one 
which he indicates by naming conscience the “natural judge” in the soul. 
In this sense, the habit of conscience is not acquired but innate and serves 
as a principle of acts. Thus, Bon a ven ture’s conception of conscience holds 
together an Aristotelian understanding of habitus with a concept of “natu-
ral habit,” which is oxymoronic in the Philosopher’s terms. It is therefore 
ironic that, again, Bon a ven ture turns to Aristotle to explain and defend 
a distinction between the natural and the acquired habits of conscience. 
Bon a ven ture regards “the Platonic position [of anamnesis] which posits all 
habits of knowing to be simply innate” as too absurd to be worthy of seri-
ous consideration (and refuted both by Aristotle and Augustine).37 He thus 
attempts to reconcile the notion of a “natural judge” of conscience with the 
Aristotelian axiom that the soul is created a “blank slate” (tabulam nudam). 
Accordingly, he is not content to conclude, as some have, that the universal 
principles of good works are known innately and the particular conclu-
sions are acquired. Rather, particular conclusions are indeed the result of 
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 acquisition, but, as Aristotle demonstrated, knowledge of universal prin-
ciples is also acquired “through the senses, memory, and experience.”38
Yet as Bon a ven ture explains, knowledge requires both a knowable ob-
ject and a mediating light by which we judge that object.39 It is this light 
that is innate and is called a “natural judge.” Thus, there are no innate 
objects of knowledge, only an innate light, which allows those objects de-
rived from sense and experience to be known. A distinction between uni-
versal principles and particular conclusions is still operative here, but it 
does not correspond neatly to the distinction between innate and acquired 
conscience. On the one hand, particular conclusions are acquired, for they 
require some moral education and experience in order to be known. Gen-
eral principles, on the other hand, are both innate and acquired. The gen-
eral principles (construed as universal tenets of moral action) include, for 
example, the command to honor one’s father and mother or to treat others 
as one wishes to be treated. In a sense, these principles are innate to the 
soul because the natural light of conscience is suffi cient to recognize their 
validity. Yet such principles are not known innately because they are only 
meaningful if one knows the particular objects (in Bon a ven ture’s words, 
the “exterior species”) to which they refer. Until I learn what a “father” or 
“mother” is, I do not really know that I should honor them.40 The acquisi-
tion of these exterior species occurs through sense perception and experi-
ence. Even innate moral knowledge (at least from the perspective of the 
knowing subject), then, is embodied, temporal, and linguistic.41
More precisely, all knowledge is acquired to the extent that it becomes 
present to the soul through conceptual and imaginal representations de-
rived from sense perception (an “abstracted likeness”). But some things, 
Bon a ven ture adds, are present to the soul through the soul’s own essence, 
thereby requiring no exterior species. Concepts like “parent” and “neigh-
bor” depend on sense perception, and therefore the commandments re-
garding them are, in a way, acquired. God, on the other hand, “is not 
known through a likeness received by the senses,” but through a knowl-
edge naturally and essentially present to the soul. Thus, we know to love 
and to fear God (Deum amare et Deum timere) with a truly innate under-
standing because “human beings know what love and fear are not through 
a likeness accepted exteriorly, but through essence. For in this way, affects 
are in the soul essentially.”42 This kind of knowledge, then, is innate to the 
soul for two reasons: because it pertains to God and because it is affective. 
The knowledge of God to which Bon a ven ture refers here is not a discur-
sive (much less exhaustive) understanding of God’s attributes, but simple 
infi nitives—to love and to fear God.
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The innate, affective disposition of the soul toward God demarcates a 
sphere of absolute interiority, of a strictly essential ineffability. In itself, free 
from the contingencies of sense perception to which all other knowledge 
is subject, this affective knowledge (if that word is still appropriate here) 
can only be represented or made known by a betrayal of that interiority 
into exterior species. The only knowledge that is entirely natural to the 
soul is not really knowledge at all but an immediate and interior affective 
relationship to God. With respect to these affective dispositions, Bon a-
ven ture concludes, conscience is a simply innate habit. Yet an innate affec-
tive orientation to God is also how Bon a ven ture characterizes synderesis.43 
One might be tempted to see here, then, nothing more than a blurring of 
the distinction between conscience and synderesis. But it is not simply a 
matter of imprecision: Bon a ven ture has, after all, drawn very clearly the 
line between the truly innate love of God and those modes of conscience 
characterized by knowledge obtained through external species. Rather, 
insofar as conscience names a truly and simply innate habit, it proves in-
distinguishable from synderesis. Synderesis, then, would be the interior-
ity of conscience, or its secret, the absolute limit of its representability 
to itself.44
Bon a ven ture on Synderesis
If the soul’s innate love of God is thus set apart in the soul, what practical 
effect can it have on concrete moral action? This is the problem to which 
Bon a ven ture turns in his discussion of synderesis— one that, I argue, he 
cannot fully resolve given the heterogeneity of the affective orientation 
toward God and the operations of the practical intellect. Bon a ven ture ac-
knowledges the diffi culty of determining the best way of distinguishing 
synderesis from the other powers.45 Some have said that conscience is the 
habit that orients the power of synderesis toward the object of the natural 
law. Synderesis would then be the superior portion of reason directing the 
inferior powers in the performance of the law. Bon a ven ture sees no prob-
lem with this scheme per se, but it contradicts Jerome’s claim that syndere-
sis is not mixed up in the errors of the other powers. The proper way of 
speaking must, then, render synderesis more autonomous, or more aloof, 
with respect to the fallible power of cognition.
More to the point, Bon a ven ture surmises that if synderesis were simply 
a knowledge of the natural law (for example, a knowledge of the univer-
sal principles of the law), then one would still have to posit some further 
motivation to follow the law. As Douglas Langston rightly observes, in 
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 Bon a ven ture’s terms, a purely cognitive theory of moral action could pro-
vide no explanation for why human beings should follow, rather than dis-
regard, the principles of the law. Only a motive cause could provide that 
explanation: “It is part of Bon a ven ture’s achievement to see that the goal 
which justifi es our following fi rst principles must be found outside the ra-
tional order, viz., in the affective order.”46 On the face of it, however, this 
solution remains tautological (we are motivated to the good by our mo-
tivation to the good). To have any explanatory value, Bon a ven ture must 
account for the role this natural motivation plays in the discernment of and 
concrete action towards the good. And at the heart of this task lies a basic 
dilemma, of which Bon a ven ture was certainly aware: How can synderesis 
be utterly infallible if it is effi caciously involved in fallible human desire 
and action?
After considering several unsatisfactory opinions about the “place” of 
synderesis in the soul, Bon a ven ture then offers a defi nition of synderesis as 
the “weight of the will [pondus voluntatis], or the will with that weight, inso-
far as it inclines to the noble good [bonum honestum].”47 In the next chapter, 
I explore the signifi cance of Bon a ven ture’s use of the term “weight” in this 
connection. But the explicit point to be made here is that Bon a ven ture’s 
defi nition works to restrict the goal of synderesis to the noble good (bo-
num honestum). Corresponding to the distinction between speculative and 
practical knowledge in the intellect, the things that the affect desires are 
of two genera: the noble and the pleasing. Those things belonging to the 
latter type (in genere commodi) are not intrinsically and universally good, 
though they may represent a genuine good to the one desiring them (such 
as food and drink). Synderesis refers, by contrast, to the affective power 
insofar as it desires the noble good of the natural law—the obedience due 
to God and the respect due to one’s neighbor. Further, synderesis may 
be distinguished from the desirous powers of the soul more generally by 
its movement. The rational, concupiscible, and irascible powers are either 
moved naturally or deliberatively, while “synderesis names the affective 
power as it is moved naturally and rightly.”48 In this way, Bon a ven ture sets 
the natural rectitude of synderesis in opposition to deliberative movement. 
To move deliberatively, for Bon a ven ture, means to act in accordance with 
free choice (liberum arbitrium), which involves the cognitive and affective 
powers working together.49 If “free choice” names the deliberative (and 
fallible) movement of the will in conjunction with the intellect, then “syn-
deresis” refers to the will’s natural (and thus infallible) motion—that is, the 
affective power insofar as it can be considered distinct from the operations 
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of the cognitive faculty. “And this is why synderesis,” the eagle of Ezekiel’s 
vision, “is said to soar above the others.”50
Only in terms of movement, and not in essence, then, is synderesis dis-
tinguished from the rational, concupiscible, and irascible affective powers. 
Furthermore, it shares with these other powers its essential functions—
and in this way, too, synderesis is to be distinguished from the cognitive 
functions of conscience. Corresponding to the concupiscible and irascible 
powers, the functions of synderesis are to desire (appetit) the noble good 
and to fl ee (refugit) evil (that is, to feel remorse over sin). Synderesis moves 
and inclines the soul; without it, the directives of conscience could never 
be translated into action. Moral action requires, then, some cooperation 
between synderesis and conscience, in the same way that action generally 
requires the interpenetration of cognitive and affective functions: “Just as 
reason is not able to move without the will mediating, so neither can con-
science move without synderesis mediating.”51 This is why synderesis is 
called the “spark” or stimulus of conscience. Moral action requires the 
integration of synderesis and conscience. But this integration produces 
 certain conceptual problems. If the conjunction of reason and will is de-
liberative action, in what sense can the motion of synderesis still be called 
natural when it is working in conjunction with conscience and is dependent 
on its cognitive judgments? And in what sense can it be called infallible if 
it is involved with the fallible actions of human beings?
Bon a ven ture considers these problems at length, according to the terms 
set by Jerome’s commentary, by way of two questions. First, can synderesis 
be extinguished through sin? That is, can the soul be so corrupted that syn-
deresis no longer has any effect? And second, can synderesis itself be cor-
rupted (depravari) by sin or “lose its place,” so that it desires evil instead of 
good? To the fi rst question, Bon a ven ture responds that synderesis cannot 
be extinguished totally (as Jerome wrote, “not even in Cain”). Because syn-
deresis is natural to human beings, its removal would constitute a change in 
human nature, which, as divinely instituted, sin can never effect.
Yet with respect to the act of synderesis, three vices can interfere: blind-
ness, lasciviousness, and obstinacy. The last case refers to the damned, 
who, Bon a ven ture maintains, still possess synderesis but are so confi rmed 
in their wickedness that it no longer inclines them to the good. In the 
damned, synderesis marks the site of a punitive and unredeeming sorrow 
over sin. The other two vices are found among the living. One’s lust for 
carnal pleasure can be so powerful that it drowns out the murmuring and 
remorse of synderesis. The darkness of blindness, similarly, can impede 
F6909.indb   59 10/7/16   1:41:35 PM
60 Affect, Cognition, and Natural Motion
synderesis from murmuring against evil, “because the evil is believed to 
be good.”52 Here, it appears, an error of judgment causes the function of 
synderesis to go awry. Though it continues to stimulate the soul toward 
the good, it cannot murmur against evil because that evil is misidentifi ed 
as the good. Thus, it would seem, not only is synderesis impeded, but it 
is stimulating the pursuit of evil, insofar as it inclines toward an evil end 
which is wrongly identifi ed as good.
The problem may seem abstract, but it raises serious practical and the-
oretical problems when one considers, as Bon a ven ture does, the case of 
heretics, “who, dying for the impiety of their errors, believe that they are 
dying for the piety of their faith. And therefore they feel no remorse, but 
in fact feel a false and vain joy.”53 Heretics, no doubt, are in error, but are 
they right to pursue the wrong good? According to Bon a ven ture’s under-
standing of conscience, they are not. Such people are guilty of an “errone-
ous conscience,” a culpable bad habitus developed through a long history 
of sinful actions, and thus are accountable for their bad consciences—and 
morally bound to correct them.54 But what about synderesis? Is it right 
in inclining the soul even if, due to a cognitive error, its inclination is, in 
fact, directed toward evil? Heretics do not necessarily pose a threat to the 
understanding of synderesis as inextinguishable. After all, as Bon a ven ture 
notes, being wrong about one important thing does not preclude being 
right about many other smaller issues: Thus, synderesis in heretics “does 
not carry out the function of murmuring against the errors because of 
which they are killed. Yet it is not extinguished, because it murmurs against 
other evils . . .”
This show of fair-mindedness toward heretics on Bon a ven ture’s part is 
primarily in service of a theoretical point—synderesis is not extinguished 
so long as some aspect of its operation is carried out, even if it is partially 
impeded from time to time. This seems suffi ciently clear in itself, and it 
is therefore curious that Bon a ven ture presses the example of heretics fur-
ther than would appear necessary to make his point. That is, he goes on 
to contend that synderesis is not extinguished in heretics, in spite of their 
confusion of good and evil, not only because it murmurs against other 
evils, but also because it murmurs “against that which the heretics believe 
to be evil.”55 With this clause, then, Bon a ven ture appears to affi rm the 
dependence of the natural movement of synderesis on a deliberative judg-
ment of reason.
On one level, this dependence would seem to be inevitable. How, af-
ter all, can synderesis move toward the good and fl ee evil unless the soul 
has some understanding (whether correct or incorrect) of what that good 
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and evil are? If synderesis is an act of the affective part of the soul, then 
it must be preceded by cognition because, as Bon a ven ture affi rms repeat-
edly, intellect precedes affect.56 This axiom in itself does not jeopardize the 
infallibility of synderesis, which Bon a ven ture understands to follow the 
innate aspect of conscience as natural lumen of the practical intellect, prior 
to an act of deliberative reason.57 Understood in this way, synderesis’s de-
pendence on conscience would precede the introduction of any possibility 
of error. That is, synderesis follows the natural light of conscience as it is 
truly innate, not as it is informed by the external species abstracted from 
sense perception. And thus, synderesis must not be dependent on actual 
knowledge. Yet the example of heretics is problematic from this stand-
point. There a judgment regarding evil (undoubtedly deliberative because 
erroneous) directs or determines the course of synderesis. Synderesis, in 
turn, is in some way misled by reason, even if it is not held to be culpable 
for that error.
Note, however, that despite Bon a ven ture’s frequent use of language of 
priority and precedence, it is clear that he is not offering a temporal ac-
count of the soul’s operations. A concrete act is, after all, not the fi nal 
outcome in a temporal chain, but the sum of all the soul’s powers acting in 
concert. Yet especially in matters of rectitude and error, it is important for 
Bon a ven ture to distinguish the various operations of the soul—and in do-
ing so he relies, even more than on temporal metaphors, on a topography 
of the soul, delineating spheres of operation within a hierarchy of the soul’s 
powers. If this topographical language is not strictly literal, since the soul is 
not localized, it is nevertheless indispensable to the distinctions Bon a ven-
ture draws and, especially, to the account of synderesis that he gives.
To further clarify synderesis’s relation to sin, Bon a ven ture distinguishes 
between synderesis itself, which is incorruptible, and its dominion in the 
soul, which can be compromised through the sins of the inferior powers. 
Repeating a common analogy for synderesis, Bon a ven ture compares it to 
“a knight who, in himself, always sits well on his horse, but when his horse 
falls, he is said to have fallen too.”58 Thus, reason (through cognitive error) 
and will (through obstinacy) can resist the promptings of synderesis. The 
distinction between the act of synderesis and the resistance of the other 
powers depends on a hierarchical scheme that protects the superior from 
the defi ciencies of the inferior, while allowing for the interpenetration that 
makes a concrete action possible.
The hierarchical scheme, however, is simply one spatial logic that Bon-
a ven ture offers to explain the place of synderesis, and it stands in tension 
with other analogies he draws, such as the comparison of synderesis to 
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the bodily organ of sight. Just as the eye itself remains faultless when it is 
used to take in an illicit sight, so too does synderesis remain free from sin 
even when its inclinations are carried through to wicked ends.59 Bon a ven-
ture hesitates over this analogy, however, because it implies that synderesis 
is subject to the deliberative movement of free choice—that which syn-
deresis is supposed to “soar above.” As he affi rms, “synderesis, since it is 
a natural power and is moved naturally, is not subject to the rule of free 
choice. And therefore it does not follow that free choice can misuse it.”60 
The analogy to the eye, then, is a hedging of analytical bets: “Moreover, 
even if free choice is able to misuse synderesis, it does not follow that there 
is sin in synderesis.”61 Just as the body is not morally accountable for the 
sins of the soul, so synderesis is not corrupted by the depravations of free 
choice. Thus even if synderesis can be moved in the service of a delibera-
tive error (as seems to be the case with heretics who believe themselves to 
be martyrs), still it is not, strictly speaking, the subject of that error.
What accounts for this persistent ambiguity in the relation between 
synderesis and free choice—that is, between the natural and deliberative 
motions of the will? One factor, perhaps, is that Bon a ven ture seems to 
hold little esteem for the practical value of such speculative discussions. 
He prefaces a discussion of the substantial unity of reason and will, for 
example, with the caveat that the issue is more a matter of curiosity than 
utility— one’s moral and spiritual life simply does not depend on getting 
it right.62
Additionally, the ambiguity regarding synderesis may be traced back to 
a more fundamental ambiguity, one previously encountered in the discus-
sion of the innate and acquired aspects of conscience. The fact that all 
actual knowledge is acquired—that is, informed by the species of things 
derived from sense—means, as Potts argues, that practically speaking, 
Bon a ven ture provides no criterion with which to distinguish categorically 
our knowledge of the universal principles of the law (which are certain) 
from our particular conclusions (which can be erroneous). Bon a ven ture re-
curs to this uncertain distinction in responding to the objection that, since 
conscience can be right or wrong, so too can synderesis, since it “follows 
conscience as its natural judge.”63 He explains that “conscience, insofar 
as it remains in the universal and is moved by a simple aspect, is always 
right. But as it descends to particulars and connects them, it is able to be 
mistaken, on account of the fact that it is mixed up with the act of delib-
erative reason.”64 It is thus only with respect to universals that synderesis 
can be said to follow conscience because synderesis is “moved not against 
this or that evil thing, but against evil in universals. Or, if synderesis is in 
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some way inclined to detest this or that evil thing, it is not insofar as it is 
a this or that, but insofar as it is evil.”65 Again, the ambiguity between the 
universal and the particular prevents a univocal determination as to the 
precise domain of synderesis. A further example provided by Bon a ven ture 
offers little clarifi cation:
Even the conscience of the Jews, by the original natural command, 
dictates that God is to be obeyed. And they assume still that God now 
commands circumcision and discretion in food. And from this their 
conscience is formed in particular to circumcise themselves and to 
abstain from food. The error does not come from the fi rst principle, 
which was certainly true, but comes from an assumption which does 
not issue from conscience insofar as it is a natural judge, but rather 
from an error of reason.66
The command to obey God is truly innate to the soul, prior to any infor-
mation by sense perception or language. But the attempt to defi ne what 
it means to obey God requires the operation of reason and thus intro-
duces the possibility of error. Thus synderesis cannot be held to “descend” 
with conscience to particulars. But does this mean that synderesis has no 
place in the carrying out of universal commands? Perhaps, or perhaps 
not: Synderesis may move toward good and detest evil not only in uni-
versals, but also insofar as those universals exist (universally) in particular 
beings and acts. What is certain, and apparently the crucial point to get 
right, is that “synderesis does not deviate (obliquatur) as conscience errs 
(errat)” 67; rather, “synderesis is always right (recta), but conscience can be 
right or wrong.”68
Despite Bon a ven ture’s agnosticism on many aspects of synderesis and 
its relationship to the other powers, two points appear to be fundamental: 
Synderesis is always right, and synderesis is wholly affective. The concep-
tual diffi culties that arise in maintaining the former proposition in relation 
to the deliberative action of the soul, I contend, help to explain the empha-
sis Bon a ven ture places on the latter. The distinction between universals 
and particulars, both in relation to conscience and to synderesis, proves to 
be too ambiguous and too porous to secure the place of rectitude in the 
soul, and to keep synderesis free, as it were, from the imputation of error. 
But synderesis is always right only insofar as it is heterogeneous to the order 
of cognition. Rectitude in synderesis means something very different from 
rectitude in conscience. The rectitude of synderesis is not a question of 
right belief or correct knowledge—its object is not truth but the good, 
and its operation is not the apprehension of the good but the simple move-
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ment toward it. Thus its rectitude consists not in knowledge but, like the 
rider on his horse, in its posture, its place, the straightness of its motion. 
However interdependent with conscience it may be in the functioning of 
the practical intellect, synderesis, in itself, remains set apart from cogni-
tion in the soul.
What, then, of the rectitude of conscience? Perhaps it is better to say 
that the crucial distinction between the natural and the deliberative is 
more fundamental than that between the cognitive and the affective. In-
deed, Bon a ven ture makes a place for inerrancy in conscience insofar as it 
is innate. Yet the only truly innate aspects of conscience that Bon a ven ture 
mentions—to love and to fear God—are themselves affections, which, 
Bon a ven ture explains, are truly present to the soul prior to and apart from 
the intrusion of knowledge acquired exteriorly. The natural, the affective, 
and the infallible converge in his account at a point that can never be trans-
lated into concrete knowledge without breaking it apart—a pure interior-
ity that, as such, never betrays its mute allegiance to the good.
In a gesture that appears to anticipate the analysis of Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, Bon a ven ture establishes synderesis as a (non)space of pure in-
teriority as the exclusion of exterior species, prior to and uninterrupted by 
representation. And yet, in Bon a ven ture’s attempts to represent this pure 
interiority, a strange reversal or torsion occurs—the innermost becomes 
ecstatic, a curiously alien force acting upon the soul. More intimate than 
knowledge and prior to language, synderesis is the “spirit which intercedes 
with ineffable sighs.”69 It is not a light but the “weight” and “heat” of the 
soul, carrying the soul inexorably to its end. The innate affective motion to 
God, more interior than the structures of discursive knowledge, is also ec-
static, standing outside those structures. As an interiority that exceeds and 
eludes the order of reason and the logic of cognition, synderesis conforms 
itself instead, perversely, to the dynamics of embodied movement. The 
goal of the next three chapters is to elucidate those embodied dynamics of 
the natural affectus, tracing at the same time this torsion of interiority and 
exteriority that manifests itself most spectacularly in the body of Francis, 
as it is shaped and inscribed in Bon a ven ture’s account.
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c h a p t e r  3
Elemental Motion and the Force of Union
This chapter examines more closely the corporeal language with which 
Bon a ven ture describes synderesis, the soul’s instinct for the good, accord-
ing to the physical properties of fi re. Rather than treating Bon a ven ture’s 
extensive use of fi re imagery as an illustrative metaphor, I argue that this 
pervasive imagery indicates something important about the cosmic signifi -
cance of the soul’s natural desire for God, and reveals the corporeal dynamic 
at the heart of spiritual ascent. The body is exemplary of the soul’s most 
fundamental desire—not only the glorious and wretched body of Christ 
as refracted through the body of Francis, but even, more fundamentally, 
what ancient and medieval philosophers called the simple bodies—above 
all, the body of fi re.
Bon a ven ture’s divergence from previous scholastic discussions of syn-
deresis is perhaps most evident in the imagery he evokes to defi ne it. In 
arguing for the affective nature of synderesis, an analogy helps to clarify 
the stakes: “Just as the intellect needs a light for judging, so the affectus 
needs a certain spiritual heat and weight [calor et pondus] for loving rightly. 
Therefore just as in the cognitive part of the soul there is a certain natural 
judge, which is conscience, so in the affective part of the soul there will be 
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a weight directing and inclining to the good, and this is synderesis.”1 In 
the same place, as discussed in the previous chapter, he defi nes synderesis 
as the “weight of the will [pondus voluntatis], or the will with that weight, 
insofar as it inclines to the noble good [bonum honestum].”2 Bon a ven ture is 
not the fi rst medieval theologian to ascribe a weight to the soul, as I will 
discuss shortly. But with the image of a “weight and heat for loving,” he 
gives the concept of synderesis an entirely new cast.
By contrast, Alexander of Hales, commenting on the same section of 
Lombard’s Sentences, asks, “And in the same way as there is a material light 
in the senses for seeing and in the intellect for understanding truth, why 
would there not be in the motive force a light to the good, always turn-
ing away from evil?” Elsewhere in the same text, he writes that synderesis 
“lights and burns [lucet et ardet], and is thus always opposed to darkness, 
and thus to sin.”3 Alexander sets up a correspondence between material 
light, intellectual light, and a motive or affective light. By positing an af-
fective light to the good, Alexander seems to be suggesting that there is 
some cognitive component to the affect, an idea that is not at all unprec-
edented in ancient and medieval theories of the soul.4 What is remarkable, 
by way of comparison, is how differently Bon a ven ture draws the lines. For 
Bon a ven ture, there is no “affective light”—such an image muddles the op-
erations of the cognitive and affective parts of the soul, and confuses the 
affect’s movement toward the Good with the practical intellect’s illumina-
tion of that good.
Bon a ven ture’s dispensing with the light metaphor for synderesis also 
represents a departure from his other teacher and predecessor Odo of Ri-
gaud. In answering how synderesis can be free of error, Odo considers ap-
provingly a slightly different optic metaphor: “Otherwise we could say that 
conscience and synderesis differ just as light and vision, so that synderesis 
is, as it were, light, but conscience is the vision enabled through that light. 
Whence it is able to see rightly and wrongly, without there being an error 
in the light.”5 Here Odo’s analogy tightens the connection between syn-
deresis and conscience, enlisting synderesis in the service of judgment, and 
binding both together in a comparison with vision.
By shifting the register of synderesis from “light” to “heat,” Bon a ven ture 
divorces the natural motion of the will from the dynamics of  intellectual 
 vision in which conscience, as natural “light,” participates. Yet insofar as 
light and heat refer to two properties of a single substance, fi re, Bon a-
ven ture’s imagery also works to draw an even tighter connection  between 
conscience and synderesis. In fact, the attributions of calor and pondus both 
refer to the analogy to fi re. In 2 Sent. 14 he identifi es three formal proper-
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ties (proprietates) of fi re: luminositas, caliditas, and levitas, “through which it 
is moved through an upward motion” ( per quam movetur motu, qui est sur-
sum).6 In fact, the comparison with fi re makes for a fairly precise compari-
son. Synderesis and conscience are not distinct substances, but as properties 
or powers they are properly distinguished.7 If the light, heat, and weight of 
fi re are found together in a single substance, they are not dependent upon 
one another. The contrast between light, heat, and weight expresses a very 
different relationship than that between light and vision: The properties 
may be concurrent without one being subordinate to another.
If synderesis does not pertain to the properties of light and the dynam-
ics of intellectual vision, what function does it serve in the soul? Just as 
levitas is that by which the fi re is moved upward, so, too, does the weight of 
synderesis refer to a particular way that the soul is moved. As Bon a ven ture 
clarifi es later, synderesis is not essentially distinct from the concupiscible, 
irascible, and rational powers (the triad named in the Cistercian, pseudo-
Augustinian treatise On the Spirit and the Soul),8 but differs in its mode of 
movement (modus movendi), which, invoking Jerome’s gloss, is to fl y over 
the other powers, high above their errant motions. By identifying syn-
deresis as a weight, Bon a ven ture reinforces the point that it belongs to the 
motive, or affective, part of the soul.
But the metaphorical investment of synderesis with the language of 
weight and motion yields a return. The linking of synderesis with weight 
not only illustrates the motive and affective nature of synderesis, but helps 
to clarify in turn what belongs to affectus. Bon a ven ture’s shifting of syn-
deresis from the image of light to that of weight is signifi cant not only for 
his understanding of synderesis, but also for the nature and constitution of 
affectus— of which synderesis is a crucial aspect. How, exactly, does affect 
move? Why does Bon a ven ture describe synderesis, the soul’s spark and 
infallible inclination to God, in the seemingly crudely physical terms of 
weight and heat (crude, at least, in comparison to the subtle and spiritual 
image of light)? And what does Bon a ven ture’s understanding of affective 
motion reveal about the role of desire in the soul’s ascent towards God? In 
this chapter, I argue that the association of synderesis with pondus is not an 
isolated use of an illustrative metaphor, but an instance of a crucial theme 
that structures Bon a ven ture’s understanding of affectus throughout later 
writings.
According to Bon a ven ture in his Sentences commentary (and in conjunc-
tion with his treatment of synderesis), natural affectus is a particular kind 
of motion within and beyond the soul. As I will highlight in what follows, 
thinking that motion in relation to the other kinds of action that the soul 
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is capable of proves diffi cult, presenting ambiguities that Bon a ven ture does 
not attempt to solve. To put these ambiguities in a clearer light, I will then 
look briefl y at some aspects of Aristotelian motion that resonate with Bon-
a ven ture’s account of the soul’s natural motion, and consider two earlier 
Christian thinkers who draw broadly on Aristotelian physics in order to 
describe love as a weight of the soul moving it toward God: Augustine 
and the Cistercian William of St-Thierry. As I will ultimately argue in an 
analysis of the Breviloquium, Bon a ven ture employs this philosophical and 
spiritual motif as a conceptual linchpin in his understanding of both the 
soul’s ascent and the consummation of the cosmos. The language of weight 
and motion are not for Bon a ven ture physical metaphors for an incorporeal 
reality, but rather describe a dynamic that is more fundamental than the 
distinction between soul and body and that governs them both alike. This 
common dynamic is more evident in the simple bodies than in the con-
founded and distorted human soul, so that the former become exemplary 
for the latter. In this way, the natural order is a means of meditating human 
beings’ spiritual progress: The soul’s ascent to God is an imitatio of the 
simple and inexorable motion of fi re.
The Soul in Motion
For Bon a ven ture, synderesis is distinguished among the powers of the soul 
not as a separate faculty but as a particular capacity for motion, a capacity 
that he describes as the soul’s “weight” (pondus). The existence of sin, how-
ever, demonstrates that the soul is all too capable of being moved otherwise 
than toward the good. To understand how the soul can be moved always 
to the good and yet still sin, Bon a ven ture relies on John of Damascus’s 
distinction between the natural and deliberative motions of the soul. This 
distinction raises its own problems, however—for example, how can these 
two motions coexist in the soul?—and thus presses the question of what it 
means to say that the soul has motion at all.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the context of Bon a ven ture’s treat-
ment of synderesis is a commentary on a distinction in Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences about the goodness and corruption of the will. The problem that 
Peter’s text poses is how the will, as a natural good inherent in the soul, 
can ever be made wicked by sin.9 What is the relationship between the 
will’s innate goodness and its proclivity to evil? Peter also raises a question 
about the will in relation to the intellect. Why is it that it is not a sin for 
the intellect to think some evil thing, but it is always a sin for the will to 
will something evil?
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Because this distinction concerns the innate goodness of the will, it was 
routine for thirteenth-century commentators to discuss synderesis in rela-
tion to this passage (though Peter’s text does not mention the concept by 
name). Yet though synderesis helped theologians conceptualize the will’s 
natural goodness, the idea that synderesis moves infallibly only height-
ened the problem framed in the Sentences: What is the relation between 
the natural movement to the good and the deliberative movement to sin? 
Bon a ven ture considers the objection that “it is impossible, at one and the 
same time, for the will to be moved by contrary motions, or even disparate 
motions.”10 In response, he acknowledges the diffi culty and admits that the 
authorities have understood the relationship between these movements of 
the will in different ways. Some hold the motion of the natural and delib-
erative will to be indistinct, and say that a morally wicked act is simply a 
deformed act of willing a natural good. That is, a wicked act is a deformed 
and morally culpable attempt to attain the natural good of happiness.
But Bon a ven ture fi nally rejects this interpretation, wishing to uphold 
the moral integrity of the natural will to the good, “since, when Ambrose 
says that human beings naturally will the good, he does not mean only the 
natural good, which is indeed an act of will, but even the moral good. For 
human beings desire justice and hate injustice by their natural will.”11 The 
alternative, which Bon a ven ture endorses, is to admit two motions of the 
will, one “by which the will naturally desires the good, and the other by 
which the will deliberately desires evil.”12
But even here opinions are divided as to whether the two motions can 
exist simultaneously. Some say the act of the deliberative will does not 
exclude the act of the natural will. Others say that, if the power of the 
will is simple, it cannot be moved by different or contrary motions at the 
same time. Those who hold this position, Bon a ven ture argues, claim that 
synderesis is “always” acting in the sense of a habit, rather than literally 
acting at all times. Thus, they can claim without contradiction that the 
natural will is always acting (because it is always capable of acting), and 
that the will moves to sin from time to time, and that there is only one mo-
tion in the will at a time. Bon a ven ture agrees that the natural will is not in 
fact continually acting: “And therefore the text should be understood thus: 
that the word ‘always’ means the continuity of the habit of willing, not the 
act.”13 The substantial operation cannot be taken away, but the consequent 
operation can be impeded; in other words, the movement of the natural 
will toward the good is constant, but its realization in a concerted act of 
the soul is not. Nevertheless, Bon a ven ture explicitly leaves unresolved the 
more perplexing question: whether the deliberative motus to sin and the 
F6909.indb   69 10/7/16   1:41:36 PM
70 Elemental Motion and the Force of Union
natural motus to the good can act simultaneously. Can there be two con-
trary motions in the soul at the same time?
What is clear is that the natural and deliberative motions of the will 
should act together, in whatever way that might be possible. Bon a ven ture 
understands moral progress to involve the entire will, natural and delib-
erative. In 2 Sent. 39, he clarifi es that the natural desire for the good does 
not make the will good as such. Here he takes up obliquely a question that 
earlier commentators on synderesis frequently discussed—whether the 
movement of synderesis is meritorious. Bon a ven ture responds: “It must 
be said that the goodness of the will is inchoate in the natural appetite 
and consummated in deliberative virtue. Nor is the will wholly (simpliciter) 
good and upright unless it is upright insofar as it is moved both delibera-
tively and naturally.”14
Bon a ven ture also considers explicitly the other dilemma posed in  Peter’s 
text: Why is the will more corrupted in its act than any other power? Why 
is it a sin to will evil, but it is not necessarily a sin to understand evil? Given 
that an act’s value depends on its object, the evil of an object of intellect 
should, it seems, confer evil upon the act of understanding that object. The 
objection recognizes a distinction between the act of willing and the act of 
understanding: The former involves a motion from the will to its object, 
whereas the latter is accomplished by the motion of the object toward the 
intellect. Therefore, it seems, the wicked object should pollute the intel-
lect more than the will.
Bon a ven ture endorses the premise of the objection in his response: 
Willing does indeed involve a motion toward the object, whereas under-
standing involves a motion of the object toward the intellect.15 The will is 
that which is said properly to have motion, while the intellect remains at 
rest in its act. Yet for Bon a ven ture, this difference in orientation to objects 
proves that the will is more corrupted in its act than is the intellect, for 
to move toward the object transforms the will into its object, while the 
intellect is merely conformed to its object. To will an evil object is to be 
transformed by and into that evil. The difference between intellect and 
will is not, however, simply the direction of force involved in the act, but 
also its intensity: “This is so on account of the greater force of union which 
consists in love itself, just as Dionysius said: ‘We call love [amor] the unitive 
force’; moreover it is said in 1 Corinthians 6: ‘Whoever adheres to God 
is made one spirit.’ ”16 The claim that Bon a ven ture makes elsewhere that 
responsibility—the capacity for merit and blame—is based in the capac-
ity for free choice is tied to a conception of the will as a susceptibility to 
F6909.indb   70 10/7/16   1:41:36 PM
Elemental Motion and the Force of Union 71
an intense force, one that binds the soul to its object for better and for 
worse.17 The affective part of the soul’s greater capacity for corruption also 
accounts for its greater force of union with and transformation into God. 
The force of union is the force of the object acting on the soul, drawing the 
soul to itself; the affective part of the soul is its capacity to be affected by a 
good (or perceived good) beyond itself.
This interpretation of affective movement is reinforced in Bon a ven-
ture’s discussion of amor in the fi rst volume of the commentary, where 
he discusses the relationship between the terms amor, dilectio, and caritas. 
Though Bon a ven ture acknowledges shades of meaning in the different 
terms, he does not offer a disjunctive picture of affect as a whole. He de-
fi nes amor as “the adhesion of an affection with respect to the one loved.”18 
But with this general defi nition of love, Bon a ven ture rejects the opinion 
that amor names a “libidinous affection,” while dilectio signifi es an act of a 
well-ordered will (ex voluntate ordinata). And he cites Dionysius in Divine 
Names 4 in support of this conclusion: “Theologians seem to me to signify 
the same thing by the words amor and dilectio,” with amor translating the 
Greek eros and dilectio translating agape.
Nevertheless, Bon a ven ture does draw a distinction between the terms: 
To the basic defi nition of amor, the term dilectio adds (addit) the sense of 
election (electio). That is, dilectio is the adhesion of affection with respect 
to the loved object chosen out of a number of possible objects. This is the 
love spoken of in Song of Songs 5: “My beloved [dilectus], chosen out of a 
thousand.” Finally, caritas, from carus or dear, adds to the sense of dilectio 
an appreciation for the great value of the beloved object.
This passage alerts the reader to the importance of attending to the 
nuance of affective terms in Bon a ven ture’s writings. Yet it would be too 
simple to expect to fi nd in the passage a legend for decoding every discus-
sion of love in Bon a ven ture’s corpus, or to simply equate amor with the 
will’s natural motion and dilectio with deliberation. However, the passage 
demonstrates Bon a ven ture’s concern to uphold the basic understanding of 
amor that he derives from the Dionysian authority: Love, in every case, is 
an affective adhesion of lover and loved, a unitive and transformative force. 
The defi nition leaves unresolved, then, the ambiguity evident both in the 
concept of dilectio and in the operation of the deliberative will: The soul’s 
capacity for choice is simply one mode of the force by which the soul is 
attracted by and transformed into the object of its desire.
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Aristotle and Elemental Motion
The ambiguity that I am suggesting is constitutive of Bon a ven ture’s un-
derstanding of affectus is not unique to him, and can be found in a number 
of his philosophical and theological sources. But here I am particularly 
interested in exploring the way in which Bon a ven ture’s theory of affect 
depends on a theory of motion. And while it would be misleading to call 
Bon a ven ture’s understanding of affective motion “Aristotelian,” Aristotle’s 
theory of natural motion and its relation to the soul’s movement forms part 
of the framework for Bon a ven ture’s refl ection on affect. It may therefore 
provide a helpful point of reference for thinking through aspects of Bon-
a ven ture’s conception of affective motion, while also further illuminating 
the intractability of the ambiguity that characterizes the motion of affectus 
in its relation to the intellect and to its object of desire.
Bon a ven ture uses the term motus both of conscience and synderesis. In 
the discussion of whether synderesis can sin, Bon a ven ture says that con-
science is “not moved by a simple motion alone, but by a collative one.”19 
Yet elsewhere he suggests that motus applies only analogically to the cogni-
tive part of the soul: “Conscience is the habit perfecting our intellect inso-
far as it is practical, or insofar as it directs in works. And thus the intellect 
has in a certain way a motive cause, not because it effects movement, but 
because it dictates and inclines to movement.”20 He is even clearer on this 
point when, in arguing that synderesis is affective, he writes, “Therefore 
just as reason is not able to move without the will mediating, so neither can 
conscience move without synderesis mediating.”21 In attributing motion to 
the practical intellect and, to a greater extent, to affect, Bon a ven ture fol-
lows the outlines of Aristotle’s account of animal motion in De anima III.10. 
Accordingly, he reads Aristotle’s discussions of the acts of the soul through 
the thirteenth-century language of faculties and powers.
Aristotle had argued that both desire and practical intellect together are 
necessary for motion, but, strictly speaking, it is desire alone— or desire in 
conjunction with the object of desire—that effects motion.22 Bon a ven ture, 
like other medieval theorists of the soul, equates the motive part of the soul 
with the affectus (and the natural mode of the motive part with synderesis). 
But perhaps refl ecting either the ambiguity in Aristotle’s text or simply the 
conjunction of the practical intellect to affect, he also attributes motion, 
in a less proper sense, to conscientia in the cognitive part of the soul. In 
his discussion of synderesis and conscience, however, Bon a ven ture leaves 
unexamined the question of the agent of motion—whether the object of 
the affectus (the bonum honestum) is properly considered the cause of mo-
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tion, or whether the cause is internal to the soul itself. Nevertheless, the 
question—and its attendant diffi culties—may still be discerned in Bon-
a ven ture’s texts. Here close attention must be paid to the analogies and 
the images he uses to describe the soul’s natural tendency to motion—as 
a weight or pondus of the soul by which it ascends, just as fi re ascends to its 
natural place.
Though Bon a ven ture does not cite Aristotle as the source for his ac-
count of elemental motion, Aristotle’s comments on this point, as found in 
Physica and De caelo, infl uenced medieval cosmological and physical theo-
ries through a number of late ancient channels. The geocentric cosmology 
that underwrites this theory of motion is by no means unique to Aristotle, 
nor is the presence of such a cosmic scheme in a later author necessarily ev-
idence of Aristotelian “infl uence.” The philosopher’s accounts of elemental 
motion within a geocentric cosmos, however, bring into relief a number 
of conceptual ambiguities that attend any such theory, and so Aristotle, 
though not an absolute beginning for ancient and medieval physics, is nev-
ertheless a helpful place to start.
The equivocation in De anima, which appears to explain motion both 
as a function of a desire internal to the soul and as a function of the ex-
ternal object of desire, points to a major diffi culty in Aristotle’s theories 
of animal self-motion.23 In an infl uential essay, David Furley argues that 
Aristotle needs both explanations of motion to be true in order to maintain 
a distinction between the motion of animals and the motions of inanimate 
beings, including the elements, which, rising or falling inexorably to their 
natural places, may seem to contain some inherent principle of motion 
themselves.24 Aristotle considers this problem at greatest length in Physics 
and On the Heavens (De caelo). In the fi rst, he states that the natural move-
ments of animals come from themselves and that, in fact, all self-movement 
is natural.25 This is obvious enough because in Book Two Aristotle had al-
ready defi ned a physis of a thing as a “certain principle and cause of change 
and stability in the thing.”26 Natural movement would be that movement 
that is due to a nature—that is, an inhering cause of motion. The soul of 
the animal is, by virtue of its embodiment, also susceptible to unnatural, 
external movements. An important link is established between interiority 
and self-motion, on the one hand, and exterior motion and corporeality, 
on the other.
More diffi cult is the case of simple bodies—fi re, air, water, and earth—
and inanimate things composed of them. The simple bodies are natural, 
and they have their own natural movements: Fire moves upward or to-
ward the extremity; earth moves downward or toward the center. But they 
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cannot be self-movers, both because self-motion belongs only to living 
things, and because, if they moved themselves, they would also have the 
ability to stop moving. But, though lacking the ability to cause movement, 
the simple bodies do contain a source of movement: “it is a source which 
enables them to be affected.”27 The problem of the natural movements of 
simple bodies is solved (though only partially) by positing a potentiality to 
particular kinds of motion in those simple bodies. So, for example, air has 
the natural capacity to be moved upward—to actualize its potential for 
rising—if a hindrance is removed.
In De caelo, Aristotle provides greater detail about the nature of elemen-
tal motion. Book Four presents an inquiry into the meanings of the terms 
“heavy” and “light,” which constitute “a proper part of the theory of move-
ment, since we call things heavy and light because they have the power of 
being moved naturally in a certain way.”28 He considers two previous theo-
ries of this natural motion. The fi rst, which he identifi es as coming from 
the Timaeus, holds that heaviness is a function of the quantity of identical 
parts of which a body is composed. If quantity were the determinant of 
heaviness and lightness, Aristotle counters, then a larger quantity of fi re 
should rise more slowly than a smaller one. But the opposite is in fact the 
case. He then considers a second theory, which deems lightness a result of 
the void that is trapped in bodies, and raises a number of objections to this 
theory before advancing to his own.
In offering his own account, Aristotle provisionally accepts “the com-
mon statement of older writers that ‘like moves to like,’ ” because, he says, 
“the movement of each body to its own place is motion toward its own 
form.”29 Elemental motion would then be a continual process of cosmic 
sorting, all bodies moving to their own kind. But this principle in itself 
is not suffi cient to explain the determinant motions of elements to fi xed 
positions. To advance the explanation further, Aristotle hypothesizes, “If 
one were to remove the earth to where the moon now is, the various frag-
ments of earth would each move not towards it but to the place in which 
it now is.”30 The reason for this surprising conclusion, Aristotle continues, 
is consistent with the principle that like seeks like, for what bodies move 
toward when they move toward their like is a common form. Thus for the 
earth to abandon its natural place would be to abandon its form. A thing’s 
natural “place” is the boundary that contains it, and this boundary is sim-
ply the thing’s form—and so, “it is to its like that a body moves when it 
moves to its own place.”31 The natural place of a simple body is its form; its 
tendency to movement toward that place is its potential for its own form; 
its attainment of that place is its actualization. The change that is natural 
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motion, then, is explicable as a species of alteration in general: “Thus to 
ask why fi re moves upward and earth downward is the same as to ask why 
the healable, when moved and changed qua healable, attains health and not 
whiteness.”32 The difference with elemental motion—and what makes the 
elements seem to have some internal source of their motion (even though 
in fact they are moved by their natural place)—is that they are “closest to 
matter.” That is, the simple bodies appear to have some internal agent of 
motion because they are observed to move so determinately, so inexorably, 
to their place (and because there is no visible external agent of change act-
ing upon them). Whereas according to De anima III.10, the soul moves 
itself through a complicated interplay of desired object, the faculty of de-
sire, and the practical intellect, by contrast, the simple bodies are moved 
immediately by the form (that is, their place), which is external to them. 
The trajectory of external motion is so certain that it appears to be inter-
nally driven.
Bon a ven ture’s discussion of synderesis and conscience explicitly refers 
to Aristotle’s theory of animal motion. But his description of natural mo-
tion as a weight by which the will is drawn more closely resembles the Ar-
istotelian explanation of bodily, elemental motion.33 What are for Aristotle 
two different kinds of motion proper to two different kinds of beings—the 
self-motion of the soul and the external motion of bodies—are for Bon a-
ven ture two kinds of motion (natural and deliberative) both belonging to, 
though not simply internal to, the soul.
Augustine and the pondus amoris
A number of Christian theologians before Bon a ven ture saw in the move-
ment of elements a fi tting description of the soul’s tendency to the good. 
Perhaps the deepest refl ection in early Christian literature of the theme of 
the “weight” of the soul is in the fi nal book of Augustine’s Confessions. Here 
Augustine expands the scope of his inquiry to the whole created order:
A body inclines by its own weight towards its own place (Corpus pondere 
suo nititur ad locum suum). Weight does not always tend towards the 
lowest place, but to its own proper place. Fire tends upward, stones 
tend downward: they are both led by their weight, seeking their place 
(ponderibus suis aguntur, loca sua petunt). Oil poured into water, rises 
again above the water, but water poured over oil will sink beneath the 
oil: they are both led by their weight, seeking their place (ponderibus 
suis aguntur, loca sua petunt). When things are out of order, they are not 
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at rest; coming to order, they fi nd rest. My love is my weight (Pondus 
meum amor meus). By it I am carried wherever I am carried. By your gift 
we are infl amed and carried upwards; we are enkindled and we set off 
(imus). In our hearts we rise as we sing a song of ascent. By your fi re, 
your good fi re, we are infl amed and we rise (imus) . . . 34
Augustine puts the movement of bodies in the passive voice: By weight 
all things are led (aguntur) to their place. Pondus is the capacity for being 
moved in a certain way, whether in the physical bodies or in the human 
soul. As Augustine writes just before the cited passage, “Our place is where 
we come to rest. Love carries us there.”35 The passage hesitates between 
the active and passive, locating in love the point at which activity and pas-
sivity meet, where the distinction is confounded because the love felt by 
the soul for God is never truly its own. This is far from Aristotle’s ac-
count of motion. And yet there is an echo of the Aristotelian hesitation in 
De  anima III, between desire and the object of desire, orexis and orektikon, 
as the agent of affective movement.
For Augustine, if pondus is the capacity to be moved, it is also that by 
which all things loca sua petunt—seek or strive for their place. Aristotle’s 
own writings about the elements in motion, though denying an internal 
source of change, suggest some kind of desire or longing for place. With 
the term peto, Augustine also attributes a kind of desire to material bodies. 
He expands on this theme in De civitate Dei 11: “If we were stones or waves 
or wind or fi re, or something like these, without any sense or life, we would 
nevertheless not be without a certain appetite [appetitus] for our own place 
and order. For the movement produced by weight is, as it were, the body’s 
love [amor], whether it bears downward by heaviness or upward by light-
ness. Just as a body is carried by its weight, so is the soul carried wherever 
it is carried by its love.”36 On one level, this passage works precisely to 
distinguish human beings from stones or waves because love in the hu-
man soul seeks the Creator and not simply place, or fruitfulness, or sensual 
goods. But what grounds the comparison of human beings to inanimate 
bodies is a common term, appetitus, which all things have in common and 
which functions in an analogous way in both bodies and rational souls. The 
force of the comparison is that the love of God is as natural to the soul as 
downward or upward motion is to stones and fl ames.
One of the most striking differences between Augustine’s description 
of pondus in the Confessions and Aristotle’s baros is Augustine’s claim that 
weight does not always tend toward the lowest place, that is, toward the 
element of earth. In De caelo, Aristotle argues at some length that weight 
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is the principle of downward motion (or—what amounts to the same in a 
geocentric cosmos—motion toward the center). While even air has some 
weight, Aristotle maintains that pure fi re is absolutely light—that is, ab-
solutely without weight. But for Augustine, pondus signifi es a natural ap-
pointment to a proper level or place within the physical order and has no 
contrary.37 Augustine discusses pondus most frequently as the last term in a 
triad of properties of all created things—measure, number, and weight—
following Wisdom 11:21, “God ordained all things in measure, number, 
and weight.”38 In the fourth book of De Genesi ad litteram, he examines the 
role of this triad in God’s creation: “Measure set a mode on everything, 
number bestows form, and weight draws everything to rest and stability. 
And God is all three of these things originally, truly, and uniquely, who 
limits all, and forms all, and orders all.”39 As the means by which God or-
dained his creation, mensura, numerus, and pondus are not only properties 
of bodies:
Measure, number, and weight can be observed and understood not only 
in stones and wood and such corporeal things with mass and quantity, 
whether terrestrial or celestial. There is also the measure of something 
to be done, lest it run out of control and out of bounds; and there is the 
number of the affections and virtues of the soul, by which the soul is 
drawn away from the deformity of foolishness and drawn towards the 
form and splendor of wisdom; and there is the weight of the will and 
of love, in which appears the value of what is to be desired [appetendo], 
what is to be avoided [fugiendo], and what is to be given priority.40
The weight of the soul is not a quantity or a function of mass as it is 
in bodies, but like the pondus of the body, the pondus of the will or love is 
a principle of movement—that by which the soul seeks what is good and 
fl ees what is not. In the case of both bodies and the soul, as Augustine 
writes, pondus is that which “draws each thing to repose and stability.”41 
By contrast, Augustine identifi es a further sense of measure, number, and 
weight to which the others are subordinated: “And there is a measure with-
out measure, to which must be reckoned all that is from it, though it is not 
from anything else; there is a number without number, by which all things 
are formed, though it itself is not formed; and there is a weight without 
weight, to which those whose rest is pure joy fi nd that rest, though it is still 
not drawn to any other.”42 In one sense, God can be said to have mensura, 
numerus, and pondus insofar as God is the source and destination of all cre-
ated beings; but in himself, he is without measure, without number, and 
without weight. God is not subject to limit, to form, or to being moved.
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Pondus in creatures, then, would seem to refer simply to the passivity to 
movement. But there is an ambiguity to Augustine’s notion of weight in the 
soul. On analogy with the weights of material bodies, Augustine suggests 
that the soul has a particular weight by which it moves to its appointed 
place. But elsewhere, pondus in the soul appears less determined. If every 
body has a specifi c weight drawing it to its proper place, the weight of the 
soul may be a means of ascent or descent. As the passage from the Confes-
sions cited previously states, by love I am carried wherever I am carried. If 
the soul can be carried aloft by the love of the Spirit, it can also descend by 
the pondus cupiditatis into the depths of sin—the depths being not a local, 
physical place, but the inordinate passions “which drag us downward to 
love of worldly concerns.”43 In De libero arbitrio, Augustine compares the 
will’s movement to the movement of a falling stone. While both the will’s 
movements and the stone’s are proper to them, the movements are dis-
similar in that “a stone lacks the power to restrain the motion by which it is 
carried downward, but the soul is not moved to abandon higher things for 
inferior things only so long as it does not will it. Therefore the stone’s mo-
tion is natural, but the soul’s is voluntary.”44 It would be beyond absurd, he 
continues, to attribute moral culpability to the stone for falling given that 
it is naturally moved downward. But when the soul descends to the depths, 
this is a voluntary movement in that it results from an abandonment of the 
love that bears the soul aloft and is a gift of the Holy Spirit.
The soul, then, is capable of a downward movement, which is to be dis-
tinguished from elemental movement by the presence of volition. Augus-
tine is also careful to distinguish the interior downward movement of the 
soul from the motion of bodies. In Confessions 13.7, he refl ects on the dif-
fi culty of speaking about the motions of the soul. The depths to which we 
sink are not places, he admits, but states of the soul—affections, loves, and 
impure spirits—and yet they are not entirely unlike places. Quid similius, 
et quid disimilius? Augustine does not answer his own question, leaving the 
analogy—and its attendant ambiguities—for later medieval theologians 
to parse.
The Place of the Soul: William of St. Thierry’s 
De natura et dignitate amoris
In the twelfth century, the Cistercian abbot William of St.-Thierry was 
also concerned with the applicability of locus to the soul and to God. His 
caution against the theory that the soul is localized in the body does not 
inhibit him from fully embracing the theme of the soul’s movement to its 
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natural place. In the prologue to his treatise on the growth of love in the 
religious novice, De natura et dignitate amoris, William identifi es love as “a 
force (vis) of the soul, carrying (ferens) it by a certain natural weight (natu-
rali quodam pondere) to its place or destination (locum vel fi nem suum).”45 
Here the Augustinian theme of love as the weight by which the soul as-
cends is reprised, only with a greater emphasis on the proper place of the 
soul: “Every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, has a fi xed place [cer-
tum locum] to which it is naturally carried, and a certain natural weight by 
which it is carried. For weight, as a certain philosopher correctly teaches, 
does not always move downwards. Fire rises, water descends, and so on.”46 
Whatever William may understand incorporeal place to be (a question 
that I will revisit shortly), his statement here must be read as more than a 
simple metaphor: Bodies do not possess weight or a place in a truer sense 
than do spiritual creatures. All creatures—corporeal or spiritual—are alike 
in possessing pondus and having a proper place. Nevertheless, determining 
the weight and place of the elements such as fi re and water, as William 
well observes, is a simpler thing than explaining precisely what is proper 
to spiritual place. And when it is a question of human beings, composed of 
bodies and souls, the situation becomes even more complicated:
Human beings are also moved by their weight, which carries the spirit 
upward, and the body downward, both toward their place or destina-
tion. What is the place of the body? Scripture replies: “You are earth 
and to earth you shall return.” Yet it says in the Book of Wisdom con-
cerning the spirit, “and the spirit returns to God who created it.” Look 
at humans in their disintegration, how completely they are carried 
along by their own weight to their place. When things go well and 
according to order, the spirit returns to God who created it, and the 
body to earth, not only to earth but into the elements from which it 
was composed and formed. When earth, fi re, water, and air reclaim for 
themselves something of it, when there is a natural disintegration of a 
natural composite, each part returns by its own weight to its own ele-
ment. The disintegration is complete when all of them are restored to 
their proper place.47
It is a poignant description of the human being, a fragile composite whose 
members are all out of place. The physical elements that compose the body 
fi nd, without deviation, their proper place upon the corruption of the body. 
Here the likeness of spiritual weight to corporeal weight also breaks down: 
“While not one of the elements deviates from its natural course, only the 
miserable soul and degenerate spirit, corrupted by the vice of sin, although 
F6909.indb   79 10/7/16   1:41:36 PM
80 Elemental Motion and the Force of Union
by itself naturally tending to its place, does not know or learns with dif-
fi culty how to return to its origin.”48 Why, if love is a natural force within 
the soul, must it be learned by the soul, when the physical elements move 
immediately to their places?
In the prologue, William explains that love is implanted in the soul by 
the “Creator of nature,” so that, barring love’s destruction by “adulterous 
affections,” it teaches the soul from within how to love properly. In the 
rest of the treatise, William describes the process of preparing oneself to 
receive that teaching within the structure of a monastic community. He 
describes the will as the affectus of the rational soul—that is, the soul’s 
capacity to be fi lled with good (by grace) and with evil (by its own fail-
ings). Love is kindled when, by grace, the will fi xes itself to the Holy Spirit, 
for love is “nothing other than the will vehemently attached to something 
good.”49 In the beginning stages of this love, the religious novice engages 
in the hard labor of self-discipline at the hand of an external authority, 
until, under the direction of his own reason, the external regulations he has 
been following impress themselves on him interiorly.
As the novice grows into spiritual maturity, his love is illumined (illumi-
nari) by God. At this stage, the love that was previously guided by reason 
and inculcated in the performance of exterior commands begins to “pass 
over [transire] into the affectus.”50 Affectus is an intricate and multivalent 
term in William’s writings.51 In the most general sense, he uses the term 
as the capacity of the soul to be moved, with an emphasis on the passiv-
ity of the soul to the object of its desire. Here, however, in describing the 
passing over of love into the affectus, William seems to be using the term 
in a more exalted sense as charitas. As he defi nes it a bit later on, “The af-
fectus is that which seizes the mind by a kind of general force and perpetual 
virtue, fi rm and stable and maintained through grace.”52 He contrasts this 
with the various affectiones (referred to elsewhere in the work as affectus in 
the plural), which vary with time and circumstance. To be gripped by the 
enlightened affectus is to be held steady from the attacks of the affectiones. 
The enlightened affectus, or charitas, awakens the fi ve spiritual senses in the 
soul, and, with its two eyes of amor and ratio, is able to see God: Reason 
sees God through what He is not, while love abandons itself (defi cere) in 
what He is.
Upon this self-abandonment, the soul takes rest from its labors and fi nds 
repose in wisdom and the enjoyment of God. But only upon the death of 
the body does the spirit truly return to its place: “When all things proceed 
well and according to order, just as we said at the beginning, the weight 
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of each thing bears it to its place: the body to the earth from which it was 
taken, to be raised up and glorifi ed in its time, and the spirit to God who 
created it.”55 The return of the spirit to its origin in God is in accordance 
with nature, but it is not inevitable like the return of the physical elements 
to their places. Neither, however, is it a result of an effort of loving. By 
calling the affectus a natural pondus of the soul, William makes clear that 
the love of God is not an act that the soul performs. Its effort is aimed at 
removing the hindrances to that motion.
Bon a ven ture: Pondus as Ordinativa Inclinatio
As is clear, then, Bon a ven ture by no means invented the trope of pondus as 
the means by which the soul rises to God. What he did do, however, was 
elevate it from a trope to a key dynamic in his theology of creation and 
return. This dynamic is perhaps most evident in his Breviloquium, or Brief 
Discourse, written as Master of Theology around 1257. Covering the basic 
articles of faith, from the Triune God to the Last Things, the Breviloquium 
serves as a kind of short summa, or, to use Bon a ven ture’s own imagery, a 
map through a dense and diffi cult forest. It provides, by the work’s stated 
intention, a synoptic view from which to observe connections and patterns 
across different areas of Christian teaching, and the theological concepts 
through which those connections are forged.
The concept of pondus plays a surprisingly far-reaching role in these 
connections for Bon a ven ture, especially as a force accounting for the 
Neoplatonic hydraulics of procession and return that structure the Brevilo-
quium (and which can be discerned everywhere in Bon a ven ture’s writing). 
In the Breviloquium, pondus signifi es a created, intrinsic property by which 
all creatures, corporeal and incorporeal, are moved to their end. Bon a-
ven ture writes that “the whole structure of the world [universitas machinae 
mundialis] was brought to being in time and out of nothingness by one fi rst, 
single, and highest principle, whose power, though without measure, dis-
posed all things in a certain weight, number, and measure [in certo pondere, 
numero et mensura].”54 As he explains, the attribution of measure, number, 
and weight to all creatures is a statement about their threefold cause:
The phrase “in a certain weight, number, and measure” indicates that 
creation is the effect of the Trinity creating through a threefold kind of 
causality: as effi cient cause, by which there is unity, mode, and measure 
in creatures; as exemplary cause, by which there is truth, species, and 
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number in creatures; and as fi nal cause, by which there is goodness, 
order, and weight in creatures. These vestiges of the Creator are found 
in all creatures, whether corporeal, or spiritual, or composites of both.55
In De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine, too, correlates mensura, numerus, and 
pondus with modus, species, and ordo.56 Bon a ven ture explains the relation be-
tween creator and creature by means of a threefold causality derived from 
the fourfold Aristotelian scheme. The properties of creatures are expres-
sions of their relationship to God as their maker, exemplar, and end.
Later in the same chapter of the Breviloquium, Bon a ven ture repeats, al-
most to the word, the same formulation, but this time, instead of numerus 
he uses the term discreta (“distinction”) and he appends a gloss to pondus—
“for pondus is an ordering inclination” (ordinativa inclinatio).57 It is clear, 
then, that pondus is not primarily a physical quantity that is analogously, 
or metaphorically, applied to incorporeal things. Rather, in its most literal 
application, pondus is an ordering tendency directing creatures toward God 
as their fi nal cause. This is true of the weight of bodies as well as the weight 
of souls.
Thus, the pondus of human beings, as body-soul composites, is complex. 
First of all, Bon a ven ture says explicitly that all creatures have measure, 
number and weight, whether those creatures are spiritual, material, or 
composite, as is human nature. Whereas for William, the weight of the hu-
man soul was to be distinguished from the weight of the human body, each 
going its own way upon disintegration, Bon a ven ture does not make this 
distinction. Perhaps, then, he has in mind a tighter integration of soul and 
body in the human being, ordained to one pondus or ordering inclination. 
Yet Bon a ven ture elsewhere seems to suggest that the weight of the human 
person is multiple, or, rather, variable. In fact, in Part 5 he suggests that the 
proper weight of the soul is something that must be achieved through the 
ordering of the soul, which occurs through grace.58 These statements point 
to the complexity entailed in Bon a ven ture’s conception of the pondus of hu-
man beings in light of his statements about human dependence on grace.
This complexity is apparent throughout Part 5 of the Breviloquium, 
which treats the grace of the Holy Spirit. Grace, Bon a ven ture begins, is a 
gift infused by God, by which the soul is “perfected and made the bride of 
Christ, daughter of the eternal Father, and temple of the Holy Spirit.”59 It 
is a gift that cleanses, enlightens, and lifts up the soul. And the lifting up 
of the soul is at the same time the condescension of God, not through his 
essence but through “an outpouring emanating from him.”60 What is this 
movement of ascent that is at the same time a descent? It is not that “the 
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spirit is elevated above itself in place [per situm localem],” but rather, it takes 
on the form of God (per habitum deiformem). And this elevation, so under-
stood, is not effected “through a habit naturally inserted, but only through 
an infused gift divinely given.”61 In one movement, the soul ascends to 
God when God condescends in grace to the soul.
In the subsequent chapters of Part 5, Bon a ven ture traces the operations 
of grace in relation to sin, virtue, and meritorious acts. Grace has three 
senses. In its most general sense, grace is a gift to all creatures enabling 
them to continue to exist. Because creatures are created from nothing, they 
would revert to nothing without the continual support of their Principle. 
Bon a ven ture’s term for this contingency is vanitas, itself a kind of weight 
whose motion God hinders through his presence in all things. He draws 
the comparison to someone holding a heavy object (corpus ponderosum) in 
mid-air. If the object is released, it will fall down.62 Though he does not 
call vanitas the weight of creatures, his simile makes it clear that the pondus 
of creatures, properly speaking, is itself the presence of grace, God’s action 
in sustaining all creatures from reverting to nothingness.63
This general grace is a gift to all creatures, from stones to human beings. 
The other two senses of grace pertain only to the rational spirit: Grace in 
its special sense (sometimes called actual grace) prepares the rational spirit 
for receiving the third grace. This sanctifying grace makes the soul capable 
of attaining merit and advancing to salvation. This is the grace of which 
Augustine wrote, it “prevenes in the will, so that it wills, and follows the 
act, so that it does not want in vain.”64 Bon a ven ture then examines the 
workings of sanctifying grace as a remedy for sin in the virtues, the gifts 
of the Spirit, the fi ve spiritual senses, and other aspects of sanctifi cation. 
Then he turns to examine the workings of grace in meritorious acts: belief 
in the articles of faith, the ordering of the affections, the performance of 
the divine law, and petitioning God in prayer.
It is in the context of the ordering of affections that Bon a ven ture dis-
cusses the pondus of the soul. Four things must be loved with caritas— God, 
ourselves, our neighbor, and our body. The ultimate end of loving is the 
ordering of oneself to the Good in which human beings fi nd rest and enjoy-
ment. Because of this, charity is due, fi rst, to God, who is that Good, and 
secondarily to ourselves and our neighbors, who will be made capable of 
enjoying the Good, and fi nally to our bodies, which will be beatifi ed with 
the spirit and will share in this enjoyment. To love these things properly, 
however, the soul’s affections must be brought to order, against their own 
refl exive tendency: “Love [amor], the weight of the soul [mens], and the 
origin of every spiritual affection [omnis affectionis mentalis], is brought back 
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toward the self with ease, extends to the neighbor with diffi culty, and is 
raised up to God with greater diffi culty.”65 Because the soul in loving tends 
toward itself and its body, it needs ordering by two commandments—to 
love God and to love one’s neighbor.
In addition to the commandments, God has given another grace for 
ordering the affections: “Charity is the root, form, and end of virtue, at 
the same time joining everything to its fi nal end and binding all things 
together in order. Thus charity is the weight of ordered inclination and the 
bond of perfect union.”66 By using the term pondus both for the refl exive 
love of the soul and for the ordering grace of charity, Bon a ven ture casts 
the ordering of the affections and the sanctifi cation of the affect as a kind 
of play of forces. The weight of the soul is transformed by the pull of a 
greater weight, which draws up the affections of the soul and binds them to 
God and to neighbor, and, in an extended sense, to everything in creation. 
For as charity orders and hierarchizes, it at the same time unifi es.67 Char-
ity should not be understood simply as a gift to the soul or an aid in moral 
progress, but as the telos of creation. As Bon a ven ture writes in concluding 
this section: “With this union consummated through the bond of charity, 
God will be all in all in true eternity and perfect peace. Through love all 
things will be ordered to communion and bound in an indissoluble con-
nection.”68 When he asserts that all things will be in “perfect peace,” this, 
he later explains, is to be understood not simply as a psychological state of 
the human being, but rather as a perpetual state of cosmic quiescence—
one in which the heavenly motions that mark time and the simple elements 
now in fl ux will all come to rest.69
But though the fi nal state is one of repose, the events leading up to it are 
anything but peaceful. At the fi nal judgment, a fi re will devour the face of 
the earth—though not completely:
It is said that “the form [fi gura] of this world will pass away,” not in 
the sense of the complete destruction of this sensible world, but that 
through the action of that fi re infl aming all elemental things, plants 
and animals will be consumed, and the elements will be purifi ed and 
made new, especially air and earth, and the just will be purifi ed and the 
wicked will be consumed in fl ame. With these things accomplished, the 
motion of the heavens will cease, so that, with the number of the elect 
fulfi lled, the bodies of the world will in a certain way be made new and 
rewarded.70
Just as the association of the affective movement of the soul with fi re evokes 
the ancient Stoic conception of fi ery pneuma as the motive and animating 
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substance of the body and of the cosmos, so too the infl uence of the ancient 
Stoic vision of a periodic confl agration that renews the cosmos is evident in 
Bon a ven ture’s depiction of the fi nal renewal of heaven and earth through 
fi re.71 Bon a ven ture’s account, like the Stoic doctrine of confl agration, de-
scribes a balancing of elemental forces. At the beginning of humankind, a 
fl ood of water devoured and cleansed the earth, and so its contrary, fi re, 
will devour and purify the earth at its end. Moreover, fi re is the necessary 
antidote to the “cooling of charity” (refrigerium caritatis) that has befallen 
the world in its old age.
Because this cleansing is eternal, no creature could bring it about on its 
own, and thus a higher power must initiate the confl agration. Neverthe-
less, Bon a ven ture explains, the effect is produced by means of the natural 
powers of fi re: “infl aming” (infl ammare), “purging” (purgare), “rarefying” 
(rarefacere), and “subtilizing” (subtiliare). All things will be subject to this 
“concourse of fi res”—the just will be purged by the fi res of purgatory, the 
wicked tormented by the fi res of hell, the elements refi ned, and the animals 
and plants consumed by elemental fi re. The heavenly bodies will burn with 
an intense brightness and come to rest.
It may be tempting to parse here an analogy between the spiritual “fi re,” 
which purges the just, and the real fi re, which refi nes and consumes the 
bodies of earth. However, Bon a ven ture explains with terrible clarity the 
nature of the fi res of purgatory and hell. It must be held, he insists, that 
the fi re of purgatory is a corporeal fi re (ignis corporalis) that burns the spirit 
of the sins it carries and causes it to suffer.72 Because the soul sinned by 
sinking to the body, it is fi tting to divine justice that the punishments of 
purgatory come from the body and affect the soul. Thus the spirit is burned 
by a material fi re (ab igne materiali) in purgatory. The fi res of hell are also 
corporeal, Bon a ven ture writes, tormenting both the bodies and souls of 
the damned “in a corporeal place down below” (in loco corporali deorsum), 
and the “smoke of their torments will ascend forever and ever.”73
These statements leave no refuge for the wicked in metaphor. For the 
just, however, the effect of corporeal fi re on the spirit is, ultimately, good 
news. The soul is punished for its faults and “relieved of the burden of its 
guilt” (reatuum onere alleviatam). This occurs, Bon a ven ture explains, either 
on the basis of some God-given power in the fi re, or, more likely, through 
the interior working of grace with the external fi res assisting. He sees, 
however, the diffi culty introduced by claiming that corporeal fi re directly 
affects the incorporeal spirit—and yet does not wish to deny that the cor-
poreal fi re itself, in whatever way effected by grace, has a role to play in the 
cleansing punishment. When the purgation is complete, immediately the 
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purifi ed spirits, “whom the fi re of charity lifts up, and who have no impu-
rity of the soul or any guilt to hold them back (retardans), necessarily fl y 
away.”74 The purifi cation of the soul is, here again, understood as a contest 
of forces, the removal of a weight (impuritas or onus reatuum) that acted 
as a hindrance to another, greater weight (caritas). And this action occurs 
through (at least the assistance of ) corporeal fi re, which will envelop the 
earth and infl ame, subtilize, and rarefy all things—that is, will transform 
all things into itself. Thus the confl agration of the earth appears to achieve 
the goal of the ordering weight of charity: all things are set in upward mo-
tion, bound together, and ultimately brought to rest.
The connection between the affective heat of the soul and the cleans-
ing fi re of the cosmos recalls the Stoic identifi cation of the warm pneuma 
that produces changes in bodies with the “craftsmanlike fi re” that creates 
and recreates the cosmos.75 The resonance here with the Stoic teaching 
stresses the deep continuity between the movement of souls and the move-
ments of bodies. And just as, for the Stoic philosophers, this fi re is both 
natural and divine, for Bon a ven ture, too, the affective movement of the all 
things to God is at the same time natural and gratuitous.76 But Bon a ven-
ture’s vision of the fi nal confl agration is at the same time the devastating 
eschatological realization of Dionysius’s erotic cosmos: “We call love the 
unitive force.”77
This love, as Bon a ven ture makes clear, has fully cosmic dimensions, and 
extends to every aspect of creation. Nevertheless, the rational soul, being 
immortal and possessed of the image of God in memory, intellect, and will, 
receives this love in a distinctive and greater mode than other creatures. 
Bon a ven ture affi rms the Aristotelian distinction between the motion of 
the soul and the motion of bodies when he argues that, in all cases of cor-
poreal motion, there must be distinguished an agent and patient of motion, 
but in the case of the will, true self-motion is possible. That is, the will is 
both the mover and moved, whereas in cases of bodily motion, there is an 
external agent (whether place, or some effi cient cause) and the thing that 
is moved.78
Rather than obviating the force of Bon a ven ture’s corporeal analogies 
for the ascent of the soul toward God, this distinction between self-motion 
and external motion renders the analogies all the more remarkable. For 
though the deliberative motion of the soul is unlike the motion of bodies, 
the highest motion that human beings are capable of (the ascent toward 
and union with God) most closely resembles the most basic kind of motion 
in the universe—that of the elements moving toward their natural places. 
Bon a ven ture is clear that the will is not subject to coercion: “Since attain-
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ing beatitude is not glorious unless it is through merit, and there is no 
merit in something unless it is done voluntarily and freely, it is fi tting that 
freedom of choice [libertatem arbitrii] be given to the rational soul, through 
the removal of all coercion, for it is of the nature of the will that it in no 
way can be forced.”79 But while Bon a ven ture maintains that even the attain-
ment of beatitude is not the result of any coercion of the will, he does, as 
we have seen, embrace the language of “necessity” in describing the ascent 
of purifi ed souls to God by the fi re of charity—that is, when the agent of 
motion in the soul is the weight of charity, a gift of the Holy Spirit. It is the 
sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit that troubles the basis of the distinc-
tion between spiritual motion and bodily motion. The deliberative motion 
of the will to any number of determinate ends is properly understood as 
self-motion, in which the agent of motion is the will itself (though this is 
without doubt dependent on grace in a general sense). When it is a mat-
ter of the infused grace of charity bearing the soul upwards, certainly the 
freedom of the will is not destroyed. Yet in this case the most fi tting com-
parison for this motion is the movement of the elementary bodies toward 
their natural places. The motion of grace in the soul is, like the inexorable 
motion of fi re to its sphere, both a divine and a natural motion.
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c h a p t e r  4
Hierarchy and Excess in the 
Itinerarium mentis in Deum
This chapter and the next examine Bon a ven ture’s development of the 
theme of love as unifying fi re not only as a vision for the consummation of 
creation, but also as a medium and goal of Christian devotion in contem-
plation, prayer, and the practice of charity. In this chapter, I analyze the 
excessive order of creation and of the soul in Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 
Bon a ven ture’s treatise on the stages of the soul’s ascent modeled on the 
Seraph of Francis’s vision at La Verna. In the next chapter, I turn to the re-
lation of the will’s self-motion and the movement of affect in Bon a ven ture’s 
Life of St. Francis, and the affective movement that the presentation of Fran-
cis’s life effects in the reader. Together, I suggest, these two works (albeit, 
in different ways) lead the reader into a practice of devotion whose goal is 
the transformation of the affect and the ecstatic erasure of the boundary 
between nature and grace, interior and exterior, action and passion.
On Mount La Verna
In the crucial, curious prologue to the Itinerarium mentis in deum (The 
Soul’s Journey Into God), Bon a ven ture’s enchiridion of  Franciscan  spiri
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tual  pilgrimage, the author describes the displacement that served as the 
impetus for the work. He composed the Itinerarium in 1259, thirty-three 
years after Francis of Assisi’s death (transitus) and just two years after Bon-
a ven ture was appointed to “the place of this most blessed father” (loco ip-
sius patris beatissimi) as Minister General of the Friars Minor.1 Feeling the 
pressures of his new role as Francis’s lieutenant, he was moved by a divine 
inclination to seek retreat in “a place of rest” (ad locum quietum). This was 
the place in which Francis, too, had sought rest—Mount La Verna, where 
Francis saw a Seraph, its six wings blazing and affi xed to a cross, and re-
ceived the wounds of Christ’s passion. Writing in the fi rst person, Bon a-
ven ture refl ects on that vision: “In considering this, it appeared to me at 
once [statim] that this vision pointed not only to the uplifting of our father 
himself in contemplation, but also to the path by which it is reached.”2 A 
second vision thus occurs in the very place of the fi rst. The exemplary 
nature of Francis’s vision—that is, the path it describes for the reader—
appears to Bon a ven ture statim, “on the spot”; the peak of La Verna serves 
rhetorically as a single point condensing the time of the two visions and the 
space of the spiritual journey that follows.
Conveniently for historians, this passage provides plausible evidence 
for the dating of the work and for Bon a ven ture’s appointment as minister 
general.3 Yet the passage is just as valuable for the interpretive clues it of-
fers to the theological vision outlined in the work as a whole. By locating 
the inspiration for the work at Mount La Verna, Bon a ven ture frames the 
Itinerarium as a spiritual geography and itinerary that describes at once 1) 
the ecstatic order of the cosmos as the unfolding of God’s being in likeness, 
image, and vestige, and 2) the order of the soul as a hierarchy of powers by 
which God is revealed and loved. The account of successive illuminations 
that it traces can be read, in light of this framing, as an account of how the 
soul is elevated through this order and brought into union with God.
By the year 1259, Francis’s Seraphic vision and stigmata were a com-
monplace legend, one whose theological and scriptural signifi cance Bon a-
ven ture would further exploit in his biography of Francis.4 The body of the 
Seraph defi nes the hierarchized and ecstatic space of the Itinerarium. The 
six wings divide the work into six chapters, describing six successive “il-
luminations” by which the mind is elevated through the contemplation of 
created things until it reaches its transitus—the soul’s fi nal “passing over” 
or “death” in which the acts of the intellect are abandoned, illumination 
is replaced by darkness, and the soul is immolated with the ardent love 
witnessed in and made possible by the life and death of Francis.5 For Bon a-
ven ture, the fi gure of the Seraph is signifi cant not only for the  enumerative 
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possibilities of its six wings, but also for its Dionysian position of greatest 
intimacy to God within the angelic hierarchy and its identifi cation with 
burning love, as I discussed in Chapter 1. Bon a ven ture exploits these as-
sociations in his description of the soul’s transitus in a seventh and fi nal 
chapter of the Itinerarium, adumbrated in the Prologue when he identifi es 
the way as “nothing other than through the most ardent love of the Cruci-
fi ed one.”6
That same love is, not by chance, also the destination of the ascent, a co-
incidence that renders dynamic—and problematic—the relation between 
the elevating contemplations of the fi rst six chapters and the consuming af-
fective ecstasy of the seventh. The Itinerarium proceeds less as an ordered 
progression toward a goal than as a series of displacements, culminating 
not in a fi xed destination that can be charted in advance, but in the soul’s 
excessus (exceeding) of itself and ecstasis (standing outside) of the intelligible 
in a transformation of its affective power.7 The desire that draws the soul 
toward the summit through contemplation of the interior and cosmic hi-
erarchies ends with the silencing of the mind’s contemplations and the 
transformation of the affective part of the soul into God.
The nature of this journey’s goal surely indicates something about the 
path that leads to it. Yet even scholars who have taken seriously the apopha-
sis of knowledge described in the Itinerarium’s seventh chapter have  often 
read it as a kind of coda to the spiritual progression of the fi rst six chapters. 
Responding to a recent article by Gregory LaNave on the structure of the 
Itinerarium, Jay Hammond suggests the importance of the framing of the 
work.8 Hammond asks, “How can one accurately understand a text if its in-
troduction and conclusion are ignored?” He offers an illuminating reading 
of the work in light of the structuring devices that Bon a ven ture introduces 
in the prologue that suggest a six-part structure. There are good reasons 
for this reading, both internal and external to the text. First, the fi gure of 
the six-winged Seraph suggests, literally, a six-part body to the text. More-
over, the Itinerarium’s six body chapters can be seen as a doubling of a 
three-part structure that Bon a ven ture repeats throughout the work. And 
in its historical context, the six-part progression corresponds to the struc-
ture of several similar twelfth- and thirteenth-century guides to prayer, in-
cluding, most proximately, Richard of St. Victor’s Beniamin Maior, which 
undoubtedly informed Bon a ven ture’s own work.9
Considering each of these factors in turn, I hope here to build on La-
Nave and Hammond’s work, and take Hammond’s suggestion further by 
asking what difference it makes to the whole that Bon a ven ture posits a state 
beyond the sixth contemplation. If, as I suggest, the transitus described in 
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the seventh chapter stands as a distinct stage or state beyond the six con-
templations, its purpose is not to add one more stage to a six-fold ascent, 
but rather to recast the movement of the whole in terms of the ecstasis to 
which it leads. Treating this fi nal chapter as the interpretive key to the en-
tire text, I argue, in turn necessitates a re-evaluation of the structure of the 
work—and not only that, but indeed a re-evaluation of the very concept 
of structure in Bon a ven ture’s spiritual cosmology. To this end, I will fi rst 
examine the order that Bon a ven ture posits within the soul and the role 
of desire in its becoming hierarchical. I will then turn to Bon a ven ture’s 
elaboration of the hierarchical arrangement of the cosmos as vestige, im-
age, and likeness. Already contained within these discussions of hierarchy, 
I will ultimately suggest, is the affective transitus, which he outlines in the 
seventh chapter of the Itinerarium.
In this way, I contend, Bon a ven ture’s very understanding of  hierarchy 
—both the hierarchy of the soul’s powers and the cosmic hierarchy of ves-
tige, image, and likeness—depends upon a theology of ontological and 
spiritual ecstasis. The affective transitus that Bon a ven ture describes in the 
seventh chapter, then, is not a coda to the Itinerarium or even the fi nal 
stage. It is rather, along with the prologue, an indication that the itinera-
rium is not the soul’s movement through a static hierarchy, but its partici-
pation in the ecstatic, self-negating time and space of the Christocentric 
cosmos, which is at the same time participation in the passion of Christ 
enacted through Francis’s wounding vision. As Michelle Karnes rightly 
notes, “When it comes to the Itinerarium, the line between mysticism and 
philosophy is hard to draw.”10 This is true not just because Bon a ven ture 
has melded genres, but because a single conception of hierarchy under lies 
Bon a ven ture’s philosophical speculation and his devotional program. The 
instant in which Francis’s vision occurs on Mount La Verna to Bon a ven-
ture statim is itself ecstasis, where the transitus—both passage and death—is 
always already taking place.
Ordering Desire
The relation between desire and excess is established early in the Itinera-
rium. In the prologue, Bon a ven ture locates the starting point of the journey 
(itinerarium) in the “groans of prayer,” by which desire is enkindled in the 
soul.11 Then again at the beginning of Chapter 1, he writes that “prayer is 
the mother and the origin of upward movement [sursum-actionis].”12 Here 
he explains, with recourse to a citation of Dionysius’s Mystical Theology, 
that ascent must start with prayer because the ascent of the soul is a matter 
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of the soul exceeding itself, rising above itself, “not by a bodily ascent, but 
by an ascent of the heart.” Yet the soul cannot exceed itself by itself: “We 
cannot be elevated above ourselves unless a superior power lifts us up. No 
matter how our interior stages may be ordered, nothing will happen if 
divine aid does not help us. But divine aid comes to those who pray from 
their heart humbly and devoutly.”13 Ascent begins in affective prayer not 
as the soul’s fi rst act, but as the initial giving over of oneself to the divine 
agency that enables the soul’s movement. Moreover, the fact that ascent 
cannot occur without divine aid (because ascent entails self-surpassing) 
means that ecstasis, the state of the soul as above or outside itself, is not re-
served for the fi nal stage of the itinerarium. That is, Bon a ven ture does not 
present a series of steps that the soul takes to bring itself to order, at the 
end of which that order is exceeded. Rather, the entire journey into God is 
an ecstasis, or, better, a series of them. If the six wings of the Seraph entail 
an ordering of the soul’s illuminations from vestige to image, and from 
image to likeness, Bon a ven ture is emphatic from the beginning that the 
entire Seraphic order is set on fi re and affi xed to the cross.
As Hammond argues, the goal of the Itinerarium is peace, understood 
as “right order,”14 but it is clear that this is an ecstatic order from be-
ginning to end, an order of movements. The threefold ordering scheme 
(which Bon a ven ture then doubles to arrive at six stages) is presented not 
as a three-step, vertically oriented ladder, but as a movement from with-
out, to within, and fi nally to above or beyond. The order described and 
traversed in the Itinerarium is oriented around the human soul. And since 
it is the soul (mens)15 itself that is the wayfarer on this journey, the move-
ment is ecstatic in each of its stages.16 The soul is never simply “in itself”: 
even (and perhaps especially) its turn inward is ecstatic, since in the inward 
movement of the journey one discovers the image of God and is thus taken 
beyond oneself. Outside itself, the wayfaring soul moves through the ve-
stigia of God, within itself as an imago of God, and fi nally beyond itself, to 
the eternal and spiritualissimum.
In the progression through this order, desire (desiderium) plays an over-
arching role—as initiator, vehicle, and consummation of the ascent. In 
the prologue Bon a ven ture writes that “no one is disposed at all for divine 
contemplations which lead to mental ecstasies without being, like Daniel, 
a man of desires [vir desideriorum].”17 And in the fi nal chapter, he explains 
that the mystery of the excessus mentis can be revealed only to those who 
desire it, “and no one desires it but one who is infl amed to the marrow with 
the fi re of the Holy Spirit whom Christ has sent into the world.”18
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At the same time as it frames the entire journey, desire also has a precise 
psychological valence for Bon a ven ture, and in a sense has a specifi c place 
among the soul’s powers. Early in the Itinerarium, Bon a ven ture lists six 
powers of the soul: sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia, and apex 
mentis or synderesis scintilla.19 This sixfold list is only one of many ways that 
he enumerates and distinguishes the soul’s powers, and this one works here, 
clearly, to reinforce the Seraphic structure of the work: The six powers 
may be understood to correspond to the six illuminations of the journey. 
In this scheme, desiderium takes its place in the third power, ratio, which 
corresponds to the contemplation of the rational image of God.
For Bon a ven ture, this imago follows the familiar Augustinian triad of 
memory, understanding, and will (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas).20 Because 
the subject at hand remains the ascent of the soul, Bon a ven ture explains 
these powers in terms of their ability to lead the soul back through itself to 
the eternal Art, the supreme Truth, and the highest Good. Memory holds 
all things in the soul—past, present, and future; it is not only a depository 
of things derived from sense, but also a kind of “inner reason” (quoting 
Augustine) that is able to assent immediately to the fi rst principles of the 
sciences, “as though it recognizes them as innate and familiar (tanquam 
sibi innata et familiaria recognoscat).”21 The intellective power (virtus intel-
lectiva) —Bon a ven ture’s precise term here for Augustinian  intelligentia —is 
the ability to understand terms, propositions, and inferences. Bon a ven ture 
describes this power as the process of reducing specifi c defi nitions and 
propositions to more general ones until the intellect arrives at the exem-
plars of knowable things in the eternal Art. The third power—what Bon a-
ven ture calls the “elective power” (virtus electiva)—involves three aspects: 
consilium, iudicium, and desiderium.22
The fi rst of these, consilium (commonly translated “deliberation”) is the 
determination of better and worse. This is, Bon a ven ture explains, in fact a 
determination about a thing’s proximity to what is best, and requires some 
notion of a highest good (summum bonum). Iudicium (judgment) makes 
a determination about the rightness of something with respect to some 
higher law. When the soul judges itself, it requires some law higher than 
itself, and thus depends on a divine law for its operation. The fi rst two 
aspects of the elective power, then, involve both deliberation and a no-
tion of the highest good. The third aspect is desire (desiderium): “Desire is 
principally concerned with that which moves it the most. And that which 
moves it the most is that which is loved the most. And that which is loved 
the most is to be happy. But happiness is attained only by reaching the best 
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and ultimate end. Therefore, human desire wants nothing but the supreme 
Good, or that which leads to it or in some way refl ects that Good.”23 Desire 
is that which is always moved by and to the summum bonum,24 a goal that 
lies well beyond what the soul can reach with its own powers. Bon a ven-
ture’s discussion of the soul’s powers, then, and especially his account of 
desire in the third chapter, serves less to highlight the role these powers 
play in ascent than to chart more precisely how human beings are created 
with the capacity for a grace that exceeds them.
And it is not only human beings who are so created. The cosmic hierar-
chy also has an essentially ecstatic structure. The fourth stage of ascent—
the transformation of the imago of God in the mind’s powers to the simili-
tudo of God in the hierarchized soul—depends on this structure. In the 
fourth stage, Bon a ven ture writes, the soul is like someone fallen who lies 
waiting for the help of another to get up again. In the soul’s case, this help 
comes from the three theological virtues—faith, hope, and love. Bon a-
ven ture details the several effects of the clothing of the virtues on the im-
age of the soul. Most signifi cantly, the virtues purify, illumine, and perfect 
the soul—that is, they make the soul hierarchical according to Dionysius’s 
triple operation. The remainder of the chapter describes this threefold op-
eration. The soul’s becoming hierarchical involves the awakening of the 
fi ve spiritual senses and three ecstasies. Invoking the Song of Songs, Bon a-
ven ture argues that this awakening is brought about by the lover’s desire 
for her beloved. Here the interlocking analogies make clear that “becom-
ing hierarchical” is both inward and ecstatic, experiential and affective.
The spiritual senses have everything to do with the soul’s love for Christ 
because, as Bon a ven ture explains, they are capacities for receiving and 
experiencing Christ the beloved. By faith, the soul recovers the spiritual 
senses of sight and hearing by which the soul perceives the light and the 
words of Christ. Hope enkindles the soul’s sense of smell (which, according 
to the analogy, is linked to the capacity of breath) as it yearns to be fi lled 
with the inspired Word. In love the soul embraces the Bridegroom and, 
“receiving delight from him and passing over [transiens] to him in ecstatic 
love [ecstaticum amorem], it recovers its taste and touch.”25 In the hierarchy 
of the corporeal senses common to the thirteenth-century schools, taste 
and touch are the basest of the senses, the perceptual modes in which bod-
ies (of the perceiver and the perceived) are most implicated. As Bon a ven-
ture explains earlier in the Itinerarium, what is sublime and luminous enters 
through sight, while what is solid and earthly enters through touch.26 Yet 
here, in describing the spiritual senses, taste and touch are the very senses 
that love awakens.27
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Why would something as exalted as the soul’s love for the Bridegroom 
be described through the mode of these most bodily and earthly senses? 
The embrace of the Bridegroom is above all a matter of taste and touch 
because these senses involve the closest contact (a contact that can only be 
conceived, even if analogically, as corporeal) between perceiver and per-
ceived.28 Thomas Gallus makes a similar point in his Commentary on the 
Song when he writes that the external senses are “models of love because 
love meets its objects by touching, smelling, and tasting.”29 Yet the spiritual 
senses of taste and touch signify more than just intimacy for Bon a ven ture 
here.30 Thomas Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologiae that touch and 
taste (the latter being a species of the former) are the most material senses 
insofar as they are modes in which the body is affected naturally by the 
object according to its proper quality.31 For example, a hand becomes hot 
by touching a hot object. In this way, then, the bodily senses of touch and 
taste are modes in which external objects act upon the perceiver naturally 
and materially; that is, they are modes of natural affect.32 In the embrace 
of the Lover and the Bridegroom, touch is not only the most intimate ap-
prehension of the soul’s object, but the most vulnerable opening of the soul 
to being affected by and transformed into her Beloved.
With its spiritual senses restored, and the soul able to feel her Beloved, 
she now assumes the voice of the Solomonic lover. In fact, Bon a ven ture 
says, the Song of Songs was written for and about this fourth level of ascent, 
which “no one grasps [capit] except one who receives it, for it is more a 
matter of affective experience [experientia affectuali] than of rational consid-
erations.”33 It is at this stage that the soul becomes prepared for three spiri-
tual ecstasies (mentales excessus), as performed in the Song. The awakening 
of the spiritual senses leads directly to these ecstasies, in that the fi vefold 
spiritual sensory experience of Christ causes the soul to overfl ow itself in 
three ways: through devotion, admiration, and exultation. Bon a ven ture 
describes these three ecstasies with the language of the Song. In the fi rst 
ecstasy, the soul is fi lled with an abundance of devotion, so that it becomes 
like “a pillar of smoke with the aromas of myrrh and frankincense.”34 In the 
second, the soul is fi lled to overfl owing with admiration, through which 
the soul becomes like “the dawn, the moon, and the sun.” These three 
lights correspond to the three illuminations that lift the soul in wonder at 
the Bridegroom. The third ecstasy occurs through an overabundance of 
joy or exultation. In this ecstasy, the soul is “fi lled with delight” and “leans 
[innixa] completely on her Beloved.”35
The description of these three ecstasies echo Richard of St. Victor’s 
much lengthier discussion of the three alienations of the mind in the 
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 Beniamin Maior—through greatness of devotion, greatness of admiration, 
and greatness of joy, each of which is described by the same passages of the 
Song that Bon a ven ture cites here.36 However, here as so often in the Itine-
rarium, Bon a ven ture does not borrow without casting his material in a very 
different light. Richard’s text describes three different ways that the mind 
is lifted above itself and acknowledges that the mind is raised in different 
ways in different people. “For in order that the author of all goods might 
commend the gifts of His grace in us, He shows diverse effects from the 
same thing at diverse times and in diverse persons.”37 Even if Richard sug-
gests at times that the third alienation is higher (or at least more dependent 
on divine grace) than the others, there is still no sense that the three alien-
ations form an ordered progression of a single soul. Bon a ven ture, by con-
trast, describes the three ecstasies as a kind of triple operation, analogous 
to the other threefold transformations that occur at this stage: the infusion 
of three theological virtues, the opening of the three senses of scriptural 
meaning, and, the triad discussed most extensively, the three “hierarchiz-
ing” operations of the virtues—purifi cation, illumination, and perfection.38 
Purifi cation corresponds to the ecstasy of devotion, as indicated by the pu-
rifying “pillar of smoke.” Illumination occurs in the overfl owing of wonder, 
by which the soul becomes like “the dawn, the moon, and the sun.” And the 
ecstasy of joy perfects the soul’s delight in Christ, so that she “leans totally 
on her beloved.” In a real sense, then, the ecstasies of the soul are what 
make the soul hierarchical: “With these [ecstasies] accomplished, our spirit 
is made hierarchical in order to ascend on high in accordance with that 
heavenly Jerusalem. No one enters that city unless, through grace, that city 
has fi rst descended into the heart, as John sees in his Apocalypse.”39
This becoming-hierarchical of the soul is at the same time the refor-
mation of the image into a similitude of God. The opening of Chapter 4 
makes this connection through an allusion to the parable of the Good Sa-
maritan from Luke 10, by way of Bon a ven ture’s own commentary on this 
passage. In his Commentary on Luke, Bon a ven ture interprets the human 
race as the man who
went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, that is to say, from paradise into 
the world, and fell among robbers; namely, into the power of demons 
who robbed him of the gifts of grace and wounded him in his natural 
powers. They left him half-dead in that after the similitude had been 
taken away only the image remained. . . .  That image, nevertheless, was 
despoiled because of a turning away and wounded because of a turning 
around.40
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This is the soul at the beginning of the fourth stage. Like the wounded 
man, the soul lies waiting on external help to lift it up. In the fourth con-
templation, the soul receives faith, hope, and charity from above. These 
virtues awaken the spiritual senses, through which the soul receives such 
delights that it overfl ows itself, lifting it up to the heavenly place which has 
already established itself in the soul.
More precisely, the soul is established as a heavenly place through the 
reformation of the imago: “The image of our mind therefore should be 
clothed with the three theological virtues by which the soul is purifi ed, 
illumined, and perfected. In this way the image is reformed and made to 
conform with the heavenly Jerusalem and is made a part of the church 
militant which is the offspring of the heavenly Jerusalem, according to the 
apostle.”41 Note that in Chapter 3, Bon a ven ture recalled the Augustinian 
triad of memory, intellect, and will, which is the created image through which 
the soul contemplates the Trinity. Now here, at the fourth stage, the soul, 
reformed by faith, hope, and charity, is made into an imago of the whole 
heavenly retinue in which God dwells and is contemplated. By the lover’s 
ecstasy the soul is stretched to encompass the heavens, and thus to become 
“a house of God,” a “temple of the Holy Spirit.”42
Hierarchy and Ascent: Vestige, Image, and Likeness
The “hierarchization” of the soul is thus both a gradus of ascent and a radi-
calization or a reversal of ascent’s logic—for the journey of the soul into 
God shows itself to be the movement of God (and of the cosmic hierarchy) 
into the soul.43 This reversal, however, is consistent with the character of 
incarnational grace. Christ descends in order that the soul might ascend. 
The movement underscores the passivity of the soul in its own reformation 
and the role of grace—specifi cally, the grace of the theological virtues of 
faith, hope, and charity—through which the soul becomes a dwelling place 
for the Spirit. The connection between the dwelling place of God and the 
theological virtues recalls a triad of distinctions that appears throughout 
Bon a ven ture’s earlier writings as magister, though not with complete con-
sistency. Vestige (or trace), image, and likeness (or similitude) are three 
grades or aspects by which creatures represent God. The second book of 
the Breviloquium contains the most extended account of this triad:
The created world is like a book in which its maker, the Trinity, is re-
fl ected, represented, and read according to three grades of expression, 
namely, through the modes of vestige, image, and likeness. The aspect 
F6909.indb   97 10/7/16   1:41:37 PM
98 Hierarchy and Excess
of vestige is found in all creatures, that of the image is found only in 
intellectual or rational spirits, and the aspect of the likeness is only 
found in those which are conformed to God [deiformibus]. The human 
intellect is created to ascend these stages, like the steps of a ladder, to 
the highest principle which is God. This should be understood to mean 
that all creatures regard and depend on their Creator, and are likened 
to him in three ways. They may be likened to him as to a creative prin-
ciple, as to a motive object, or as to an indwelling gift. In the fi rst way 
all his creatures [effectus] are likened to him, in the second way all intel-
lectual creatures [intellectus], and in the third way all righteous spirits 
accepted by God [acceptus]. All effects, insofar as they have being, have 
God as their principle. All intellects, insofar as they have illumination, 
are naturally created to grasp God through knowledge and love, and all 
righteous and holy spirits are infused with the gift of the Holy Spirit.44
Trace, image, and likeness are not only different ways that God is repre-
sented in creation; they also constitute the created order and provide a 
means of ascent or return (reductio) to God. According to Bon a ven ture’s 
summary in Chapter 7, the Itinerarium is an elaboration of that order. Just 
before the fi nal transformation of the affectus, Bon a ven ture writes, “our 
mind has contemplated [contuita] God outside itself through and in the ves-
tiges; within itself through and in the image; and above itself through the 
similitude of divine light shining down upon us, and in that light insofar as 
that is possible in our wayfaring state and by the exercise of our mind.”45 
This summary indicates that the contemplations of Chapters 1 and 2 oc-
cur, respectively, through and in the vestiges of God in creation, those of 
Chapters 3 and 4 through and in the image of God in the soul, and those 
of Chapters 5 and 6 through and in the likeness of divine light.
This structuring principle has been well observed by scholars.46 Yet the 
unfolding of the triad in the itinerarium is not as neat as the summaries 
made by scholars or by Bon a ven ture himself. At the fourth stage, Bon a-
ven ture describes the point at which the soul is made a hierarchical, God-
conformed dwelling of the Spirit infused with the theological virtues. 
Because this description conforms unmistakably to his description of the 
similitudo in the Breviloquium (and in several other places), it would seem 
that the structuring principle laid out in Chapter 7 is inaccurate. Chapter 4 
contains a description of the similitude of God when the summary would 
lead us to expect a discussion of the image. In fact, Chapter 4 does not 
mention the similitude as distinct from the image. Has the terminology 
shifted from the Breviloquium to the Itinerarium? Or does Bon a ven ture’s 
own summary misrepresent the contents of the work? While both possi-
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bilities must be admitted, the problem deserves further exploration for the 
light it may shed on Bon a ven ture’s understanding of this triad and of the 
nature of hierarchy in general.
The conception of the created world as a scale of refl ections of God’s 
presence appears throughout Bon a ven ture’s writings. In several of the 
works dated to his period as baccalarius at Paris and regent master of the 
Franciscan school there, he discusses this scale in terms of the difference 
between the vestigium and imago of God in creation. Here, similitudo some-
times completes the triad.47 In all of these writings, it is easy enough to 
understand how these distinctions structure Bon a ven ture’s descriptions of 
creation and the soul’s ascent to God. What is more diffi cult to determine 
is precisely what these distinctions are. Or, more to the point, to what do 
these distinctions refer?
Most simply, “shadow,” “vestige,” and “image” all refer to God and can 
be understood as different ways of referring to God. In this sense, although 
they underlie the order of creation, the distinctions of shadow, vestige, 
image are not degrees of creatures. And although they determine what 
creatures are, they are not properties of creatures.48 Bon a ven ture explains 
this in the third distinction of the fi rst book in his Sentences commentary, 
and assumes it in later writings. The distinction between vestigium and 
imago arises fi rst in the question of whether God is knowable (cognoscibilis) 
through creatures.49 The fourth argument for the affi rmative introduces 
the principle that “like is known through like.” If God is known through 
creatures, then creatures must be like God (similis Deo), and there are dif-
ferent ways that a creature can be like God: as vestige and as image.
In his responses to the objections, Bon a ven ture considers the ways in 
which others have (inadequately) explained the distinction between vestige 
and image. Some, he notes, simply refer the distinction between vestige 
and image to the distinction between sensible and spiritual creatures.50 But 
“vestige” concerns the ways in which the unity, truth, and goodness of 
God is evident in creatures. And spiritual creatures, certainly no less than 
sensible ones, evince these perfections; thus spiritual and sensible creatures 
alike are vestiges of God. Corporeality is therefore not the basis for the de-
grees of likeness to God. Moreover, every created thing, spiritual and cor-
poreal alike, represents God vestigially in exactly the same degree. Others, 
Bon a ven ture continues, understand the distinction between vestige and 
image as a matter of degree of completeness: A vestige would be a partial 
representation of God, and an image would represent God as a whole. This 
is mistaken, he contends, on two counts: Because God is simple, there is no 
“part” of God to represent. And because God is infi nite, no created thing, 
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not even the universe itself, could represent the “whole” of God. Whatever 
the distinction between the ways of representing God, it is inadmissible to 
distinguish them based on greater or lesser degrees of completeness.
If an image, then, is not more spiritual than a vestige, and if it is not 
more complete than a vestige, in what sense does this distinction structure 
a hierarchy? Bon a ven ture offers several ways in which the image exceeds 
the vestige. A vestige refers the creature to God according to the threefold 
principle of causality (effi cient, fi nal, and formal), whereas the image re-
fers the creature to God not only as cause but also as object of knowledge 
and love through the three powers of memory, intelligence, and will. This 
distinction, however, is based on a prior, and more obvious (notior) one: 
the mode of representing proper to each of these gradations, or what we 
might, in light of the pervasive spatial language, call Bon a ven ture’s geog-
raphy of God. Both the vestige and image represent God distinctly, but the 
vestige represents God from a distance or remove (in elongatio); the image 
represents God in proximity to God (in propinquitate). Bon a ven ture situates 
this discussion of vestigium and imago immediately after a response to the 
objection that, because the creature is separated from God by an infi nite 
distance, no progression of steps will ever reach God. He therefore affi rms 
that if by reaching God one means attaining equality with God, then it is 
true that no creature will ever arrive. But ascent can also refer to behold-
ing the presence of God (ad aspectum praesentiae), and in this sense ascent 
is always already accomplished insofar as everything, by its very creation, 
leads to God (quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum).
The spatial language, therefore, that is so integral to Bon a ven ture’s un-
derstanding of the created order helps to clarify the proper referents of 
the terms “vestige” and “image.” These distinctions are nothing in crea-
tures any more than they are in the human intellect that cognizes them. 
Rather, they are different ways in which creatures, the human mind, and 
God are all related to one another, and at the same time they are degrees 
of proximity between creatures and God. That is to say, they describe rela-
tions and not properties or entities. Etienne Gilson’s elaboration of these 
distinctions and the role they play in Bon a ven ture’s thought remains in-
dispensable: The distinctions constitute what Gilson called Bon a ven ture’s 
doctrine of universal analogy (a term Bon a ven ture uses in 1 Sent. d. 3 for 
the likeness between Creator and creature).51 But it may be better to call 
it a theory of universal anagogy. For the ontological resemblances that 
ground analogy are themselves grounded in the reductio toward which all 
creation is ordered.
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Subsequent discussions of the triad of vestigium, imago, and similitudo 
in Bon a ven ture’s writings only make this anagogical dynamic clearer. In 
the passage from the Breviloquium cited previously, Bon a ven ture compares 
the distinctions to “rungs of a ladder,” upon which “the human mind is 
designed to ascend step-by-step” to God. The Augustinian distinction 
between imago and similitudo, furnished with thirteenth-century distinc-
tions concerning grace, further emphasizes the role of creation in the 
soul’s ascent or reductio to God. He explains the rungs of the ladder as 
degrees of conformity to God, each distinguished by its own triad refl ect-
ing the Trinity:
For a creature cannot have God as its Principle unless it is conformed 
to Him in unity, truth, and goodness. Nor can it have God as its object 
unless it grasps Him through memory, intelligence, and will. And it 
cannot have God as an infused Gift unless it is conformed to Him 
through faith, hope, and love, the threefold gift. And the fi rst confor-
mity is distant, the second close, and the third most proximate. That is 
why the fi rst is called a vestige of the Trinity, the second an image, and 
the third a likeness.52
The most intimate conformity—that of the image transformed into a like-
ness —comes about, as Bon a ven ture also explains in the Itinerarium, through 
the infused gift of the theological virtues. Yet even in the Itinerarium, Bon-
a ven ture does not consistently refer to the triad of vestige, image, and like-
ness.53 Similarly, in both the Quaestiones disputatae mysterio trinitatis and De 
reductione artium ad theologiam, he refers only to vestige and image. Amidst 
the fl uctuations in terms, these passages advance a consistent view that all 
things have God as their creative principle and refl ect God’s unity, truth, 
and goodness; that among creatures, rational beings have God as their ob-
ject as well as their cause; and as such, they have the capacity to be drawn 
into God and conformed to God’s likeness through infused grace.
Chapter 3 of the Itinerarium discusses the image of God in the natural 
powers of the soul, and Chapter 4 addresses the likeness of God in the 
reformed powers. Similarly, Bon a ven ture writes in the Sentences commen-
tary that the image concerns the natural and the likeness concerns the 
gratuitous.54 Yet the distinction serves only to draw a closer connection be-
tween what belongs to nature and what belongs to grace, for it is just such 
a dichotomy that the dynamic of vestige, image, and likeness  forcefully 
resists. Nature and grace, image and likeness, belong to a single order 
and movement.55 Creation is so ordered as to lead the mind, through the 
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 operations of its own powers, toward the excess and overcoming of itself. 
The transformation of the image into the likeness (similitudo) through the 
infusion of the virtues, the mentales excessus of the lover, and the hierarchi-
cal operations, means that the rational creature is created with a natural 
desire for intimacy with God that it cannot realize with its own God-given 
powers. This is what it means to say that the created order is itself an ec-
static order. The triad of vestige, image, and likeness in creation orders the 
human mind to excess.
The dynamic and ecstatic nature of this created order is refl ected in the 
structure of the Itinerarium itself. Bon a ven ture’s summary divides the work 
into three parts: In the fi rst two stages, the mind contemplates the vestiges 
of God in creation, in the second two the image of God in itself, and in 
the fi nal two the likeness of the divine brightness. This threefold structure 
is evident in the content of the chapters, but the division is not as simple 
as this summary suggests, and itself refl ects the temporal and spatial dis-
ordering essential to hierarchy. Just as Chapter 4 (whose heading identifi es 
its subject as the image of God in the soul) describes the infusion of the vir-
tues into the soul, Chapters 2 and 6 also anticipate the stage immediately 
following. In Chapter 2, contemplation on the vestiges of God in sensible 
things develops naturally into an exploration of the capacities of the soul to 
apprehend, take pleasure in, and judge all sensible things. In this way, the 
inward turn of Chapter 3 is already begun at the previous level. Similarly, 
in the sixth contemplation, the intellect begins to fail at the consideration 
of the Trinity: “When in the sixth stage, the mind will have reached the 
point in which it sees in the fi rst and highest Principle and in the media-
tor of God and humanity, Jesus Christ. No likeness [similia] whatsoever of 
these things is found among creatures, and they exceed every grasp of the 
human intellect.”56 Like the delineation of the powers of the soul in Cister-
cian treatises such as Isaac of Stella’s (d. 1169), the stages of contemplation 
not only touch each other, but even overlap. For Bon a ven ture, this con-
tiguity becomes the means by which the transitus takes place—the lower 
stages leading, as if inevitably, to the higher, such that excess is entailed in 
the created order. The staged refl ections of God’s light which structure the 
successive illuminations of the soul, then, contain within them the dark-
ness to which they ultimately lead.
Transitus
Adopting Richard of St. Victor’s symbolism for the highest stages of con-
templation, Bon a ven ture illustrates the fi fth and sixth stages of the itinera-
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rium with the facing Cherubim seated on the Ark of the Covenant. Here, 
however, the Ark symbolism is placed within the motif of the tabernacle, 
with the fi fth and sixth stages found at the innermost part of the temple, 
the Holy of Holies.57 The two Cherubim are two modes or grades of con-
templating the invisibilia of God—namely the two names of God, Being 
and Good. In the fi rst case, the mind contemplates the divine essence; in 
the second, the persons of the Trinity. Though each may be contemplated 
individually, only in contemplating together the essence and the persons, 
the unity and the trinity, the being and the goodness of God, is the mind 
suspended in the highest wonder (in admirationem altissimam suspendaris) 
and lifted up to the perfection of the mind’s illuminations.58 Contemplat-
ing the unity and trinity together, the mind beholds mysteries surpassing 
the discerning powers (perspicacitas) of the intellect. The consummation of 
the mind’s contemplations, in a sense, already entails its own surpassing, 
and so brings about the excessus mentis in which the intellect rests entirely.
The summary of the six contemplations at the beginning of Chapter 7 
recalls, especially, the language used to describe the fourth stage: “We 
have explained now these six considerations, like the six steps to the true 
throne of Solomon, by which peace is attained. Here the true person of 
peace [verus pacifi cus] rests in a peaceful soul [in mente pacifi ca] as in an inte-
rior Jerusalem.”59 The summary also echoes on several notes the opening 
invocation of the prologue, in which Bon a ven ture prays for the peace of 
Francis, who “was like a citizen of that Jerusalem about which that man of 
peace . . . says: Pray for those things which are for the peace of Jerusalem. 
For he knew that there was no throne of Solomon except in peace, since 
it is written: His place was in peace, and his dwelling in Sion.”60 In the 
prologue, Bon a ven ture describes his journey to La Verna, a place of quiet, 
to fi nd peace. Now nearing the end of the work, Bon a ven ture’s summary 
reveals how many layers of allegory are condensed into this “place”—the 
place of Francis’s vision, which was at the same time the throne of Solo-
mon in the heavenly Jerusalem. This heavenly Jerusalem, in the course of 
the soul’s ecstatic journey to it, takes place within the soul so that the soul 
fi nds this peace within itself and, at the same time, above itself. The celes-
tial hierarchy is imaged in the interior hierarchy, established through the 
hierarchical operations (purgation, illumination, and perfection) which are 
ecstasies of the soul in love with Christ. Raised above itself, the soul con-
templates God through and in the similitude of divine light.
This is the end of the itinerarium, for there is nowhere else for the soul, 
raised to the height of contemplation, to go. After this point, only death 
remains, but it is not the journey’s destination. For if the consummation 
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of contemplation brings rest, death sets the soul in motion in a different 
manner. As Bon a ven ture explains, “Having contemplated all these things, 
it remains for the soul to transcend and pass over [transcendat et transeat] 
not only the sensible world, but the soul itself.”61 This movement, the ex-
cessus mentis, is not a stage of contemplation, like the mentales excessus of 
the fourth stage. There, the lover’s ecstasies were outside the soul and si-
multaneously interior to it. Here, by contrast, the phrase excessus mentis 
emphasizes the soul’s going out from itself, especially given that the phrase 
is used interchangeably with the term transitus. There is no indication, 
however, that the difference holds great signifi cance for Bon a ven ture; his 
use of the terms is fl uid. The Chapter 7 heading identifi es the topic as de 
excessu mentali et mystico.
Moreover, Bon a ven ture discusses the going out or passing over of the 
soul, which is the subject of Chapter 7, throughout the Itinerarium. In the 
prologue, his fi rst gloss on the Seraph of Francis’s vision identifi es the six 
wings as six illuminationum suspensiones. Bon a ven ture writes that the cru-
ciform Seraph of Francis’s vision indicated the suspensio of the father in 
contemplation (ipsius patris suspensionem in contemplando).62 The father is 
Francis lifted up in ecstasy, but Francis’s suspensio is itself conformed to 
Christ suspended on the cross—just as Paul, carried off (raptum) to the 
third heaven, could say that he was nailed to the cross with Christ.63 By 
identifying the six stages as six suspensiones, the prologue declares the entire 
ascent—from the contemplation of corporeal natures to the fi nal passing 
over—to be the via crucis. The lexical connection is completed in the sev-
enth chapter, when the soul in ascent repeats the words of Job: “My soul 
(anima) chooses hanging (suspendium), and my bones death.”64 Suspensio 
leads to suspendium; the groans of prayer that initiate the ascent of the soul 
anticipate its consummation on the cross.
The layered scriptural and Christological allusions in the seventh chap-
ter perform the excessus depicted there. In ecstasy, nothing is simply what it 
is; every image empties out into another. The soul, like the language used 
to describe it, is beside itself. The movement of ascent, the transitus, is the 
rapture of Paul, which is the passing through the Red Sea, which is the 
Passover, which is the pascha, the sacrifi ce of Christ on the cross, which is—
in a word whose shock is undiminished by the density of  allusion—simply 
death.65 Moriamur, exhorts Bon a ven ture: “Let us die, then, and enter into 
this darkness.”66 The darkness of death is the end of the illuminations and 
the consuming heat of desire: “not light, but the fi re that infl ames totally 
and carries one [transferentem] into God through excessive fervor and the 
most burning affections.”67 In his Sentences commentary, Bon a ven ture dis-
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tinguishes the cognitive and affective parts of the soul with reference to the 
light and heat of fi re, respectively.68 He recognizes an analytical distinction 
between the heating and illuminating properties of fi re, even if those prop-
erties are always naturally concurrent in act. Here those same properties 
appear again, this time in the uncanny image of a fi re that gives heat with-
out light. At the end of the soul’s journey into God, the properties of light 
and heat, of intellectual knowledge and affective desire, are separable—
and in fact must be so if the soul’s ascent is to be consummated: “In this 
passing over, if it is to be perfect, all intellectual operations [intellectuales 
operationes] must be abandoned, and our apex affectus must be entirely car-
ried into [transferetur] and transformed into God.”69
As I discussed in Chapter 1, “intellectual operations” is a quotation from 
the opening of Dionysius’s Mystical Theology, which Bon a ven ture goes on 
to cite at length: “Abandon sense and intellectual operations [intellectuales 
operationes], sensible and invisible things, and all nonbeing and being, and, 
insofar as possible, be restored, unknowing [inscius], to unity with the one 
who is above all essence and knowledge [scientiam].”70 Bon a ven ture’s state-
ment that intellectual operations must be abandoned and the apex affectus 
transferred into God functions then as a gloss on the Dionysian passage. 
The Dionysian reference makes clear that the excessus mentis is truly a state 
of unknowing. Affect is introduced not to reinstate the knowledge that 
Dionysius so emphatically excludes from union, or to locate union in an-
other power of the soul, but to give an account of the dynamics of union 
beyond knowing—a union that, in Bon a ven ture’s reading of Dionysius, is 
thoroughly Christological. This union beyond knowing is the soul’s par-
ticipation in Christ’s passion. In fact, given the importance and the extent 
of Bon a ven ture’s citation of Dionysius (the Itinerarium is, after all, book-
ended with quotations of the Mystical Theology), Bon a ven ture’s work may 
be understood as a kind of extended exegesis of Dionysius as much as it is 
an exegesis of Francis’s vision. Or, better, the Itinerarium is Bon a ven ture’s 
interpretation of the Mystical Theology by way of Francis’s Seraphic vision—
which is, at the same time, a vision and enactment of Christ’s passion. The 
excess that marks each stage of the Itinerarium and prefi gures the fi nal 
passing over shows that, for Bon a ven ture, the Dionysian union beyond 
knowledge is entailed in and enabled by the ecstatic nature of hierarchy.
Bon a ven ture has long been counted, largely on the basis of this pas-
sage, in the tradition of “affective” readings of Dionysius, facilitated by 
the traditional association of the Seraphim (whom Dionysius associates 
only with fi re) and ardent love.71 To the extent that this manner of reading 
constitutes a tradition, Bon a ven ture indisputably belongs to it. And yet, 
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as I have suggested, for Bon a ven ture the characterization of the excessus 
mentis as affective refl ects not merely a priority for love over knowledge, 
but represents an attempt to work out the dynamics of Dionysian hierarchy 
in the cosmos and in the soul. For Bon a ven ture, desire is the agent of both 
the soul’s movement into God and its own transformation. Yet precisely 
through the image of fi re by which this desire is depicted, Bon a ven ture 
insists that such desire is no possession or activity of the soul. Qui quidem 
ignis Deus est: “It is God who is this fi re.” Fire is the most active element, 
and the one most responsible for motion. Thus to identify God with fi re 
here is to name God as the agency that inhabits and moves the soul, as 
well as the desire that consumes it.72 This divine desire is cruciform: “It is 
Christ who starts the fi re with the intense heat of his burning passion.”73 In 
his fi nal exhortations, Bon a ven ture invites the pilgrim soul to silence all its 
wants—using the word concupiscentiis rather than desideriis. For desire is not 
a having, like conscientia, or an operation of the soul, like contemplation; it 
is the grace of Christ’s passion taking place in the soul.74 This desire can be 
enlarged and perfected in excessus mentis only because, from the very begin-
ning of ascent, it always already exceeds the soul.
In Bon a ven ture’s account, the same desire that fi nally overwhelms the 
soul has been, in fact, innate to the soul all along. When all the powers of 
the soul are silenced or abandoned in the “pacifi ed soul” (in mente pacifi ca), 
desire remains because it is not a power of the soul. It is, both at the be-
ginning and end of ascent, the capacity of the soul to be moved above and 
outside itself, not by its own movement but by the drawing of its beloved. 
The transfer of the affect into God means the surrender of all the soul’s 
higher operations—a ceasing of activity that is granted to the soul as its 
long-desired death. The soul’s powers are ordered toward their own death, 
just as the gradations of God’s presence in creation are ordered toward 
their own excess. This desire for death is the ecstatic force of the soul’s 
journey, and the principle that establishes the structure of the Itinerarium 
as an ecstatic order, that is, a hierarchy.
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c h a p t e r  5
The Exemplary Bodies of the Legenda Maior
With the language of death in the fi nal passage of the Itinerarium, Bon a-
ven ture insists that the excessus mentis is not simply a matter of abandoning 
intellectual operations in favor of affective operations. The transitus into 
God involves, after all, a transformation of the highest part of the affectus, 
and the drawing of that transformed affect into God. What does this trans-
formation entail if it is not simply the death of the intellect? What must 
occur within the affect for the journey to reach its end? The answer to 
this question (insofar as an explanation is possible for what Bon a ven ture 
describes as “mystical and most secret”) gets at the heart of the ecstatic 
death that the Itinerarium depicts. It involves, I suggest, not only the aban-
donment of the intellect, but also, and more radically, the abandonment of 
what Bon a ven ture properly calls the will (voluntas).
Though the seventh chapter of the Itinerarium contains no detailed 
discussion of the nature of affect, Bon a ven ture’s writings on the various 
aspects of the soul’s affective part lay the groundwork for—and are consis-
tent with—the transformation by fi re that occurs there. Making that case 
will require a look at Bon a ven ture’s understanding of the will (voluntas) 
and how it relates to the affective part of the soul ( pars affectiva, or simply 
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affectus) on the one hand, and his understanding of free choice (liberum 
arbitrium) on the other.1 The fi rst part of this chapter examines Bon a ven-
ture’s theory of the voluntas and how it relates to the higher part of the 
affectus. The second part examines a very different kind of account of affec-
tive transformation—but one, I argue, that is consistent with and helps to 
elaborate the vision of affective abandonment witnessed in the Itinerarium. 
The Legenda Maior, Bon a ven ture’s longer vita of Francis of Assisi, depicts 
in the person of Francis the abandonment of the will for which the affec-
tive part of the soul is created. It culminates in the infl aming and death of 
Francis’s soul, transforming him into an exemplar of affective fervor that is 
witnessed in his wounded and dying body.
Nature and Necessity in the Affective Part of the Soul
In order for the distinction between liberum arbitrium, the voluntas, and the 
affectus even to be legible in English, the misleading translation of liberum 
arbitrium as “free will” must fi rst be abandoned.2 This translation, among 
its other faults, obscures the painstaking distinctions by which medieval 
theologians sought to understand the rational capacities and limits of hu-
man beings—both intellectual and voluntary—to deliberate, judge, de-
cide, and act.3 The translations of liberum arbitrium as “free choice” or 
“free decision” avoid the confusion that the term “will” introduces and 
better capture the sense of arbitrium as an activity or capacity to act, rather 
than as a distinct power.
Augustine had declared that free choice refers to the soul as a whole. For 
Bon a ven ture this means that free choice spans the most basic division of 
the soul’s powers, the cognitive and the affective.4 As Bon a ven ture writes 
in the Breviloquium, “Freedom from compulsion is nothing else than a 
faculty of will and reason, which are the principal powers of the soul.”5 
The name itself implies this: libertas belongs properly to the will (voluntas), 
wherein lies the capacity for self-motion and command (imperium) of all 
the other powers; whereas arbitrium, which is synonymous with judgment 
(iudicium), belongs to the cognitive part, whereby the soul is able to refl ect 
upon its own act and discern right from wrong.6 To simplify a long and 
complex discussion, Bon a ven ture defi nes free choice as a habit or faculty 
belonging to reason and will (distinguished from each in some way, but 
without constituting an entirely separate power). By it the soul acts delib-
erately and free from external coercion. Free choice is begun in reason and 
completed in the will, and for this reason is properly said to be in the will 
more than it is in reason.
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Even though free choice spans the entire soul, it does not, Bon a ven ture 
clarifi es, encompass the whole of reason or will. After concluding that free 
choice comprehends the reason and will, he deals with two arguments that 
reason and will are each more than that which properly pertains to free 
choice. Bon a ven ture concedes the point and offers a clarifi cation:
To the objection that free choice does not comprehend the whole 
of reason nor the whole of the will, it must be said that this is true. 
Rather, free choice comprehends the cognitive power only insofar as it 
is joined to the affective, and it comprehends the affective insofar as it 
is joined to the cognitive. Thus it can be called a “deliberative affect,” 
or a “voluntary deliberation.” And therefore, since “reason” refers to 
the cognitive power as it is ordered to the affective, and “will” refers to 
the affective power as it is regulated and made rational by the cognitive, 
thus it is better to say that free choice is a faculty of the will and reason 
than a faculty of the intellect and the affect.7
Free choice, then, is simply the name for what happens when the soul’s 
powers act in concert. But the response reveals a signifi cant aspect of Bon-
a ven ture’s understanding of the division of the soul: the will is not coexten-
sive with affect, just as reason is not coextensive with intellect. Bon a ven-
ture acknowledges some affective capacity that is not voluntas—that is, a 
way of looking at affect in itself and not joined to intellect. What does this 
encompass? The objection that occasioned the reply gives an indication: 
“Our will is unchangeable [impermutabilis] with respect to some things; but 
whatever our free choice desires, it desires changeably [ permutabiliter].”8
As Bon a ven ture explains at length in the twenty-fourth distinction of 
the same book of his commentary, the affective part of the soul can be 
divided, in a sense, into two aspects or activities— one in which the soul 
necessarily and unchangeably desires the Good or beatitude; and one in 
which the will, in conjunction with reason, deliberates and chooses among 
different proximate goods.
It must be conceded that the natural will and the deliberative will are 
a single power, which is called natural or deliberative according to its 
mode of moving. The power by which I desire beatitude is the same 
as that by which I desire a virtue for doing this or that good thing 
ordained to beatitude. In desiring beatitude, it is called natural, since its 
desire is unchangeably inclined to beatitude. But as it desires to do this 
or that good, it is called deliberative, and according to the judgment of 
reason it is able to incline to the contrary.9
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The idea that reason is capable of contraries was a common scholastic as-
sumption derived from Aristotle.10 For medieval theologians, “contrary” 
is used broadly to mean contingent existents: the soul is free to choose 
among things that could be otherwise. For Bon a ven ture here, the emphasis 
is on possible acts that the soul may elect to perform. By contrast, the soul 
is not free to choose beatitude as the object of its desire—not because it is 
constrained to do so, but because the Good in which beatitude consists has 
no contrary, evil being only a privation of the Good.11 Thus the distinc-
tion of the affective part on the basis of different modes of moving is itself 
based on a difference in the objects of desire. The Good is not one among 
a number of desirable objects but the source and end of every desire.12
This same distinction appears in Bon a ven ture’s explanation of syndere-
sis discussed in Chapter 1. Here, however, the question concerns whether 
the natural and deliberative wills are essentially distinct powers. And in 
arguing the negative position, Bon a ven ture encounters the diffi culty of 
demonstrating how the will can be rational and yet incapable of contraries 
in its natural movement. The arguments for the affi rmative state explicitly 
the theological risk that lurks in all of Bon a ven ture’s discussions of syn-
deresis and the natural will: How is this innate and immutable desire for 
the good—the spark by which an otherwise fallen human nature remains 
upright—distinguishable from nonhuman varieties of desire, either simple 
natural attraction or brute animal instinct? If there is in the affective part 
of the soul both an immutable and an indeterminate will, then there must 
be two wills, the fi rst irrational, the second capable of rational deliberation. 
The division, as the argument goes, would safeguard the rational nature of 
the deliberative will against the apparent irrationality of natural instinct, 
and, by extension, the uniquely human character of human desire: “The 
power that we have in common with brute animals cannot be the same 
as the power by which we differ from them. But we are like brute animals 
with regard to natural appetite, and we differ with regard to our rational 
appetite. For just as brute animals naturally desire the preservation of their 
being, so do we too desire this.”13
Though it is not named here, the question invokes something like the 
Stoic conception of oikeiosis, the natural and nonrational desire for self-
preservation found in human infants and animals alike.14 In response, Bon-
a ven ture distinguishes two senses of “natural.” On the one hand, there is a 
way of distinguishing natural and deliberative desires on the basis of differ-
ent objects, “such as when one is desirable only by a rational substance, and 
another object is desired by an animal substance.”15 But on the other hand, 
when it is a matter of a common object that is desired naturally or delib-
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eratively, the two desires are essentially one, and differ only in their mode 
of desiring. In this sense, “we say that synderesis is a natural will which 
naturally inclines and incites us toward the honest good and murmurs 
against evil. And we call the deliberative appetite the will by which, after 
deliberation, we cling sometimes to a good, sometimes to evil.”16 Thus, the 
natural will (which humans share in common with nonrational animals) 
constitutes a natural appetite directed toward a good that is desirable to a 
creature with or without reason.17
The mention of synderesis indicates that there is another way that de-
sire can be natural, while also remaining essentially rational. A certain logic 
opposes this, too, as evidenced by the second objection: As Aristotle says, 
the rational powers are capable of contraries, that is, of choosing this or 
that object of intellection or desire. But to be moved naturally to an ob-
ject is to be moved singly (uniformiter) and to be moved rationally is to be 
moved changeably (vertibiliter). In this way, the argument implies, a natu-
rally moved desire is by defi nition not a rationally moved desire.
The force of Bon a ven ture’s refutation to this objection is diffi cult to 
register, but it helps to clarify the stakes of the question:
The rational will is ordained to something such that it in no way desires 
its contrary, as is clear in the ordination of our will to beatitude and 
felicity. And although it is determinately inclined to beatitude, this 
very same power of the will is nevertheless indeterminate with regard 
to many kinds of desirable objects, so that it is made to be moved to 
opposites. And for this reason the power is natural, while not ceasing 
to be rational and deliberative.18
The response clarifi es the defi nition of “rational,” which means, for the 
present purposes, to be determined toward beatitude and free to deliberate 
on everything else. It is clear now that the will must be essentially one—
for if it were truly divided into a natural and deliberative power, then there 
would be an irrationality at the center of human desire. The end for which 
human beings were created as rational beings would be itself irrational, the 
object of an irrational appetite.
This is, as Bon a ven ture insists, not the case: The will is wholly ratio-
nal because it is capable of contraries, even if not in every case. A purely 
natural power is one that cannot be otherwise. Fire, to use Bon a ven ture’s 
example here, heats and illumines.19 It cannot do otherwise. The will is 
rational because it is capable of contraries in most cases. But the surprising 
fact remains that the rationality of human beings’ desire comes into ques-
tion precisely where the ultimate and highest end of human rationality is 
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concerned. If humans were to desire this ultimate end in such a way that 
they could not deliberate as to proximate ends—if the natural will were 
distinct from the deliberative will—then human desire for beatitude would 
be akin to the physical properties of the simple bodies.
Yet though the natural and deliberative wills are not, in fact, two pow-
ers, they are two diverse motions. The natural will is moved immutably and 
necessarily—rationally, yet without the deliberative and cognitive opera-
tions of reason. If liberum arbitrium is the operation of the will insofar as it 
is joined to cognition, then, it would seem to follow that the natural move-
ment toward beatitude is not, strictly speaking, an operation of liberum 
arbitrium. The will is not coerced into desiring beatitude. But neither is the 
soul free to deliberate concerning the natural desire for the Good that is 
the end of all human activity, however much it may deliberate as to whether 
or not to assent to this desire.20 Yet as Bon a ven ture insists in the Brevilo-
quium, free choice and beatitude have everything to do with each other: 
“Attaining beatitude is not glorious unless it is through merit, and there is 
no merit in something unless it is done voluntarily and freely.”21
How can beatitude be the sole object about which the soul does not 
deliberate, and at the same time be the end and glory of the soul’s power 
of free choice? And what kind of moral pedagogy does such a seemingly 
paradoxical end require? When Bon a ven ture takes up these questions in 
the following distinction, he turns again to animals.
Free Choice and the Interiority of Desire
It is telling that the fi rst question that Bon a ven ture treats on the subject of 
liberum arbitrium is whether the faculty is found in non-rational animals. 
Augustine’s declaration that “When we speak of free choice, we are speak-
ing not of a part of the soul, but of the whole” (a key auctoritas for scholastic 
refl ection on the subject) positions free choice as the very defi nition of 
spiritual substance, in which humans and the higher intelligences partici-
pate by virtue of their rationality. So the question of free choice in brute 
animals is not an oblique opening. Rather, it gets to the heart of what free 
choice is and what it does theologically. And Bon a ven ture’s resolution of 
the question is unequivocal: “It must be said that free choice is without a 
doubt found in rational substances alone.”22
In his conclusion, Bon a ven ture explains that to affi rm liberum arbitrium 
in rational creatures is to affi rm two things: their special liberty and their 
distinctive capacity for judgment or choice. On the fi rst count, to be “free” 
means, on the one hand, to be unconstrained in desiring and in fl eeing 
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an object of the concupiscible or irascible appetite. Anything that can be 
desired or fl ed can be so on account of three types of desiderata: the delec-
table or pleasurable, the agreeable or convenient, and the Good itself, that 
is, the bonum honestum. While irrational animals can desire or fl ee an object 
on account of its delectability or agreeability, only rational substances are 
capable of desiring the Good itself—that is, the intrinsic and highest good 
that is the object of synderesis. The rational substance is the only one that 
can be said to be truly free, since it is unconstrained with respect to all three 
genera of desiderata. Thus, in an apparent paradox, what makes rational 
substances free is their necessary and natural inclination to the Good. It 
is not actually a paradox in Bon a ven ture’s account, however, because the 
necessity of desiring the good is no restriction on the soul’s liberty; it is, in 
fact (and following Augustine), the very condition of liberty.
At the same time, to be free means to be totally unconstrained not only 
with respect to the object of desire, but also with respect to the act of de-
sire. While animals may be able (or can be trained) to restrain themselves 
from acting on their appetites, they cannot, Bon a ven ture assumes, restrain 
the interior act of desire itself; “And so if they love (amant) something, 
they are unable not to love it.” What appears as self-restraint in irrational 
animals will always turn out to be a constraint of some feared outcome 
(punishment, for example): “And this is why John of Damascus says that 
‘they are more acted upon than acting (magis aguntur quam agant),’ because 
the agent of restraint in animals is always external to them.”23 Rational be-
ings, by contrast, can restrain not only the exterior act of desire, but even 
the interior desire. The rational will can choose to stop loving something 
it previously loved, without any external stimulus or threat provoking the 
change. That is to say, the rational will can truly restrain itself, and this 
capac ity for self-reversion is crucial to the distinction between rational and 
irrational appetite. Bon a ven ture cites Anselm to the effect that the rational 
will is “a self-moving instrument,” and maintains that even though ani-
mals seem to move from some intrinsic cause, the interior appetite arises 
in  every case from an exterior object rather than true self-motion.24
Accordingly, both with respect to objects and acts of the appetite, a 
certain notion of interiority defi nes true voluntary liberty. With respect 
to the object of desire, only the rational and thus truly free creature is able 
to desire the intrinsic good of something, as opposed to its goodness “for 
me” as a source of pleasure or advantage. With respect to the act of de-
sire, the rational will has control over its own interior impulses; no outside 
force need act upon the will for its movement. A similar interiority and the 
capacity for self-reversion also characterize the second of the two words in 
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free choice (liberum arbitrium), which, Bon a ven ture argues, belongs prop-
erly to rational substances alone.
Arbitration [arbitrium] is the same as judgment [iudicium], at whose 
command [nutum] the other virtues are moved and obey. And “to 
judge” with a complete accounting [secundum rationem completam] is 
proper to that which discerns between the just and the unjust, and 
between what is proper to oneself and what is proper to another. And 
no power knows (novit) what is just and unjust except the one which 
participates in reason and which is made to recognize (cognoscere) the 
Highest Justice, from which comes the rule of every law.25
The power that participates in reason is the mind, which is the image of 
God, and which alone is able to know itself and its own act: “And no power 
that is bound to matter ever knows itself, nor is turned back upon itself.”26 
Because the rational substance alone among the powers of the soul is not 
bound to matter, then only reason is capable of self-reversion, and is thus 
capable of judging what is proper to oneself and what is alienus.
The Quaracchi editors attribute this assertion to the Liber de Causis, a 
digest and paraphrase of Proclus’s Elements of Theology that was read under 
the authority of Aristotle in the medieval schools.27 This indirect invoca-
tion of the Proclean understanding of nous as the self-reverting principle 
indicates that interiority, as a capacity for self-reversion through self-
knowledge and self-motion, is central to the conception of rationality and 
of the voluntas as the rational appetite. In this sense, a natural motion of 
the will is not contrary to reason, insofar as the inclination to the good, 
while not itself subject to deliberation or error, is innate to the soul, fully 
intrinsic to the will that desires it. The self-determining character of the 
will is thus reconciled to the necessary movement toward the good, insofar 
as the object of desire is not external to the soul itself.
This “Neoplatonic” or “Augustinian” gesture is not a departure from 
Aristotle. Even leaving aside the question of Proclus’s own “Aristotelian-
ism,” as well as the Aristotelian attribution under which Proclus’s words 
circulated, Bon a ven ture is careful to uphold the Aristotelian dictum that 
rationality is capable of contraries. The second argument for attributing 
free choice to animals observes that “a free power is one that is capable 
of opposites, and in brute animals there is a power to do opposing things, 
since sometimes they show kindness, sometimes ferocity; sometimes they 
are willful, and sometimes they respond and come.”28 To this Bon a ven ture 
responds that animals clearly are not able to be moved to all opposites, 
“but only those which are below the dignity of free choice.” Free choice 
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properly respects the bonum honestum, the same good that is also the proper 
object of synderesis.
However, although they have the same object, free choice and syndere-
sis (or the natural will to the good) are not identical. The natural and the 
deliberative wills, after all, are not distinguished according to their objects, 
but by their mode of moving toward that object. This is how the honest 
Good can here be classed as an oppositum. It is not that the Good itself has 
a contrary, but rather that the free soul may choose whether or not to pur-
sue a particular act toward that Good. The desire for this Good is always 
present, yet the merit of attaining beatitude consists in choosing the acts 
and the objects that will lead the soul to the Good it seeks. The will wills 
rightly when it consents to its own most fundamental desire.
The paradox, the point at which opposites coincide, is this desire—as 
desire for God’s presence is never, as the Itinerarium makes clear, sim-
ply one’s own. The will’s self-consent (so to speak)—the fulfi llment of the 
soul’s capacity for free choice and reversion of the rational will to itself—is 
a state of being moved wholly by the soul’s natural desire for the Good.29 
And to desire the Good, as the whole of the Itinerarium attests, is a move-
ment within and ultimately above oneself, an ascent of the mind toward 
its own excessus. In this ecstasy, deliberations cease. Thus, the will’s self-
control comes to resemble nothing so much as the complete abandonment 
of that self-control to the Good, the object of the soul’s most intimate and 
most excessive longing.30
If the distinction between rational will and irrational appetite is mea-
sured in the distance from an interior impulse to an external attraction, 
then the ecstatic character of the soul’s desire—a desire which is both in-
ternal to the soul and which lifts the soul out of itself—cannot be under-
stood in any straightforward way as rational. Animal affections are “more 
acted upon than acting.” Divine desire, at the same time complete interi-
ority and complete exteriority, would seem for Bon a ven ture to be a state in 
which being acted upon and acting are the same movement.31
Carried by Desire: Francis and the Legenda Maior
In the previous chapter, I suggested that because of the analogical struc-
ture of creation and the ecstatic character of desire, the transformation of 
affect that occurs in the excessus mentis is always already underway from 
the very beginning of ascent. That is, the soul, insofar as it is constituted 
by the desire for the good into which it is ultimately consumed, exceeds 
itself even as it remains possessed of its powers. If so, then according to 
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the Seraphic movement of the Itinerarium, the transformation of the af-
fectus that occurs in ecstatic union is already begun in statu viatoris. And 
the will’s self-motion, ordained naturally and determinately to beatitude, is 
always also a kind of being moved. Given the prevalence of this theme in 
Bon a ven ture’s exposition of Francis’s Seraphic vision in the Itinerarium, it 
is not surprising that this dynamic also appears in his account of Francis’s 
life, the Legenda Maior.
The remainder of this chapter examines Bon a ven ture’s depiction of 
Fran cis in the Legenda. Generically, Bon a ven ture’s hagiography is far re-
moved from his early scholastic speculations on free choice and the will. 
But I examine these two disparate sources together in order to demonstrate 
their affi nities on a theological level. In both accounts, what Bon a ven ture 
reveals is the paradoxical coincidence of activity and passivity, the surpris-
ing but not inexplicable torsion of inner and outer effected by the divine 
origin and goal of human beings’ natural capacities. Nature, in Bon a ven-
ture’s metaphysics, is after all divine, and the identity of these two poles 
keeps in motion the hierarchies that the distinction between nature and 
grace underwrites. As I suggested earlier, in Bon a ven ture’s accounts of free 
choice and the will, the ecstatic nature of desire upsets the distinction be-
tween interior self-motion and external, corporeal motion, such that the 
consummation of self-motion is its becoming external motion. If this is so, 
then the progressive perfecting of the soul should manifest itself in some 
way, should become, in other words, external. This is precisely what takes 
place, I will argue, in Bon a ven ture’s depiction of Francis’s life—his effu-
sive compassion, his attachment to nonrational animals, and his long, spec-
tacular death, his ardent desire literally transforming him into a corpse, a 
martyr whose lifeless form witnesses the progressive perfection and mani-
festation—the embodiment— of his love.
By the end of Bon a ven ture’s Legenda, it is clear that he has positioned 
the work as a kind of companion or hagiographical counterpart to the Iti-
nerarium, echoing its seven-stage structure, whereby “through six stages 
you were led to the seventh in which at last you have rest.”32 Though the 
stages described in Francis’s life do not correspond one-to-one to the 
stages of the soul’s ascent in the Itinerarium, the seventh stage in which 
the affections are infl amed and transformed fi nds a clear resonance with 
Francis’s seventh stage. This is the ecstatic Seraphic vision that leaves his 
body marked with the death he undergoes in taking on Christ’s passion.33 
Both the parallels in Bon a ven ture’s own text and the exemplary nature 
of Francis’s life and spiritual death invite the reader to examine how the 
desire that transforms the soul is manifested in Francis’s disposition and 
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actions. In other words, Bon a ven ture frames the Legenda Maior as a model 
of what a soul carried along by desire toward God looks like.
For this reason, the Legenda deserves attention alongside Bon a ven-
ture’s other works outlining the dynamics of the soul’s natural affection for 
God.34 The Legenda, however, is more complicated as a source for Bon a-
ven ture’s thought. Bon a ven ture was the third biographer of Francis, after 
the two vitae of Thomas of Celano and the vita of Julian of Speyer. And 
Bon a ven ture relied heavily on these previous accounts for his own, in many 
cases simply reproducing entire passages. Thus the question of Bon a ven-
ture’s authorial voice in the Legenda is a complicated one35—and rendered 
all the more complicated by the circumstances surrounding Bon a ven ture’s 
compilation of the work (which included heightening divisions within the 
order regarding Francis’s intentions for the friars minor).36 These autho-
rial questions, however, do not discount the Legenda as a source for Bon a-
ven ture’s thought, but rather make particularly visible the imbricated and 
situational nature of authority in all medieval theological works. Generic 
conventions, institutional exigencies, and the presence of other authorial 
voices in the text are constitutive of all of Bon a ven ture’s writings. Reading 
them well is not a matter of discerning his authentic voice behind these 
circumstances, nor it is simply a task of explaining every assertion as a 
function of those authorial voices.
Rather than searching for the authentically Bon a ven turean thought in 
his compilation of Francis’s life, I suggest that the text as a whole be read for 
the ways in which it complicates and amplifi es the ideas I have been trac-
ing in Bon a ven ture’s other works thus far. This involves, then, an explora-
tion of how Francis’s desire for God and his will to the good appear in the 
text. In this view, the generic differences between the Legenda on the one 
hand and the Itinerarium and Bon a ven ture’s university texts on the other 
are paramount. In the vita, the pedagogical medium is neither the scho-
lastic quaestio nor the mnemonic six-winged fi gure of the Seraph, but the 
embodied actions and appearance of a holy man. This is not a claim for the 
text’s greater realism or relative lack of allegorization, but rather for a dif-
ferent form of theological expression. Because the subject is the person of 
Francis, desire in the vita can only appear in and through the human body. 
Perhaps one of the most remarkable aspects of the Legenda is its exploration 
of the ways in which the body bears the affections of desire and compassion. 
Francis’s body is not only the sign of his ecstatic love—in the form of the 
stigmata of Christ’s passion—but the site upon which it is enacted.
In the prologue, Bon a ven ture gestures to the end of Francis’s life, in 
which he was “given an angelic offi ce, and was totally infl amed with a 
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 Seraphic fi re. Like a hierarchic man, he was carried up [sursum vectus] in 
a fi ery chariot.”37 Through the invocation of the Seraph and the descrip-
tion of Francis as a vir hierarchicus (a man whose soul has been made hier-
archical through the threefold operation of purgation, illumination, and 
perfection), Bon a ven ture frames Francis’s life in terms of the Dionysian 
ascent in the celestial hierarchy. In this way, he immediately establishes a 
link to the threefold Dionysian framework of his other writings, including 
not only the Itinerarum, but also De Triplici Via and the later Collationes in 
Hexaemeron.
Francis’s angelic nature is not realized only at his stigmatization and 
death, however.38 As the prologue goes on to explain, “while living among 
human beings he imitated angelic purity, by which he was made an example 
for perfect followers of Christ.”39 And though the story Bon a ven ture re-
lates of Francis’s life is one of progressive transformation, he establishes at 
the beginning of the narrative that the qualities that ordained Francis to an 
angelic offi ce toward the end of his life were present from an early age.
In the fi rst chapter, Bon a ven ture writes that even as a young man, Fran-
cis’s heart was fi lled with a “generous compassion [miseratio liberalis] for the 
poor,” such that when, on one occasion, after ignoring a beggar, he real-
ized what he had done and ran to the man. Francis then resolved never to 
refuse a beggar again, and especially if that beggar appealed to divine love. 
He kept this promise and “merited a great increase of love and grace in 
God.”40 Here the interplay between Francis’s inborn affective disposition 
and his great merit in doing good is established early in his life, and at the 
very beginning of Bon a ven ture’s account. This disposition is moved not 
only by the sight of poverty but also at the sound of God’s name: “Later, 
when he had perfectly put on Christ, he would say that even while remain-
ing in his worldly habit, he was almost never able to hear someone mention 
divine love without being changed in his heart [sine cordis immutatione].”
As described here, Francis’s compassion for the poor and his special 
affection for the love of God are rooted in a single inborn disposition. 
In striking terms Bon a ven ture states that this disposition was natural to 
Francis, present in him before his perfection by grace: “He possessed an 
inborn sympathy, which was doubled by the infused holiness of Christ. 
Therefore his soul melted [liquescebat] for the poor and infi rm, and he ex-
tended his affection [affectum] even for those to whom he was not able to 
extend his hand.”41 Here Bon a ven ture clearly distinguishes a natural affec-
tive tendency from the superadded (superinfusa) love, which intensifi es and 
perfects Francis’s innate compassion, extending the reach of his affection.
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That Francis’s life bears witness to the unity of love of God and com-
passion for God’s creation is a hallmark of devotion to Francis, both medi-
eval and modern. But reading the Legenda alongside Bon a ven ture’s other 
writings about the affectus, it becomes clear just how deep that connection 
runs in Bon a ven ture’s understanding of creation and the nature of the soul. 
As he writes, “True holiness, which according to the Apostle is good for 
all things, so fi lled Francis’s heart and penetrated his fl esh [viscera] that 
it seemed to have claimed [vindicasse] the man of God totally to its rule. 
This is what drew [agebat] him to God through devotion, transformed him 
into Christ through compassion, inclined [inclinabat] him to his neighbor 
through lowering himself, and refashioned him to a state of innocence 
through the universal reconciliation of every creature.”42 The same spirit 
that carried Francis to God and inclined him to his neighbor also restored 
in him the original rectitude of creation. All of the language here is remi-
niscent of Bon a ven ture’s descriptions of the movement of synderesis—a 
movement that lifts the soul to God and inclines it to every Good as such 
(the bonum honestum), and is that by which human beings remain upright 
as they were before sin. Bon a ven ture presents Francis as one whose natu-
ral affect was so strong, or whose will was so bent back upon his inborn 
love for God, that he seemed to be driven entirely by this natural affective 
spark. Not incidentally, it is this same Francis who is depicted earlier as 
praying incessantly with the “unutterable groanings” of the spirit—groans 
which Bon a ven ture in his Sentences commentary attributes to synderesis.
For all of the displays of virtue and good works that appear in the Le-
genda, the picture that emerges of Francis is of one who “is more acted 
upon than acting,” with passive verb forms repeatedly used to underscore 
the ease with which Francis is moved by his desire for God and for the 
poor. As I suggested in the beginning of this chapter, free choice, a capac-
ity whose hallmark is the uniquely rational ability to restrain interior im-
pulses, is paradoxically perfected in the inability to restrain the soul’s most 
deeply rooted affective impulse. In the Legenda, likewise, the question of 
Francis’s restraint is raised on several occasions. In the fi rst chapter Francis 
is praying alone when Jesus appears to him on the cross. At the sight (con-
spectum) of this, Francis’s soul melts, and “the memory of Christ’s passion 
was so impressed into the marrow of the fl esh of his heart (visceribus cordis 
medullitus), that from that moment whenever Christ on the cross came to 
mind, he could scarcely (vix) restrain his outward tears and sighs.”43 The 
interior affections, spurred by the sight of Christ crucifi ed before his mind, 
are so overwhelming that he is almost—though not quite—completely 
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overtaken by them to the point of tears. Tears are a common sight for 
those in the presence of Francis, so much so that they eventually cause a 
disease in his eyes. When his doctor warns him to hold back his tears in 
order to preserve his vision, Francis replies that celestial vision is to be pre-
ferred over “the light which we have in common with fl ies.”44 In this way, 
Bon a ven ture explains, Francis prefers to go blind from tears, “by which the 
interior eye is purifi ed so that it may see God,” than to impede the spirit 
by repressing his fervor.45 Here it appears that Francis is to be revered for 
his decision not to restrain his affect as it manifests itself in excessive tears. 
Could he? In this instance, Francis chooses to give free rein to the impulses 
of desire that threaten to overwhelm him. His exercise of choice—and 
thus his virtue—lies in surrendering to an affective devotion in both its 
inward and outward manifestations.
This is not the fi rst instance of Francis’s body being affl icted with devo-
tion. While he is still involved with the affairs of his father’s business and 
has “not yet learned to contemplate heavenly things and had not acquired a 
taste for divine things,” God affl icts his body with a long illness, in order to 
prepare his soul for being anointed by the Holy Spirit.46 The bodily illness 
wears off eventually, but the interior change it effects is terminal. Upon 
recovering his strength, he sees a poor and ragged knight in the street. 
Moved (the word is affectu) to compassion over the man’s poverty, Francis 
immediately removes his clothes and gives them to the man.47 This fore-
shadows Francis’s more dramatic disrobing in the presence of his father 
later on. But the episode on its own also dramatically illustrates the way in 
which God’s compassion is conducted, in a sense, through and in the body 
of Francis. The compassion of God fi rst appears as physical illness, then 
moves to effect an interior awakening of compassion. Finally, when Francis 
is moved by the sight of suffering, it manifests itself again outwardly in the 
nakedness of Francis’s body.
The Legenda’s concern for visibility is surely in part a function of the 
forensic demands that such a text must satisfy. This is true, of course, of 
hagiographical writing in general. But it is especially the case in Fran-
cis’s vita, which, Bon a ven ture writes, he was commissioned to produce by 
the General Chapter of Norbonne in 1260 (only a year after the date he 
gives for the inspiration of the Itinerarium, indicating that the two texts 
are very closely contemporary). Bon a ven ture’s vita was to be the authori-
tative account of Francis’s life, a unifying document meant to set to rest 
the divi sions within the order about the true nature of Francis’s life and 
the community of his followers. As Bon a ven ture writes in the prologue, 
“In order to establish with greater clarity and certainty the true facts of his 
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life to hand down to posterity, I have visited his place of birth, the places 
in which he lived, and the site of the death [transitus] of this blessed man 
and have had thorough conversations with those still living who were close 
to him, and especially with those who were most familiar with his holiness 
and were its closest followers.”48 As in the visit to La Verna, which Bon a-
ven ture relates in his prologue to the Itinerarium, Bon a ven ture again puts 
himself in Francis’s place—as the locus of true authority about Francis’s 
life and death and also as witness to Francis’s holiness in Bon a ven ture’s 
own body. He relates that when he was a child, he “was saved from the 
jaws of death through the invocation of Francis and his merits.”49 Thus, 
in gratitude he seeks to gather the true accounts of Francis’s life, for, he 
writes, “I recognize that I have experienced his power in my very self.”50 
Francis’s spiritual power inhabits Bon a ven ture, and Bon a ven ture inhabits 
the text that follows, either as eyewitness to the site or as recipient of the 
report of Francis’s holiness, compassion, and spiritual fervor.
The physicality of Francis’s concourse with God is stressed even in the 
absence of witnesses, as in the pivotal vision in the Church of San Damia-
no.51 Francis is praying with his head inclined toward a crucifi x, his eyes 
characteristically fi lled with tears, when he hears “with his bodily ears” a 
voice coming from the cross, telling him to restore the Lord’s house. He 
eventually sets about restoring the church building, only later realizing the 
spiritual meaning of Christ’s command. But immediately upon hearing that 
voice—and before he acts—he begins to tremble. Receiving the power of 
divine speech in his heart, he is “carried out of himself in an ecstasy of mind 
[mentis alienatur excessu].”52 The entire scene is structured on the dialectic 
of body and spirit. Francis is made to tremble as the words that strike his 
ears are commuted to divine power in his heart, so that he loses his bodily 
senses. And from mental ecstasy he returns to act, fi rst building a physical 
structure that itself signifi es the spiritual renewal to come.
The authenticity of this story derives not from an external witness to 
the event, but from Francis’s own report to his followers later in life. Had 
there been a witness, how would Francis’s ecstasy have appeared? Bon a-
ven ture affi rms that there is a sensible effect of the excessus mentis when he 
describes Francis’s follower Giles of Assisi as being frequently “rapt in God 
in ecstasies, as I myself have truly observed as an eyewitness [ego ipse oculata 
fi de conspexi].”53 Only later episodes from Francis’s life give an indication of 
what it was like to see him in the full ecstasy of love. His body weakened by 
age and the rigors of his devotion, Bon a ven ture reports that “he was often 
suspended in such an excess of contemplation that, rapt above himself and 
feeling [sentiens] something beyond human understanding [ultra humanum 
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sensum], he was unaware of what was going on around him.”54 On one oc-
casion, as he was riding on a donkey through the busy town of Borgo Santo 
Sepolcro, he was thronged by devoted followers: “He was pulled and held 
back by them, and pushed here and there and touched many times, but he 
seemed unaware of all of it, and paid attention to nothing, just as if he were 
a dead corpse.”55 And in an unusually cinematic scene, Bon a ven ture depicts 
Francis praying alone at night in the woods, beating his chest, groaning, 
and “watering the place with his tears.”56 Onlookers glimpse him “with 
his hands extended in the shape of a cross, his entire body raised up from 
the ground and a cloud shining around him.”57 The outward light exhibits 
the illumination of his soul, but his posture is that of a man crucifi ed. As 
in the scene at Santo Sepolcro, the physical presence of Francis in ecstasy 
of mind is a body of death—insensate and inanimate.
The fi gure of death gestures forward to the climactic episode on Mount 
La Verna, in which Francis’s vision of the cruciform Seraph leaves him 
branded with the wounds of Christ’s passion. Around two years before his 
death, Bon a ven ture writes, Francis asked a friend to open the book of the 
Gospels three times. Each time, the book opened to reveal the account of 
the crucifi xion. Francis then became fi lled with a desire for martyrdom, 
as “the unquenchable fi re of his love for the good Jesus had risen up in 
him into such a torch of fl ames that many waters could not quench such 
a strong love.”58 This love, described in language from the Song of Songs, 
will be the instrument of Francis’s spiritual martyrdom, the fl ame that con-
sumes his soul. But the vision of the Seraph itself elicits more than simple 
caritas in Francis: “By the Seraphic ardor of his desires he was being raised 
above [ageretur] into God, and by sweet compassion he was being trans-
formed into him who chose to be crucifi ed on account of his excessive love 
[ex caritate nimia].”59 The vision of the Seraph is glorious, but the vision of 
the crucifi x is pitiable: “Seeing it, he was powerfully overcome, and a mix 
of joy and grief fl ooded his heart. He rejoiced in the gracious expression 
with which Christ, in the form of the Seraph, looked at him, but that he 
was affi xed to a cross pierced Francis’s soul with a sword of compassionate 
sorrow.”60 Affective death in excessus mentis is at once greatest joy and great-
est pain, a violent overthrow of human understanding and an elevation to 
the place of Christ himself.61
The sublime ambivalence that consumes Francis’s soul and leaves his 
heart ablaze at the same time pierces and tears his body as well. The wounds 
left by his vision are referred to as “stigmata,” but they are more than sig-
nifying marks. The wounds he sustains transform his body, rendering him 
a living corpse: A wound in his side bleeds continuously, with blood real 
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enough to wet and stain his clothes. On his hands and feet are not only 
wounds but miraculous nails protruding from his fl esh so that he can no 
longer walk for himself. Thus, in the last years of his life, in the glory of his 
martyrdom, Francis’s dying body (corpus emortuum) must be carried by his 
friends through the streets, exhibited like a corpse while still living.
In this way, Francis’s body is a martyr to his infl amed soul.62 But to what 
perfection does his dying, nearly immobile body witness? Francis himself 
provides an interpretation of this sign earlier in the Legenda in a discussion 
of obedience. Here, the exanime corpus with which I opened this book ap-
pears, foreshadowing Francis’s own later martyrdom:
Once when he was asked who should be judged truly obedient, he gave 
as an example [pro exemplo] the image of a dead body. “Take a corpse, 
[exanime corpus]” he said, “and place it where you like! You will see that 
it puts up no resistance to motion (non repugnare motum), nor does it 
grumble about its position, or complain when it is put aside. If it is 
propped up on a throne, it does not raise its head up, but rather looks 
down. If it is clothed in purple, it will look twice as pale. This,” Francis 
said, “is the truly obedient one, who does not judge [diiudicat] why he 
is moved, and does not care where he is placed. He does not demand to 
be transferred. If he is appointed to an offi ce, he retains his usual humil-
ity. The more he is honored, the more he counts himself unworthy.”63
There are many reasons to wonder at this passage. Most simply, the ex-
ample is a graphic illustration of the virtue of humility. At the same time, 
the darkly comic image of a corpse slumped on a throne, neck slack and 
draped in purple, mocks the pretensions of worldly glory. Yet the power of 
the image itself is heightened by the rhetorical context in which it appears. 
Francis presents this image in response to a group of his followers seek-
ing an example, a model of perfect obedience to be imitated. And in this 
way, as the exemplar of true obedience, he offers an example of obedience 
that refl ects a pale light back onto himself. His life is a movement toward 
perfection in death, a gradual transformation into the macabre image he 
presents here. At the same time, the corpse offers a proleptic glimpse of 
Francis’s own living yet martyred body—a body that is always also the 
appearance of Christ’s crucifi ed body. Francis is offering himself as the ex-
ample of perfect obedience, while at the same time offering a lens through 
which to understand his virtue.
In what does this virtue consist? The lifeless body, or, literally, the body 
without a soul (exanime corpus), not only does not judge (diiudicat) where 
it is moved, but even has no will of its own with which to move itself. 
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The body as speculum and exemplum refl ects Francis as one who has sur-
rendered the will entirely, or, in view of Francis’s ecstatic “confl agration,” 
one whose will has been wholly consumed by desire. Francis’s dying body 
makes visible the consummation of love. No less than three times in the 
ninth chapter (which recounts the saint’s fervent love for Christ), Francis 
is described as being “carried” ( ferebatur)—by affectus, by devotio caritatis, 
and by desiderio.64 His soul puts up no resistance. It is moved like a body, an 
example of perfect obedience and consummate desire.65
To Take Place: Francis Among the Animals
Bon a ven ture’s account of Francis does more than simply render desire vis-
ible. In the Itinerarium, Bon a ven ture writes that Francis’s transitus made 
him the example of perfect contemplation—such that all spiritual per-
sons are invited not simply to imitate Francis’s transitus, but to pass over 
themselves through Francis. The soul passes with and through Francis into 
spiritual ecstasy and the confl agration of the soul. Francis is the example 
of this passing over; and for Bon a ven ture, an exemplar is much more than 
a didactic convenience for the cultivation of virtue. As he writes in the 
prologue to the Breviloquium (describing scripture’s modus tractandi), “the 
affect is moved to examples more than to arguments, to promised rewards 
more than to ratiocination, and through devotion more than through 
defi nitions.”66 An exemplum is not simply that which instructs the soul in 
how to act, but is also that which moves and draws the soul affectively to 
itself. Francis’s desire makes him the exemplary subject of the soul’s desire 
for God, and in turn transforms him into its object as well. In his trip 
through Borgo Santo Sepolcro, when Francis is perched like an inanimate 
body on his donkey, lost in ecstasy and pushed and pulled by the towns-
people, he is not the only fi gure in the scene drawn by love: “The crowds 
rushed toward him out of devotion,” the account reads.67 But the multiple 
vectors of love ultimately miss each other in this scene. The crowds are 
drawn toward Francis even as he is drawn up in love and contemplation to 
God—the present and absent object of their devotion, unaware of his sur-
roundings and yet entirely acquiescent to their physical demands: a body 
abandoned to the desires of the crowd.
Francis’s powers of attraction are nowhere more evident than in the 
celebrated stories of his interactions with animals, both in the vitae and the 
fi oretti.68 They present Francis as a fi gure of exceptional compassion and 
gentleness. In Bon a ven ture’s renditions, the stories of Francis ministering 
to animals refl ect also Francis’s understanding of the structure of vestige, 
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image, and likeness whereby all creation testifi es to God as its cause: “When 
he considered the primal origin of all things, he was fi lled with even greater 
piety, calling all creatures, however small, ‘brother’ and ‘sister,’ for he knew 
that they had the same principle as he himself did.”69 In addition, Bon a-
ven ture adds another interpretive gloss on these stories, supplementing his 
source material with two additional anecdotes concerning lambs, because 
“he embraced more warmly [viscerosius] and sweetly those creatures that 
present a natural likeness of Christ’s gentle mercy and represent him in 
scriptural signifi cation.”70 The animal in question is not a mere brute beast, 
but an allegorical stand-in for Christ.
In addition, the story of a falcon waking Francis for divine offi ce signi-
fi es, in Bon a ven ture’s account, the saint’s eventual elevation in contempla-
tion and Seraphic vision. But even so, Bon a ven ture includes more in these 
stories than an affi rmation of God’s universal causality and Francis’s alle-
gorical imagination. The falcon, for example, remains with Francis because 
he is attached to him in friendship (magno se illi amicitiae foedere copulavit). 
Birds, hares, and even a fi sh are drawn powerfully to Francis’s presence. He 
is also given a pheasant who “clung to him with such affection that it would 
in no way suffer to be separated from him.”71 Whenever the pheasant was 
placed outside, it returned immediately to Francis. And when it was given 
away, it refused food until it was returned to Francis, upon which it recov-
ered its joy and its appetite.
These miracle stories illustrate Francis’s extraordinary holiness and 
compassion, rather than the extraordinary virtue of the animals. The ani-
mals do not cling to Francis by a resolve of their will, but by a natural 
fi lial attraction to his love. And so in their response to Francis’s affective 
fervor, they also refl ect it back upon him, just as the pliable corpse refl ects 
Francis’s obedience and humility. They are more acted upon than acting. 
But in the devotion of the birds and hares and fi sh, the purity of Francis’s 
own affection for Christ is manifest, and the animals themselves, through 
Francis’s exemplary love, become examples of devotion. Francis becomes 
the fi gure and presence of Christ among the lower creatures. In a dynamic 
that could rightly be called analogical, Francis takes the place of Christ in 
these stories, as the animals take the place of Francis.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, for Bon a ven ture, analogy is a dy-
namic relationship that draws each stage of creation to its own excess. Thus, 
Francis does not simply represent Christ; he takes the place of, or becomes 
Christ through the force of his love. And the reader, for whom Francis ap-
pears as the desirous and desirable object of the Legenda Maior, is moved 
and transformed into Francis. Analogy is not simply a  representational 
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strategy, but a devotional technique ordered by affect. As the motive prin-
ciple of the rational and irrational soul alike, the affect moves the soul to 
that which it loves. As the unitive principle, affect is that by which the lover 
and the beloved are joined as one, and that which transforms the lover into 
its beloved. The movement of exemplarity is the affective movement to the 
place of the exemplar.
In the displacement that occurs, subject becomes object, lover becomes 
beloved, the moved becomes the mover. For Francis to follow the example 
of Christ means to take the place of Christ by being drawn into and trans-
formed into him through affection—and as exemplar Francis functions 
in the same role for “all spiritual persons.” For Bon a ven ture, exemplarism 
names both the metaphysical relationship of all things to their source, and 
the devotional technique by which the reader is transformed through love. 
The animals only gesture toward the outer limits of exemplarity’s reach. 
The love that draws Francis to Christ and the love that draws the animals 
to Francis is not irrational any more than it is an act of human reason. All 
things are drawn back to their source by the moving and unifying force 
of desire—exemplifi ed in and transferred through the body of Francis—
powerful as fi re and inexorable as death. Ascent to God by way of Francis 
is the becoming-body of the soul.
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c o n c l u s i o n
A Corpus, in Sum
A question of reading or hearing. In any case, negative 
theology would be nothing, very simply nothing, if this 
excess or this surplus (with regard to language) did not 
imprint some mark on some singular events of language and 
did not leave some remains on the body of a tongue . . . 
A corpus, in sum.
—jacques derrida, “Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)”1
Throughout this book, I have attempted to trace a coincidence of oppo-
sites in Bon a ven ture’s devotional program, in which the innermost affec-
tive disposition of the soul—what Bon a ven ture calls the natural instinct 
for the good or synderesis—coincides with the brute, inanimate body. 
The soul’s natural instinct for the Good is its innate capacity to exceed its 
own faculties and operations. This capacity is at once constitutive of those 
deliberative, volitional faculties and irreducible to them. In a way that is 
similarly paradigmatic for much of late medieval affective devotional prac-
tice and refl ection, a site of excess, affect names for Bon a ven ture a place of 
immanent otherness that is fi nally inassimilable to the operations of intel-
lect. This place is unknown to the soul and yet as intimate to the soul as the 
body to which it is joined. At once secret and manifest, then, the affective 
conforms to the paradoxical logic of mystical theology.
For Bon a ven ture, this logic is also exemplifi ed by Francis’s body. In 
the Legenda Maior, the drama of secrecy and disclosure unfolds immedi-
ately upon Francis’s wounding Seraphic vision: “Christ’s servant, seeing 
that the stigmata impressed so vividly in his fl esh could not be concealed 
from his close companions, was nevertheless afraid to expose the secret 
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 [sacramentum] of the Lord.”2 Illuminato, however, warns Francis not to 
hide the divine secret from the benefi t of others: “The holy man was moved 
by these words, even though at other times he used to say, ‘My secret is 
mine [secretum meum mihi].’ ”3 Thus Francis recounts his vision to his com-
panions, though not fully: “He added that the one who appeared to him 
said some things that he would never disclose (aperiret) to anyone as long 
as he lived.”4 There are secrets that Francis will take to his death, even as 
his dying body betrays him: “Though he tried with great diligence to hide 
the treasure he found in the fi eld, still he could not keep others from see-
ing the stigmata in his hands and feet.”5 The “Lord’s secret” can neither be 
disclosed nor hidden. The secret (or mystery, or sacrament: sacramentum) 
unleashes a play of hiding and revealing, and yet it is not a matter of one or 
the other. Francis’s secret is as open as the bleeding wound at his side. And 
like his wounds, it is not contained within the boundary of interiority, but 
produces a radical, ecstatic reconciliation of inner and outer. The secret is 
not something that Francis can hide, because there is nothing to hide, and 
so nothing to disclose.6 The spiritual depth of Francis’s compassion is at 
the same time the porous and protruding surface of his body. Marked with 
the signs of Christ’s passion, Francis’s body is a text, indicating the recon-
ciliation of spirit and fl esh, inner and outer.
At the opening of the fi nal chapter of Francis’s life, Bon a ven ture an-
nounces that Francis was now “nailed to the cross as much in his fl esh as 
in his spirit” as he depicts Francis’s dying body (corpus emortuum) being 
carried through the streets.7 The near-dead body is the obedient body, the 
body that does not resist the prompting of desire. Thus the glorifi ed and 
stigmatized body contrasts with the body that Francis used to address as 
Brother Ass: the body in its stubborn resistance to the promptings of Fran-
cis’s love of God.8 The miraculous Seraphic vision transforms Francis’s 
body not only by the signs of Christ’s passion but also by the weakening 
of its resistance—not to the soul’s promptings but to a different motion. 
Francis’s body becomes Christ’s body in that it no longer moves itself but 
is fi xed to the cross, carried simply by its passion. The body comes to be 
moved in accordance with the movement of the spirit. And the spirit moves 
inexorably toward God, like a simple body, by its weight.
Nevertheless, the paths of soul and body diverge in death. At Francis’s 
death, his followers witness the ascent of his soul in the form of a star rising 
on a cloud to heaven.9 Yet for all the radiance of this vision, it is Francis’s 
corpse that becomes the locus of wonder and desire. Abandoned to death, 
the miraculous nails in his hands and feet are not only plainly visible but 
tangible. The body of Francis “confi rmed the faith and incited the love” 
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of the many citizens of Assisi who came to experience the presence of the 
saint’s body, and news of the glorious body “excited the desire” of all who 
heard of it.10 Bon a ven ture reports that Francis’s formerly dark fl esh be-
came dazzlingly bright, contrasting brilliantly with the iron black protru-
sions from his hands and feet. The natural contraction of the fl esh after 
death shrank the holy man’s side wound into a perfect round rose. And at 
the same time, in an unnatural reversal of rigor mortis, his limbs became 
soft and easily movable (mollia et tractabilia).11
It would be clear, then, even if Bon a ven ture did not point it out  explicitly, 
that Francis’s corpse has been transformed, miraculously, into a resurrection 
body (illius secundae stolae pulchritudinem praetendebat).12 More specifi cally, 
Francis’s body has become the resurrected body of Christ, with a doubting 
knight by the name of Jerome playing the part of Thomas.13 Touching the 
wounds with his own hands, and moving the nails around Francis’s hands 
and feet, the knight is cured of his doubt. Yet where Jesus appeared in his 
glorifi ed body to his disciples walking and speaking, Francis’s resurrec-
tion body remains inanimate. Just as was done before his death, Francis’s 
body is now carried into the streets of Assisi. His corpse is transformed 
into a radiant example of perfect obedience, beautifully wounded, entirely 
unresistant to being moved, and bereft of both intellect and will. Fran-
cis’s sanctity, which began with an inborn affective ardor, reaches consum-
mation fi nally in his inanimate body, obedience perfected in death, virtue 
materialized in fl esh. His body is at once silent and eloquent. It heals the 
wounds of doubt and yet stupefi es the intellect.14 The body keeps its secret 
in the exhibition of the body and the certainty of death.
If Francis’s death is the enactment of Christ’s passion, then the soul’s 
excessus in union with God is itself an enactment of this death. The soul’s 
journey into God and the Dionysian abandonment of intellect that takes 
place at the journey’s consummation is a prefi guration, a living into, the 
glorifi ed corpse that Francis’s body miraculously exhibits on earth prior 
to resurrection. The soul’s ascent to God is its becoming-body, its natu-
ral desire for God is its groaning to become body, to be consumed and 
moved wholly and simply by God. Both the Itinerarium and the Franciscan 
spirituality for which it serves as blueprint are often described as a journey 
from the appreciation of the corporeal traces of God to God’s incorporeal 
being and goodness. Yet the enduring presence of Christ’s suffering body 
at the culmination of the journey suggests that the stages of ascent chart, 
paradoxically, not only an ascent from the corporeal to the spiritual but 
also a transformation, effected by love, of soul into body—that is, into the 
body of Christ and the body of Francis. And that, as Bon a ven ture writes in 
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the seventh chapter of the Itinerarium, is “mystical and most secret.” Like 
the Seraphic revelation to Francis, the secret is not scientia, something that 
could be revealed to the intellect, but something that can only be “known” 
in the darkness devoid of intellect. The secret remains hidden from intel-
lect essentially; it can only be experienced as the ecstatic body that the 
soul becomes in excessus mentis: the body of Francis in excess of the soul in 
its deliberative faculties. The itinerarium is the journey of the soul out of 
itself and into the body of Christ. What remains hidden from intellect, the 
secret that cannot be known because it is heterogeneous to knowledge as 
such, is the embodiment of the soul that is fulfi lled and redeemed in union 
with God.
Not only for Francis, but for his followers, the practice of ardent de-
votion to Christ’s suffering is similarly oriented toward this ecstatic 
 becoming-body of affect. As I suggested in the Introduction, the climactic 
episode of Francis’s vision of the crucifi ed Seraph is itself an exemplary 
scene of Passion devotion, an icon and model of the practice of vivid and 
highly wrought meditation on Christ’s crucifi xion that Bon a ven ture com-
mends to his brothers and sisters in the Franciscan orders. As an example 
of Passion meditation, Francis’s vision at LaVerna establishes the endpoint 
and purpose of meditating on Jesus’s human suffering: The lover takes the 
place of Francis taking the place of Christ on the cross, in a double dis-
placement of the self in desire. Passion meditation is an ecstatic practice 
leading to Dionysian union.
As Karnes rightly observes, Bon a ven ture’s treatises on Passion medita-
tion—most notably the Lignum vitae and On the Perfection of Life Addressed 
to the Sisters, engage the reader’s imagination, memory, and conscience; nei-
ther their purpose nor their methods can accurately be described as wholly 
affective.15 Meditation on the scenes of Christ’s passion is effortful, Bon a-
ven ture indicates. The practice requires the mind’s focused attention. But 
in drawing a devotional template that begins in purgative self-examination 
and ends in the meditant standing outside herself and—through the fulfi ll-
ment of the proper affections of fear, love, and  compassion—becoming so 
intimate to Christ that his lifeless body becomes hers, Bon a ven ture depicts 
the practice of Passion meditation as a Dionysian ascent into a crucifying 
and ecstatic union in which love is the binding and transforming force.
In Bon a ven ture’s most extensive treatment of the practice of Passion 
meditation, the Lignum vitae, the reader fi nds herself in the text from the 
opening words: “With Christ I am nailed to the cross.”16 While narrating 
and interpreting the meaning of Jesus’s crucifi xion, Bon a ven ture weaves 
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the fi rst person through the text, placing the reader in the scene, until 
Paul’s identifi cation with Christ with which Bon a ven ture opens the work 
becomes the reader’s identifi cation with Christ—even and especially unto 
death. Accordingly, “the true worshipper of God and disciple of Christ” 
should strive to carry Christ’s cross “in both his soul and his fl esh [tam 
mente quam carne] . . . until he can truly feel [sentire] in himself what the 
Apostle said above.”17 Such an effort engages the memory, intellect, and 
the will, and indeed the form of the Lignum vitae appeals explicitly to the 
imagination as an aid to understanding.18 But to be nailed with Christ to 
the cross, to take Christ’s place in that moment, is, Bon a ven ture writes, 
an affection (affectum) and a feeling (sensum). Compassion for Christ’s suf-
fering is fi nally ecstatic, lifting the meditant outside herself and bringing 
about a total identifi cation with and transformation into Christ. This is 
no less the case when Bon a ven ture addresses the sponsae Christi, a group of 
Poor Clares for whom he composed On the Perfection of Life Addressed to the 
Sisters, probably during the period just after his election as Minister Gen-
eral.19 While the treatise On Perfection is focused on practical instruction 
in the pursuit of devotion, its organization is less a step-by-step outline of 
perfection than a primer in the virtues and habits proper to the religious 
life. Like the Lignum vitae, On Perfection details the practice of exercising 
the imagination in order to witness the graphic details of Jesus’s human suf-
fering and scripts the appropriate interpretations and affective responses to 
that suffering.
In Sarah McNamer’s opinion, On Perfection presents a more emotion-
ally immediate program of meditation than the Lignum vitae, in which the 
immediacy of affective response is mitigated by a heavily allegorical frame-
work.20 McNamer attributes this difference to the fact that in the former 
work, Bon a ven ture is addressing religious women and encouraging them 
in a practice in which they are already engaged. However, while Bon a ven-
ture highlights certain devotional topoi as particularly suited to women (he 
is particularly scandalized at the prospect of garrulous nuns who neglect 
their commitment to silence), and while Jesus is frequently referred to as 
“your spouse,” the text gives no indication that meditation on Christ’s pas-
sion, or the affections proper to that practice, are infl ected by sex, or that 
compassionate meditation on Jesus’s sufferings is the special province of 
women. Instead, the text presents Passion meditation as one of a reper-
toire of devotional practices (including examination of one’s faults, fear 
for future punishment, focused attention on God, and gratitude for one’s 
vocation) proper to a mendicant life aimed at cultivating and sustaining an 
ardent, consuming love.
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In this way, the devotional program addressed to the sisters is consistent 
with the itinerary toward union with God that Bon a ven ture develops in 
other devotional works such as the Itinerarium and Triplex via.21 The leit-
motif of On Perfection is not nuptial fi delity but self-immolating affection. 
Lamenting the resistance to poverty among members of his own order, 
Bon a ven ture blames the cooling of desire, which leaves the heart frozen 
and in need of clothing and shelter to cover it. In an oblique allusion to 
Francis’s life, Bon a ven ture notes that those who burn with the heat of love 
seek nakedness, casting off their garments. Remembrance of the Passion is 
offered as a means of tending the fi res of love. One must feed the altar of 
the heart daily with the wood of the cross.22
In a chapter on perfect prayer, Bon a ven ture explains the goal of this 
ardent devotion in terms that recall the fi nal chapter of the Itinerarium and 
the culmination of the Legenda. Citing Augustine’s defi nition of prayer as 
“the turning of the mind in to God [conversio mentis in Deum],” Bon a ven-
ture explains:
When in prayer, you should recollect your whole self and enter, with 
your Beloved, into the little chamber of the heart, and remain there 
alone with him. Forget all exterior things [omnium exteriorium], and 
with your whole heart, your whole mind, your whole affect, your de-
sire, your whole devotion, raise yourself above yourself. Do not slacken 
your spirit from prayer, but keep ascending upwards through the ardor 
of devotion, until you enter into the place of the wonderful tabernacle, 
even to the house of God. There, when you have in some manner seen 
your beloved with the eye of your soul, and tasted how sweet is the 
Lord, and how great the multitude of his delights, fall into his em-
brace, and kiss him with the lips of intimate devotion. Then you will 
be wholly alienated from yourself, wholly rapt into heaven, and wholly 
transformed into Christ.23
This passage, in the context of the treatise’s emphasis on gospel meditation, 
corroborates Karnes’s observation that medieval meditation on Christ’s 
passion had a mystical purpose. Passion meditation charted a progression 
from visualizing Jesus’s human sufferings to beholding the glory of his 
divinity. This duality is further evident in On Perfection in a passage on 
evangelical poverty. Here, as in the Breviloquium, Bon a ven ture identifi es 
example and reward as the two factors that move the soul to desire. In or-
der to cultivate a love for poverty, one should fi rst contemplate the example 
of holy poverty presented through the humble life and gruesome death of 
Jesus, as well as through the lives of his exemplary followers, Francis and 
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Clare. And secondly, one should concentrate on the heavenly reward that 
awaits the person who shuns the comforts and riches of the world: “Volun-
tary poverty merits one to appear before the creator of glory, and to enter 
into the power of the Lord, in that eternal tabernacle, those illuminated 
mansions. They become citizens of that city whose artifi cer and sustainer 
is God.”24 The distinction between example and reward quickly collapses, 
however, when Bon a ven ture identifi es this celestial dwelling as “nothing 
other than you, Lord Jesus Christ.”25 Jesus is both example and reward, 
and so to live according to the example of his life and death is to enter the 
mansions prepared for those who follow him.
The goal of entering into Christ as one’s eternal dwelling is echoed 
in the treatise’s discussion of Passion meditation. The genre of Passion 
meditation is often distinguished by the presence of rhetorical devices used 
to make the reader sensorially, imaginatively, and emotionally present to 
the events of Christ’s Passion, as though the meditant were herself an eye-
witness to the scene. Bon a ven ture explains the goal of meditating on the 
crucifi xion, however, as a far deeper intimacy. The text appeals directly to 
the reader to
draw near, O handmaid [famula], with the feet of your affection step 
to Jesus wounded, to Jesus crowned with thorns, to Jesus fi xed to the 
gibbet of the cross, and with the blessed apostle Thomas, do not merely 
look upon the piercings of the nails in Jesus’s hands; do not merely stick 
your fi nger into the place where the nails were; do not merely stick 
your hand into his side, but pass totally through the door in his side up 
to Jesus’s very heart, and there, with the most ardent love of the cruci-
fi ed one, you will be transformed into Christ.26
Here, the intense, sustained meditations on every aspect of Jesus’s wounded 
body aim at more than compassion. But they neither leave behind nor rise 
above Jesus’s humanity.27 Rather, like the lover of poverty who longs to en-
ter the heavenly city that is Christ, the meditant passes wholly into  Jesus’s 
wounded fl esh until, fueled by love, she fully incorporates herself into 
Christ, taking the place of the Crucifi ed. The text explains how this trans-
formation comes about: “Fastened with the nails of holy fear, transfi xed by 
the lance of the most deep-seated love [praecordialis dilectionis], penetrated 
[transverberata] by the sword of intimate compassion [compassio], seek for 
nothing else, desire nothing else, wish to be consoled by nothing else, than 
to be able to die with Christ on the Cross. And then, with the apostle Paul, 
you will cry out and say: In Christ I am nailed to the cross. I live, now not I; 
but Christ lives in me.”28 Fear, love, and compassion are the instruments of 
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the reader’s Passion, pious affections becoming-body in the soul’s ecstatic 
transformation into Christ. The wound in Jesus’s side is not simply a portal 
one passes through on the way from fl esh to spirit, but an aporia, the gap 
in which affective dispossession, the ecstatic substitution of the lover for 
Christ, is embodied.29 The incorporation, the becoming-body, of the lover 
into Christ is an affective transformation that displaces the “I” even as she 
testifi es to her own crucifi xion in the words of the Apostle.30 An impossible 
testimony—the “I” who testifi es to her crucifi xion already “no longer”—
the words of the Apostle are not the expression of the meditant’s interior 
state but a kind of corpse, the body that remains in and after the transitus. 
Yet as the vacated “I” becomes at the same time the place in which “Christ 
lives,” the body of her testimony, Christ’s crucifi ed body, is also Christ’s 
resurrection body. The words of the meditant are witnesses to more than 
a transformation of the self; they are witnesses to the limits of what can be 
claimed for any self.
As Charles Stang has shown with regard to the Dionysian corpus, 
the twin, contradictory affi rmations of Paul’s words (“I live, now not I”) 
amount to more than a simple self-denial. Instead, consistent with the dy-
namic of affi rmation and negation developed throughout Dionysius’s mys-
tical theology, the apostle’s words testify to the unknowing—the double 
movement of cataphasis and apophasis— of the self. As Stang concludes, 
Dionysius “offers an account of what it is to be properly human in rela-
tion to God—namely, no longer an ‘I,’ neither yourself nor someone else, 
because you are now both yourself and Christ.”31 In Bon a ven ture’s hands, 
a devotional practice aiming at self-consuming love fueled by the remem-
brance of Jesus’s bodily sufferings follows this double movement of Diony-
sian mystical theology: The meditant is urged to think over (variants of the 
term cogitare appear frequently in De perfectione), imagine, and feel Christ’s 
body in pursuit of union, an incorporation more intimate than knowledge. 
The body of Christ is no longer an object of knowledge, but the place in 
which the lover dwells, united through love, fear, and compassion, in an at-
tachment that transforms lover into Beloved. The pious affections proper 
to Passion meditation reveal themselves fi nally to be what they always al-
ready were—Dionysian, deifying eros.
Recall that in Bon a ven ture’s early scholastic account of synderesis, the 
apex of the mind, he maintains that all knowledge is dependent on lan-
guage and other external information in order to be realized, save for the 
affects of loving and fearing God. These affections proper to the divine 
are given innately and immediately to the soul. Thus they can be said to be 
“known,” but the term is partly equivocal. The innate love and fear of God 
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are set apart from everything else the soul is capable of knowing; that is to 
say, they are kept secret.
Because they require nothing external for their realization, these af-
fections proper to God are in one sense that which is most fully claimed 
by the soul: “my secret is mine.” It is a fi tting coincidence, then, that the 
very same love and fear become, in the fi nal passing over, the arma Christi, 
the instruments of the lover’s passion. That which belongs to me utterly 
is thereby the means of my dispossession. The words that embody this 
dispossession—“In Christ I am nailed to the cross. I live, but now not 
I . . .”—are, to recur to the epigraph that opens this chapter, an imprint on 
the tongue, in which the tongue refers both to the body of the lover and to 
the discourse of Christian mystical theology. Just as Francis’s seraphic vi-
sion dispossesses him and leaves his body marked, the lover’s incorporation 
into Jesus unseats the “I” who testifi es to that transformation, so that her 
words, said and unsaid, remain as a corporeal trace. The words of the lover 
are no more (and no less) hers than Francis’s secret is his. To say that the 
lover’s words express her interior affections, or to say that Francis’s compas-
sion is “externalized” in his fl esh, would be to reinscribe in these scenes the 
selfsame subject that this devotional program aims to interrupt. A closer 
analog of what is occurring in this revelation can be found in Derrida’s 
refl ection on death and secrecy:
And if my secret self, that which can be revealed only to the other, to 
the wholly other, to God if you wish, is a secret that I will never refl ect 
on, that I will never know or experience or possess as my own, then 
what sense is there in saying that it is “my” secret, or in saying more 
generally that a secret belongs, that it is proper to or belongs to some 
“one,” or to some other who remains someone? It is perhaps there that 
we fi nd the secret of secrecy, namely, that it is not a matter of knowing 
and that it is there for no-one.32
What sense is there, after all? Only a sense peculiar to the place that Bon a-
ven ture reserves for the height of affectus in Christian mystical theology: an 
ecstatic inhabitation in which soul and body, possession and dispossession, 
crucifi xion and resurrection, coincide.
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introduction: weighing affect in medieval christian devotion
 1. Bon a ven ture, Legenda Maior 6.4 (Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae 
opera omnia. Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventura, 1882–
1902) XIII.520. Translations throughout this book are my own unless other-
wise noted.
 2. Ignatius Brady established the date of 1262 on the basis of several 
verbatim correspondences with Bon a ven ture’s Legenda Maior of that same 
year, but this dating is not universally accepted. See Regis Armstrong, Wayne 
Hellmann, and William Short, eds., Francis of Assisi: Early Documents: vol. 2, 
The Founder (New York: New City Press, 2000), 718. J. F. Quinn argues for 
a dating of 1269 in “Chronology of St. Bon a ven ture’s Sermons,” Archivum 
franciscanum historicum 67 (1974),145–84. This sermon appears as the fourth 
sermon on St. Francis in the Quaracchi edition of Bon a ven ture’s Opera Om-
nia (Collegium S. Bonaventura, 1882–1902) IX.585–90.
 3. Quaracchi IX.589.
 4. On the eschatological interpretation of Francis’s wounds in this 
sermon see Zachary Hayes, “The Theological Image of St. Francis in the 
Sermons of St. Bon a ven ture,” in Bonaventuriana: Miscellanea in onore di 
Jacques Guy Bougerol, ofm (Rome: Edizioni Anonianum, 1988), 1:333–34. On 
the eschatological signifi cance of St. Francis for Bon a ven ture in general, see 
Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bon a ven ture, trans. Zachary 
Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 31–38. On the metaphor of 
Francis as book, see Richard Emmerson and Ronald Herzmann, The Apoca-
lyptic Imagination in Medieval Literature (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1992), 52–53, 70–72. On Francis’s own contributions to the 
theology of ecstatic union and its cosmic dimensions, see Alessandro Vettori, 
Poets of Divine Love: Franciscan Mystical Poetry of the Thirteenth Century (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2004), esp. 40–78.
 5. On some of the meanings of cor and their importance in scholastic 
understandings of affectivity, see M.-D. Chenu, “Les catégories affectives au 
Moyen Âge,” in Du corps à l’esprit: Textes rassemblés et présentés par Jacques Du-
randeaux (Desclée de Brouwer, 1989), 145–53. Bon a ven ture is also  drawing 
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an analogy from contemporary medical knowledge in identifying heat as a 
property of the heart related to vigor. For a brief overview of medieval theo-
ries of complexio underlying this comparison, see Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval 
and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 101–6.
 6. Thomas H. Bestul, Texts of the Passion: Latin Devotional Literature and 
Medieval Society (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 4.
 7. Richard Southern, The Making of Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1992), 232.
 8. See Thomas Bestul, “St. Anselm and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon 
Devotional Traditions,” Annuale Medievale 18 (1977), 20– 41; Rachel Fulton, 
From Judgment to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, 800–1200 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Both Bestul and Fulton 
maintain, nevertheless, that the eleventh century marked a turning point in 
devotional attitudes and practices. For a more extensive critique of conven-
tional narratives of an affective turn in high medieval spirituality, see Allen J. 
Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon Penitentials,” Essays 
in Medieval Studies 22 (2005), 117–28.
 9. See Michelle Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the 
Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 15, and the similar 
critiques she cites there.
 10. See, for example, Ewert Cousins, “The Humanity and the Passion 
of Christ” in Christian Spirituality: High Middle Ages and Reformation, ed. Jill 
Raitt (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 375–91; and Eric (Edmund) Colledge, 
ed., The Medieval Mystics of England (New York: Scribner, 1961), 3–55.
 11. Fulton, 63 and 5.
 12. Southern, 240.
 13. Sarah Beckwith, Christ’s Body: Identity, Culture, and Society in Late 
Medieval Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), 51–52.
 14. Beckwith, Christ’s Body, 53.
 15. Beckwith, Christ’s Body, 52.
 16. Bestul, Texts of the Passion, 43.
 17. Bestul, Texts of the Passion, 48.
 18. Sarah McNamer, Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval 
Compassion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 84.
 19. McNamer, 90. In Bon a ven ture’s On the Perfection of Life Addressed to 
the Sisters, McNamer recognizes the features of affective Passion meditation 
but notes that this text was written for a community of women and appears 
to refl ect practices in which they were already engaged. I discuss this text 
further in the Conclusion.
 20. Karnes, 5 and 65–70.
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 21. Karnes, 10.
 22. For such studies, see Elizabeth Ann Dreyer, “Affectus in St. Bon a ven-
ture’s Description of the Journey of the Soul to God” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Marquette University, 1983); Franz P. Sirovic, Der Begriff “Affectus” und die 
Willenslehre beim Hl. Bonaventura: Eine analytisch-synthetische Untersuchung 
(Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel, 1965).
 23. Ann Astell, Eating Beauty: The Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the 
Middle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 104.
 24. To put it another way, the becoming-body of Francis’s desire is the 
absolute visibility of the secret of affect in the sight of God. In Jacques Der-
rida’s analysis of secrecy in Jewish and Christian thought, secrecy is enabled 
by, paradoxically, the dissolution of secrecy in God’s infi nite and unlimited 
gaze, interiorized in the soul in conscience: “There where, wherever, or, since 
place no longer takes place one should say more precisely as soon as there is 
no longer any secret hidden from God or from the spiritual light that passes 
through every space, then a recess of spiritual subjectivity and of absolute 
interiority is constituted allowing secrecy to be formed within it.” The Gift 
of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
100–1, emphasis original to translation.
 25. For instances and a compelling critique of this enduring dichotomy, 
see Charlotte Radler, “ ‘In Love I Am More God’: The Centrality of Love in 
Meister Eckhart’s Mysticism,” Journal of Religion 90.2 (2010), 171–98.
 26. Radler, 173.
 27. See as representative Sarah Beckwith, “Passionate Regulation: 
 Enclosure, Ascesis, and the Feminist Imaginary,” South Atlantic Quarterly 
93 (1994), 803–24; Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Sara S. Poor, Mechthild 
of Magdeburg and Her Book: Gender and the Making of Textual Authority 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Patricia Dailey, 
Promised Bodies: Time, Language, and Corporeality in Medieval Women’s Mystical 
Texts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). Hollywood provides 
an indispensable overview of this scholarship in “Feminist Studies,” in The 
Blackwell Companion to Christian Spirituality, ed. Arthur Holder (Blackwell, 
2005), 363–86.
 28. Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on 
Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 
1991), 194.
 29. See Amy Hollywood, “Inside Out: Beatrice of Nazareth and Her 
Hagiographer,” in Gendered Voices: Medieval Saints and their Interpreters, ed. 
C. Mooney (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 78–98; 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 264 –76 at 264.
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 32. Dailey, Promised Bodies, 5.
 33. Dailey, Promised Bodies, 70.
 34. Karnes, 16.
 35. Karnes, 16.
 36. Dailey, Promised Bodies, 102.
 37. See, for example, Breviloquium 2.9, where the basic division between 
the cognitive and the affective are indexed to the soul’s relationship to truth 
and the good, respectively: “Rursus quia discretio veri est cognitio fuga et 
appetitus est affectio ideo tota anima dividitur in cognitivam et affectivam.” 
While Bon a ven ture uses the language of partes, he maintains the position 
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in Chapter 2.
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 39. Damien Boquet, L’ordre de l’affect au Moyen Age: Autour de 
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Ages (New York: Routledge, 2002), 59.
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1. the seraphic doctrine: love and knowledge 
in the dionysian hierarchy
 1. On post-Bon a ven turean scholastic debates concerning the autonomy 
of the will, see Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Eth-
ics in the Thirteenth Century (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1995).
 2. Edward Mahoney’s survey of the Dionysian conception of hierarchy 
in medieval philosophy, for example, makes no mention of Bon a ven ture (or 
Thomas Gallus, for that matter). See “Pseudo-Dionysius’s Conception of 
Metaphysical Hierarchy and Its Infl uence on Medieval Philosophy,” in Die 
Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter, 429–75. Lees’s study of the sources of the 
Cloud discusses Gallus at length, as well as Hugh of Balma who was undeni-
ably and extensively infl uenced by Bon a ven ture, but she makes no mention of 
Bon a ven ture.
 3. Celestial Hierarchy (CH) 205B–C, trans. Colm Lubheid, Pseudo-
 Dionysius: The Complete Works (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987), 162. For 
the critical edition of the Greek text, see Beate Regina Suchla, Günter Heil, 
and Adolf Martin Ritter, Corpus Dionysiacum, 2 vols. (Patristische Texte und 
Studien bd. 33 and 36) (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990–91).
 4. CH 165A (Lubheid, 154).
 5. CH 301B (Lubheid, 177).
 6. Here the term “mediate” is misleading to the extent that it implies 
hierarchical ranks standing “between” God and the lower orders. Hierarchy 
does not separate one level from another; it is, on the contrary, the reason all 
things are united to and fi lled with God. For a thorough and precise analysis 
of this dynamic, see Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dio-
nysius the Areopagite (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2007), 65–81. Perl’s phrase 
for this aspect of Dionysian thought, “immediate mediation,” captures the 
simultaneous necessity and diffi culty of using the term “mediate” to describe 
the activity of hierarchy.
 7. CH 305A (Lubheid, 179). John Sarrazen’s Latin translation reads, 
“Ad intelligibilem visorum sursumagebatur cognitionem”; see Sarrazen’s and 
other Latin translations edited in P. Chevallier, ed., Dionysiaca: Recueil donnant 
l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, 
2 vols. (Bruges 1937–50), I.966.
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 8. Rorem, “The Early Latin Dionysius: Eriugena and Hugh of St. Vic-
tor,” in Re-thinking Dionysius the Areopagite, ed. Sarah Coakley and Charles M. 
Stang (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 71–84. In fact, the association of the 
Seraphim with a sublime circular movement resonates with ancient descrip-
tions of the circular movement of heavenly bodies. More specifi cally, Greg-
ory of Nyssa in his Songs commentary connects the “immovable movement” 
of the Seraphim with epektasis. See Maurice de Gandillac, La hiérarchie céleste, 
Sources Chrétiennes 58 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1958), 107n1.
 9. Though Gregory mentions Dionysius the Areopagite by name in this 
homily, his knowledge of the Celestial Hierarchy—and thus his direct debt to 
Dionysius for his own angelic hierarchy—remains disputed. Joan Petersen 
argues that given the discrepancies between Gregory and Dionysius’s list of 
angelic ranks, Gregory may have derived his rank either directly from the 
relevant biblical passages or from earlier Latin authors. See Petersen, “ ‘Homo 
omnino Latinus?’ The Theological and Cultural Background of Pope Gregory 
the Great,” Speculum 62.3 (1987), 529–51. In the Moralia in Iob, Gregory pro-
vides an alternative ordering for the angelic hierarchy (Book 32, Chapter 23).
 10. “And there are some who are enkindled with the fi re of heavenly 
contemplation, and they burn with desire for their creator alone. They want 
nothing from this world, but are fed only with love for eternity. Abandon-
ing every earthly thing, they transcend all temporal things with their minds. 
Loving and burning, and resting in their ardor, they burn with love. They 
infl ame others by speaking, and those whom they touch with their words 
immediately begin to burn with love for God. What can I call them but 
Seraphim, whose hearts, which have been turned into fi re, shine and burn?” 
Homiliae in euangelia 34.7, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (CCSL) 141, 
ed. R. Etiax (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 311.
 11. Hom. in euan. 34.10.
 12. Sermones super Cantica Canticorum (Bernardi opera, vols. 1–2), I.111.
 13. Associations of the Seraphim with love are widespread in twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century Cistercian writing. Isaac of Stella’s Epistola de anima, for 
example, connects the Seraphim with the desire for and love of God, which 
Isaac calls hope (in a passage that was included in the Pseudo-Augustinian 
De spiritu et anima, and thus familiar to Parisian theologians in the thirteenth 
century). Additionally, William of St. Thierry’s De Natura et dignitate amoris 
(discussed in Chapter 3) uses the image of the Seraph to describe those who 
are surrounded with such affectus that they ignite one another in the love of 
God. On the question of infl uence of the Dionysian corpus on Cistercian 
authors see McGinn, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Early Cistercians,” in One 
Yet Two: Monastic Tradition East and West, ed. M. Basil Pennington (Cistercian 
Studies 29) (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1973), 200– 41.
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 14. For an overview of the theological orientation of Hugh’s commentary, 
see David Luscombe, “The Commentary of Hugh of Saint-Victor on the 
Celestial Hierarchy,” in Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter, ed. T. Boiad-
jiev, et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 159–75, esp. 164 –72. For an analysis 
of the ways in which Hugh revises and contests Eriugena’s interpretation, see 
Csaba Németh, “The Victorines and the Areopagite,” in L’ecole de Saint-
Victor de Paris, ed. Dominique Poirel (Bibliotheca Victorina 22) (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2010), 333–83 at 337– 41.
 15. Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem, ed. J. Barbet, Corpus Christianorum 
Continuatio Mediaeualis (CCCM) 31 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975). The rel-
evant passages of Eriugena’s commentary include Cap V, ln 139– 40 (“angeli 
sunt Seraphim, quia feruore caritatis calefi cantur a superioribus et se infe-
riores calefi cant”); VII.26–29 (“Et quidem, inquit, qui sciunt hebraicarum 
uocum proprias signifi cationes, sanctum nomen Seraphim aut incedentes, 
aut calefacientes manifestare; hic subauditur dicunt; est enim EKLEIPSIC 
uerbi”); VII.90–145 (on the warm motion of the Seraphim); VII.164 –211 
(on the relation of the Seraphic warmth to love, for example, lines 170–73: 
“Ipsa etiam ignea celestis Seraphim uirtus incircumuelata et inextinguibilis, 
incircumuelata uidelicet, quia totam se inferioribus reuelat, inextinguibilis 
uero, quoniam semper in ea diuinus ardet amor”); et al. Chapter XIII treats 
Dionysius’s discussion of the Seraph who visited Isaiah.
 16. On the relationship between the thought of Richard of St. Victor and 
Thomas Gallus, see Robert Javelet, “Thomas Gallus et Richard de Saint-
 Victor mystiques,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 29 (1962), 
206–33. As Rosemary Lees notes, “Gallus’ concept of the unitive experience 
is thus emphatically super intellectual, and in his Spectacula Contemplatio-
nis he underlines his divergence in this respect from traditional Victorine 
contemplative theory as it was formulated by Richard, which envisages union 
through the higher function of the intellect, the intelligentia,” The Negative 
Language of the Dionysian School of Mystical Theology: An Approach to the 
Cloud of Unknowing, vol. 1 (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistik ind Amerikanis-
tik, 1983), 280.
 17. See Lawell, “Thomas Gallus’s Method as Dionysian Commentator: 
A Study of the Glose super Angelica Ierarchia (1224), with Considerations on 
the Expositio librorum beati Dionysii,” in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire 
du Moyen Âge, 76.1 (2009), 89–117 at 91.
 18. Németh, 381–83. Among other hallmarks, Németh notes the shift in 
emphasis from the Celestial Hierarchy to the Mystical Theology as the central 
text of the corpus.
 19. On the Dionysian corpus in thirteenth-century Paris, see H. F. 
Dondaine, Le Corpus Dionysien de l’Université de Paris au XIIIe Siècle (Rome: 
F6909.indb   146 10/7/16   1:41:39 PM
Notes to pages 35–37 147
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1953), and Németh, “The Victorines and the 
Areopagite,” 334. For a study of one particular thirteenth century manu-
script, see D. E. Luscombe, “Venezia, Bibl. Naz. Marziana, Latini Classe II, 
26 (2473) and the Dionisian Corpus of the University of Paris in the Thir-
teenth Century,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 52 (1985), 
224 –27. Regarding the translations available to Bon a ven ture, Dondaine cites 
evidence from De scientia Christi and De mysterio Trinitatis that Bon a ven ture 
had access at least to the translations of Hilduin, Sarrazen, and Eriugena 
(Dondaine, 114n121).
 20. Additionally, Gallus also refers to his own Exposicio on the Mysti-
cal Theology and a glose on the Celestial Hierarchy. James McEvoy translated 
and published what he believes to be Gallus’s Expositio in Mystical Theology: 
The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De 
Mystica Theologia, ed. and trans. James McEvoy, Dallas Medieval Texts 
and Translations 3 (Leuven: Peeters, 2003). Lawell disputes this attribution 
and regards this work as a later gloss infl uenced by Gallus (“Thomas Gal-
lus’s Method,” 111–17). Lawell has edited the Glose super Angelica Ierarchia in 
CCCM, vol. 223A (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).
 21. Coolman, “The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition,” in Coakley 
and Stang, 91; the passage to which Coolman refers is in Gallus’s Extractio on 
the Mystical Theology, Chapter 1 (Chevallier, I.710).
 22. “. . . principalis affectio, et ipsa est scintilla sinderesis que sola unibilis 
est spiritui diuino . . .” Explanatio MT I, CCCM 223, ed. Declan Lawell 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 4. See Lawell, “Affective Excess: Ontology and 
Knowledge in the Thought of Thomas Gallus,” Dionysius 26 (2008), 147. As 
Lawell explains, however, Thomas distinguishes synderesis as a vis animae 
from the scintilla, which is not a power of the soul, but something produced 
in the contact of synderesis with the divine Other and thus not properly be-
longing to the soul. See also Lawell, “Ne de ineffabili penitus taceamus: Aspects 
of the Specialized Vocabulary of the Writings of Thomas Gallus,” Viator 40.1 
(2009), 151–84, esp. 154 –57.
 23. Jacques de Vitry, The Life of Marie D’Oignies 1.22, trans. Margot H. 
King (Toronto: Peregrina Publishing, 1993), 54.
 24. On the possible evidence for direct infl uence, see Sarah McNamer, 
Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 86, 236n3; and King’s introduction 
to de Vitry’s Vita, 8.
 25. The original attribution of this title is generally credited to the 
Dominican friar Raynor of Pisa, who used the epithet for Bon a ven ture in his 
1333 Pantheologia.
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 26. Here I am interested primarily in the Seraph as an image of fi re, love, 
and hierarchy, though these signifi cations are not the only functions of the 
Seraph image. For example, Ewert Cousins examines the six-winged Seraph 
image as a meditative image or mandala representing an “organized totality.” 
See Cousins, “Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bon a ven ture,” Univer-
sity of Toronto Quarterly 40 (1971), 185–201.
 27. Wayne Hellmann, “The Seraph in Thomas of Celano’s Vita Prima,” 
in That Others May Know and Love: Essays in Honor of Zachary Hayes, OFM, ed. 
Michael F. Cusato and F. Edward Coughlin (Franciscan Studies 34) (St. Bon-
a ven ture: Franciscan Institute, 1997), 23– 41.
 28. Thomas of Celano, Uita prima sancti Francisci, in Legendae S. Francisci 
Assisiensis saeculis XIII et XIV conscriptae, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae 
(Analecta Franciscana, X, 1926– 41), 2.94.
 29. Thomas of Celano, Uita prima, 2.114.
 30. Thomas of Celano, Uita prima, 2.114.
 31. Thomas of Celano, Uita prima, 2.115.
 32. Hellmann contends that Thomas would have been aware of the Dio-
nysian and monastic theological associations of the Seraph image from his 
education at Monte Cassino. Whatever Thomas’s education had or had not 
exposed him to, however, what is evident is that his discussion of the Seraph 
does not at any point in his Vita exploit the association of the Seraph with 
fi re. Moreover, Thomas’s Seraph-like fi gure is not depicted as performing 
the same purifying function as the biblical Seraph. Its signifi cance is limited 
to its cruciform posture, its six wings outlining the virtues, and its fl ight 
symbolizing Francis’s ascent to Christ. For a discussion of the differences 
in the Seraph imagery in Thomas and Bon a ven ture’s respective accounts, 
see Hellmann, “The Seraph in Thomas of Celano and Bon a ven ture: The 
Victorine Transition,” in Bonaventuriana I, ed. Chevero Blanco (Rome: 
Edizioni Antonianum, 1988), 347–56. On the development of the legend of 
the Seraph in Francis’s vision, see Chiara Frugoni, Francesco e l’invenzione delle 
stimmate: Una storia per parole e immagini fi no a Bonaventura e Giotto (Turin: 
Einaudi, 1993).
 33. “. . . corraborato itinere, et sensus desere et intellectuales operationes 
et sensibilia et invisibilia et omne non ens et ens, et ad unitatem, ut possibile 
est, inscius restituere ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam,” 
Itinerarium mentis in Deum 7.5. Translations are my own; I refer throughout 
to the page numbers in the reprinting of the Quaracchi edition (with facing-
page English translation) in Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes, Works of 
St. Bon a ven ture, vol. 2 (St. Bon a ven ture, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2002).
 34. Itin. 7.4. (Boehner and Hayes, 36). Compare the similar statement in 
the Breviloquium 5.6 (Quaracchi V.260), in which Bon a ven ture characterizes 
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the excessus as “learned ignorance” and paradoxically identifi es darkness as a 
form of illumination: “Quo quidem desiderio ferventissimo ad modum ignis 
spiritus noster non solum effi citur agilis ad ascensum, verum etiam quadam 
ignorantia docta supra se ipsum rapitur in caliginem et excessum, ut non 
solum cum sponsa dicat: In odorem unguentorum tuorum curremus, verum 
etiam cum Propheta psallat: Et nox illuminatio mea in deliciis meis. Quam 
nocturnam et deliciosam illuminationem nemo novit nisi qui probat, nemo 
autem probat nisi per gratiam divinitus datam, nemini datur, nisi ei qui se 
exercet ad illam.”
 35. See also Collationes in Hexaemeron 2.30, where Bon a ven ture describes 
the “suprema unitio per amorem” as a state in which “affect alone keeps vigil 
and imposes silence on all the other powers” (sola affectiva vigilat et silentium 
omnibus aliis potentiis imponit), Quaracchi V: 341.
 36. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bon a ven ture, trans. Dom Illtyd 
Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), 458–64.
 37. George Tavard, Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology 
Accord ing to St. Bon a ven ture (St. Bon a ven ture, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 
1954), 244 – 45.
 38. Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bon a ven ture, trans. 
Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 90.
 39. Commentarius in Ecclesiasten (Comm. in Eccl.) 7 (Quaracchi IV.54).
 40. Coolman, 86.
 41. “Et dici potest secundum quod hid accipitur amor: ineffable quon-
dam feuds armonicum creators et create uniuersitatis . . .” Explanatio in libros 
Dionysii, ed. D. Lawell, CCCM 223 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 248:1718–20. 
As Denys Turner writes with regard to Thomas Gallus: “In the last resort the 
true point of Gallus’ dependence on neo-platonic eros is there, where Ber-
nard’s or Denys the Carthusian’s is to be found: in their enthusiastic espousal 
of a general world-view in which erotic love, or love modeled on the erotic, is 
the prime mover, the moved, and the end of all motion, whether in the orders 
of nature, of the human, or of grace,” Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis 
on the Song of Songs (Cistercian Studies 156) (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian 
Publications, 1995), 73.
 42. Hilduin translates eros as cupiditas. But Bon a ven ture favors the 
translation of eros as amor found in both Eriugena and John Sarrazen’s 
translations.
 43. Denys Turner, Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis on the Song of Songs 
(Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1995), 47.
 44. Divine Names (DN) 709D (Lubheid, 81). See Turner’s lucid discussion 
of Dionysian eros in Eros and Allegory, 47–70.
 45. Divine Names (DN) 709D (Lubheid, 81).
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 46. On Dionysian eros and its relation to ecstatic union in the context of 
ancient Greek and Hellenistic thought, see Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and 
Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012), 170–81.
 47. DN 712A (Lubheid, 82). Sarrazen’s translation reads: “Est autem 
faciens exstasim divinus amor, non dimittens sui ipsorum esse amatores, sed 
amatorum” (Chevallier, I.215).
 48. “Amorem dicimus vim unitivam,” Commentarius in Secundum Librum 
Sententiarum (2 Sent.), d. 39, dub 1 (Quaracchi II.916). This is a paraphrase of 
DN 713A–B (Lubheid, 83), in which Dionysius credits his teacher Hierotheus 
with this defi nition of eros: “When we speak of yearning [ton erō ta], whether 
this be in God or an angel, in the mind [noeron] or in the spirit [psychikon] or 
in nature [physikon], we should think of a unifying [enō tikē n] and co-mingling 
[synkratikē n] power [dynamin] . . .” Sarrazen’s translation of this passage reads, 
“Amorem sive divinum sive angelicum sive intellectualem sive animalem 
sive naturalem dicamus, unitivam quamdam et concretivam intelligemus 
virtutem . . .” (Chevallier I.225–26). See Chapter 3 for further discussion of 
 Bon a ven ture’s interpretation of this passage.
 49. Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae 13.46 (Quaracchi VII.349).
 50. “Excessivum autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens 
excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo 
quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum,” Quaestiones disputatae de scientia 
Christi, q. 7, concl. (Quaracchi VII.40). In his Sentences commentary, Bon-
a ven ture makes similar distinctions within knowledge. 3 Sent. d. 24, dub. 4 
(Quaracchi III.531): “God is known through vestiges, through images, 
through the effects of grace, and through intimate union of God and the soul 
[animae], just as the Apostle says, ‘Whoever adheres to God is one spirit with 
him.’ And this is the most excellent knowledge [cognitio], which Dionysius 
teaches. This knowledge consists in ecstatic love and is above the knowledge 
of faith [elevat supra cognitionem fi dei] according to its common state.”
 51. De scientia Christi, q. 7, concl. (Quaracchi VII.40).
 52. 1 Sent. d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, ad.1, 2, 3. (Quaracchi I.562): “Certain acts 
refer to a motion from a thing to the soul, such as wisdom, while others refer 
to the motion from the soul to the thing, such as loving [amare].” In his much 
later Collationes in Hexaemeron, Bon a ven ture discusses ecstasy as a sapientia 
nulliformis, but this passage from the Sentences indicates that sapientia is not 
necessarily an ecstatic movement any more than cognitio is.
2. affect, cognition, and the natural motion of the will
 1. The most extended treatment of the development of the concept of 
synderesis is D. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale au xiie et xiie siècles. Tome 
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II: Problèmes de morale, part 1 (Louvain: 1948), 101–349. Lottin edits many 
of the relevant texts and provides a clear analysis. For a brief summary, with 
emphasis on the spiritual and unitive sense of the term, see Aimé Solignac, 
“Syndérèse,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité: ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire 
(DS), vol. 14.2, ed. Marcel Viller, et al. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1932–95), 
1407–12.
 2. See, for example, Romans 7:15 and 2:15, respectively.
 3. See de Blic, “Syndérèse ou conscience?” Revue d’ascetique et de mystique 
25 (1949), 146–57.
 4. Douglas Kries, “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome’s 
Ezekiel Commentary,” Traditio 57 (2002), 69. Kries argues convincingly 
that Jerome’s reference to followers of Plato who posit the fourth part of 
the soul as syneidesis refers directly to Origen. In his commentary on  Romans, 
Origen identifi ed syneidesis, mentioned in 2 Corinthians 1:12, with the 
pneuma of 1 Corinthians 2:11 and Romans 8:16. All of these Pauline passages 
would re appear as auctoritates in medieval discussions of synderesis. See also 
 Michael B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics,” Irish Theologi-
cal Quarterly 23 (1956), 151–64, 228– 45.
 5. “. . . quartumque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam 
Graeci uocant syneidesin—quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pec-
tore, postquam eiectus est de paradiso, non extinguitur, et, uicti uoluptati-
bus uel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare 
 sentimus—, quam proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus sed tria 
errantia corrigentem, quam in scripturis interdum uocari legimus spiritum, 
qui interpellat pro nobis gemitibus ineffabilibus. Nemo enim scit ea quae hominis 
sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est, quem et Paulus ad Thessalonicenses scribens 
cum anima et corpore seruari integrum deprecatur. Et tamen hanc quoque 
ipsam conscientiam, iuxta illud quod in Pouerviis scriptum est: Impius cum 
uenerit in profundum peccatorum, contemnit, cernimus praecipitari apud quos-
dam et suum locum amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et uerecundiam habent 
in delictis et merentur audire: Facies meretricis facta est tibi, nescis erubescere,” 
Commentarii In Ezechielem, ed. F. Glorie, CCSL 12 (Turnhout, 1964) 12.
 6. Though the theory that synderesis was a mistranscription of syneidesis 
is the most widely accepted, there have been other theories put forward to 
explain the term’s appearance in Jerome’s commentary. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, H. Siebeck argued that the term synteresis derives from 
tereo and signifi es a principle of conservation or maintenance. See Siebeck, 
“Noch einmal die Synderesis,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 10 (1897), 
520–29. Also see Oscar Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas 
(Toronto: Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 175–77; Jean 
Rohmer, “Syndérèse,” in Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique, vol. 14.2 (Paris, 
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1941), 2992–96; Gerard Verbeke maintains that the medieval concept of 
synderesis is fundamentally related to the Stoic conception of oikeiosis, a term 
that “refers to the basic impulse of a being, especially of man, toward himself, 
toward his own nature and condition, toward what is suitable and connatural 
for him, in a word, toward whatever is appropriate for him,” The Presence of 
Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1983), 55.
 7. “The Spark of Conscience: Bon a ven ture’s View of Conscience and 
Synderesis,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), 93.
 8. Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bon a ven ture to MacIntyre (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 36.
 9. See, for example, 2 Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.559), in which 
he characterizes the question of the distinction between reason and will as 
one more of “curiosity than utility.” Nevertheless, while Bon a ven ture refuses 
an essential distinction between the faculties, he establishes a clear basis for 
differentiation in terms of operation.
 10. Timothy Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1980),
 11. Joseph Ratzinger, On Conscience: Two Essays (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2007), 30.
 12. Ratzinger, 22.
 13. Augustine refers to the higher part of reason or the ratio sublimior 
throughout De Trinitate XII. For a helpful discussion of the sources and 
subsequent development of this concept, see R. W. Mulligan, “Ratio Superior 
and Ratio Inferior: The Historical Background,” The New Scholasticism, 29 
(1955), 1–32.
 14. Speculum Speculationum, ed. Rodney M. Thomson (Auctores Britan-
nici Medii Aevi XI) (Oxford University Press, 1988), 405.
 15. Questiones magistri Rolandi super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Paris 
Maz. 795), ed. Lottin, 130–34.
 16. For Philip, the disposition that informs synderesis is what distin-
guishes it from the natural will. The natural will, in turn, is no more than a 
simple potentiality in the soul, undetermined to any particular end.
 17. See Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono, 2 vols., ed. Nikolaus 
Wicki (Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi) (Bernae: Francke, 1985).
 18. Thomas Aquinas treats synderesis and conscience as distinct as well. 
He expresses their relationship as one of habit to act, both belonging to the 
practical intellect (STh I.79.12–13). Aquinas discusses many of the traditional 
questions about synderesis at greater length in the sixteenth question of his 
De veritate, but the basic defi nition is the same. For a comparison of Bon a-
ven ture and Thomas Aquinas’s conceptions of synderesis, see Eduard Lutz, 
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Die Psychologie Bonaventuras, in Beitrage zur Geschicte der Philosophie des Mit-
telalters VI, 4 –5 (Munster, 1909), 180–90).
 19. Summa Theologica II.73.1.1 (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii 
St. Bonaventurae, 1924), 417. Alexander died before completing his Summa 
Theologica. What is known as his Summa—or the Summa Fratris Alexandri—
was compiled in its completed form by Alexander’s students, including Bon a-
ven ture. See V. Doucet, “The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of 
the Summa,” Franciscan Studies 7 (1947), 26– 42, 274 –312.
 20. Summa II.73.1.2 (Quaracchi II.418).
 21. Summa II.73.2.3 (Quaracchi II.423).
 22. Summa II.73.2.6 (Quaracchi II.426).
 23. Lottin II.1, 199n1.
 24. Latin text of Gallus’s commentary ed. G Théry, “Commentaire sur 
Isaïe de Thomas de Saint-Victor,” La vie spirituelle 47 (1936), 146–62.
 25. Explanatio MT I (Lawell, 4).
 26. Lawell, “Specialized Vocabulary,” 153.
 27. Peter Lombard, Sententiae in iu libris distinctae 2. d. 39, c. 3, ed. I. 
Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 –5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81).
 28. Peter Lombard, Sent. 2. d. 39, c. 3.
 29. Bon a ven ture, 2 Sent. d. 39 (Quaracchi II.897).
 30. 2 Sent. d. 39 (Quaracchi II.897).
 31. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 5 (Quaracchi II.898).
 32. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 3 (Quaracchi II.898).
 33. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).
 34. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).
 35. In his response to an objection, Bon a ven ture qualifi es this defi nition 
a bit, noting that conscience can also be understood as a potentia. Though it 
is tempting to see here a parallel to his defi nition of synderesis as a potentia 
habitualis, he appears to be making a very different point about conscience. 
A potentia habitualis is a power that is perfected or determined to a particular 
end by a habit. By naming conscience as a power and a habit simultaneously, 
however, Bon a ven ture is gesturing toward its indeterminacy. See 2 Sent. a. 1, 
q. 1, ad 1 (Quaracchi II.900): “Since an acquired habit is able to purify and 
stain the soul, thus it is that conscience is called pure and impure, right and 
not right. Still, these differences pertain more to conscience as power than 
conscience as habit.”
 36. In a response to an article by Cary Nederman, Marcia Colish lays out 
clearly the two competing senses of habitus in twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
scholastic theology. See “Habitus Revisited: A Reply to Cary Nederman,” 
Traditio 48 (1993), 77–92.
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 37. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.902).
 38. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.903), citing Posterior Ana-
lytics II.19.
 39. De Trin. XII.24.
 40. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.903).
 41. According to Timothy Potts, from the perspective of contemporary 
ethical theory, Bon a ven ture’s distinction between innate and acquired knowl-
edge thus becomes “a logical and no longer a psychological criterion for basic 
deontic propositions and is independent of whether we have any intuition 
about the truth of a deontic proposition.” As a result, Potts argues, Bon a ven-
ture fails to provide “an appropriate method for determining the truth-values 
of a priori deontic propositions; thinking it complete, he turned to synderesis.” 
Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 41– 42.
 42. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.904).
 43. More precisely, synderesis is an orientation not simply to God but 
to the Good as it exists in others. Yet the signifi cance of this distinction is 
tempered somewhat by Bon a ven ture’s contention that every good is desirable 
only with reference to the supreme good, as in De Scientia Christi IV, fund. 
29 (Quaracchi VII.20) (my emphasis): “Just as the affect holds itself to the 
good, so the intellect holds itself to the true, and as every good comes from 
the highest goodness, so every truth comes from the highest truth. But it is 
impossible for our affect to be drawn directly to a good without in some way touching 
the highest good.” Similarly, Itinerarium III.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 88): “Desire 
is principally concerned with that which moves it the most. And that which 
moves it the most is that which is loved the most. And that which is loved the 
most is to be happy. But happiness is attained only by reaching the best and 
ultimate end. Therefore, human desire wants nothing but the supreme Good, 
or that which leads to it or in some way refl ects that Good.”
 44. By “secret,” I mean an interiority that is both the limit of represent-
ability and, in a sense, its possibility, the space or interval that constitutes 
conscience as (never fully achievable) self-presence. I elaborate on this dy-
namic (as well as the philosophical debts that inform my thinking here) in the 
Conclusion.
 45. Following the familiar framework of the scholastic disputed ques-
tion, the particular diffi culty arises from seemingly confl icting authorities: 
On the one hand, Jerome calls synderesis a fourth power distinct from the 
rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts. On the other hand, the pseudo-
 Augustinian De spiritu et anima posits only the threefold division of powers 
(vires). See 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.909).
 46. Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 93.
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 47. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910).
 48. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.911).
 49. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910). On the cognitive and 
affective aspects of liberum arbitrium see also 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, 
concl. (Quaracchi II.592), and q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.598). I discuss these 
passages further in Chapter 5.
 50. “hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare . . . ” 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 
(Quaracchi II.911).
 51. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. (Quaracchi II.910).
 52. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.912).
 53. 2 Sent. D. 39, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.912).
 54. See 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.906): “All conscience 
either binds one to do what it dictates, or it binds one to change his con-
science if it is in error.”
 55. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 (Quaracchi II.913).
 56. See, for example, 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; and d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
 57. See 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 58. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.914).
 59. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
 60. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
 61. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
 62. See 2 Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.559).
 63. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.913).
 64. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 65. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 66. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 67. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 68. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
 69. See 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (Quaracchi II.910): “. . . just as 
Gregory said concerning the fi rst chapter of Job, we speak to God not only 
through thoughts [cogitationibus] and exterior words, but even through affects 
and desires [affectibus et desideriis].” Thus, Bon a ven ture reasons, synderesis is 
not cognitive even though it is described as “speaking.”
3. elemental motion and the force of union
 1. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.909).
 2. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910).
 3. Alexander of Hales, 2 Sent. d. 40 (Lottin 2.1, 176).
 4. See the discussion of ancient theories of affect in the Introduction, as 
well as Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), 5–110.
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 5. Lottin, 198.
 6. 2 Sent. d. 14, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, 3 (Quaracchi II.340).
 7. See also 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 7 (Quaracchi II.562), in which, 
in the process of arguing for the distinction of reason and will as different 
powers, Bon a ven ture suggests that the sun heats and illumines by means of 
different powers.
 8. There is no modern edition; J. P. Migne includes the work in the 
appendix to the works of Augustine (under uncertain authorship) in the Pa-
trologia Latina 40:779–832. Bernard McGinn’s English translation appears in 
Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cister-
cian Publications, 1977), 179–288.
 9. Peter Lombard, Sent. 2. d. 39.
 10. 2 Sent. d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
 11. 2 Sent. d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
 12. 2 Sent. d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
 13. 2 Sent. d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.917).
 14. “Dicendum, quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali 
et consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nec est voluntas simpliciter bona et 
recta, nisi sit recta, in quantum movetur deliberative, et in quantum movetur 
naturaliter,” 2 Sent. d. 39, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.917).
 15. See 4 Sent. d. 49, p. 2, s. 1, a. 3, q. 2, fund. 1 (Quaracchi IV.1020): “All 
cognition is motion to the soul . . . ” and 1 Sent. d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, ad.1, 2, 3. 
(Quaracchi I.562): “Certain acts refer to a motion from a thing to the soul, 
such as wisdom, while others refer to the motion from the soul to the thing, 
such as loving [amare].” Here Bon a ven ture explains that while intelligence or 
understanding conveys a form, an act of love conveys to the soul both a form 
and an effect.
 16. “Amorem dicimus vim unitivam,” 2 Sent. d. 39, dub. 1 (Quaracchi 
II.916). On the Dionysian reference, see the introduction, nn. 38–39.
 17. See also 2 Sent. d. 16, a. 1., q. 1 (Quaracchi 2.393–94), where Bon-
a ven ture deploys this defi nition of love to demonstrate that man is truly an 
image of God: “Likewise, what is most bound to be united to the other is 
most bound to be confi gured and conformed to it—for love [amor], because 
it unites, is said ‘to transform the lover into the one loved,’ just as Hugh of 
St. Victor says [in De arrha anima]—but a rational creature, such as a hu-
man being, is most bound to be united to God and to tend to Him through 
love: therefore he is most bound to be confi gured and assimilated to Him. If, 
therefore, image names an expressed similitude, it is clear that etc.”
 18. “Amor enim dicit affectionis adhaesionem respectu amati,” 1 Sent. 
d. 10, dub. 1 (Quaracchi I.205).
 19. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
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 20. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).
 21. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (Quaracchi II.910).
 22. “Thus, it is no surprise that the two things that seem to be productive 
of movement are desire and practical thinking. It is because of the movement 
started by the object of desire that the thinking produces its movement, that 
which is desired being its point of departure. And even imagination, whenever 
it produces movement, does not do so without desire.” Trans. Hugh Lawson-
Tancred (New York: Penguin, 1986), 213.
 23. Though several passages are relevant for this problem (see especially 
Physica VIII.4), the diffi culty is readily apparent in De anima III.10: “In form, 
then, that which produces movement is a single thing, the faculty of de-
sire as such. But fi rst of all is the object of desire, which, by being thought 
or imagined, produces movement while not itself in motion. In number, 
however, there is more than one thing that produces movement” (Lawson-
Tancred, 215).
 24. Furley suggests that the contradiction can be resolved by holding (as 
he believes Aristotle implicitly held) that the objects of animal desire are in 
some way intentional objects—that is, are in some sense internal to perceiv-
ing and thinking beings. See David Furley, “Self-Movers,” in Aristotle on 
Mind and the Senses (Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum), 
ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 165–80. Furley’s argument has been the subject of a signifi cant 
amount of debate, much of it collected in the volume (in which Furley’s origi-
nal essay is reprinted) Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton, ed. Mary Louise 
Gill and James G. Lennox (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 
1994.
 25. “The change of anything that is changed by itself is natural; this is the 
case with all animals, for example. For animals are self-movers, and we say 
that everything which has its own inner source of change is changed natu-
rally.” Trans. Robin Waterfi eld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 196.
 26. Waterfi eld, 33.
 27. Waterfi eld, 199.
 28. De caelo IV.1, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, trans. Richard McKeon 
(New York: Random House, 1941), 454. In the fi rst complete Latin transla-
tion of the work (William of Moerbeke c. 1260), the terms are “grave” and 
“leve.” Robert Grosseteste produced an incomplete translation of the work 
several years earlier, but this did not include Book 4.
 29. De Caelo 4.3 (McKeon, 459).
 30. De Caelo 4.3 (McKeon, 459).
 31. De Caelo 4.3 (McKeon, 460).
 32. De Caelo 4.3 (McKeon, 460).
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 33. The Aristotelian concept of natural place as a theological theme can 
also be found in Meister Eckhart’s notion of abegescheidenheit or detachment. 
In Eckhart’s formulation, however, it is God who is inexorably and neces-
sarily moved. “And I prove that detachment compels God to come to me in 
this way; it is because everything longs to achieve its own natural place. Now 
God’s own natural place is unity and purity, and that comes from detachment. 
Therefore God must of necessity give himself to a heart that has detach-
ment,” On Detachment, trans. Edmund Colledge, in Meister Eckhart: The 
Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 
Press, 1981), 286.
 34. Confessiones XIII.9. Latin text ed. James O’Donnell, Confessions: Intro-
duction and Text (vol. 1) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 187.
 35. Confessiones XIII.9 (O’Donnell, 187).
 36. “Si essemus lapides, aut fl uctus, aut uentus, aut fl amma, uel quid 
eiusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque uita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi 
quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores cor-
porum momenta sunt ponderum, siue deorsum grauitate, siue sursum leuitate 
nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque 
fertur.” De civitate Dei XI.28.
 37. The precision of this understanding of pondus distinguishes Augus-
tine’s elaboration of the theme from other metaphorical descriptions of the 
soul rising to God. Cf., for example, John Cassian, Conf. 9:4 –5.
 38. For an overview of this theme in Augustine’s writings, see C. Harri-
son, “Measure, Number and Weight in Saint Augustine’s Aesthetics,” Augus-
tinianum 28 (1988), 591–602. See also Olivier du Roy, L’intelligence de la foi en 
la Trinité selon saint Augustin: genèse de sa théologie jusqu’en 391 (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes, 1966), 279–81.
 39. De Genesi ad litteram IV.3, CCSL, vol. 47, ed. B. Dombart (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1955), 99.
 40. De Genesi ad litteram IV.4 (Dombart, 100).
 41. De Genesi ad litteram IV.3 (Dombart, 100).
 42. “. . . pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur ut quiescant, quorum 
quies purum gaudium est, nec illud jam refertur ad aliud,” De Genesi ad litte-
ram IV.3 (Dombart, 100).
 43. “. . . quomodo dicam de pondere rupiditatis in abruptam abyssum, 
et de sublevatione charitatis per Spiritum tuum, qui superferebatur super 
aquas?” Conf. XIII.7.
 44. “. . . in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur inferius, 
animus uero dum non uult non ita mouetur ut superioribus desertis inferiora 
diligat. et ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo uero iste uoluntarius,” 
De libero arbitrio III.1, CCSL 29, ed. W. M. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970) 
211–321 at 260.
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 45. William of St. Thierry, De natura et dignitate amoris n. 1, CCCM 88, 
ed. P. Verdeyen (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), 177.
 46. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
 47. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
 48. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
 49. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 4 (Verdeyen, 180).
 50. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 12 (Verdeyen, 186).
 51. See Thomas Davis’s discussion of William’s notion of affectus in The 
Mirror of Faith, 93–95.
 52. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 14 (Verdeyen, 188).
 53. De natura et dignitate amoris n. 44 (Verdeyen, 211).
 54. Breviloquium 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
 55. Breviloquium 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
 56. In 1 Sent. d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3 (Quaracchi I.79), Bon a ven ture correlates 
the triad of measure, number, and weight with Dionysius’s triad of substantia, 
virtus and operatio and Peter Lombard’s triad of unitas, speciem, and ordinem.
 57. Brev. 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
 58. Brev. 5.8 (Quaracchi V.273).
 59. Brev. 5.1 (Quaracchi V.252).
 60. “Deus non concdescendit per sui essentiam incommutabilem, sed per 
infl uentiam ab ipso manantem,” Brev. 5.1 (Quaracchi V.252).
 61. “. . . illud non potest esse per habitum aliquem naturaliter insertum sed 
solum per donum divinitus gratis infusum . . . ” Brev. 5.1 (Quaracchi V.253).
 62. 1 Sent. d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi I.639).
 63. For a concise and helpful presentation of Bon a ven ture’s conception of 
vanitas, see Christopher Cullen, Bon a ven ture (Great Medieval Thinkers), New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107–8.
 64. Brev. 5.2 (Quaracchi V.253), citing Augustine, Enchiridion 32.9.
 65. Brev. 5.8 (Quaracchi V.262).
 66. “Et caritas ipsa est radix forma et fi nis virtutum iungens omnes cum 
ultimo fi ne et ligans omnia ad invicem simul et ordinate; ideo ipsa est pondus 
inclinationis ordinatae et vinculum colligationis perfectae,” Brev. 5.8 (Quarac-
chi V.262).
 67. On Bon a ven ture’s notion of “hierarchization,” see Chapter 4.
 68. Brev. 5.8 (Quaracchi V.262). This bond of charity is also the principle 
of unity of the ecclesia as the mystical body of Christ. See Peter Fehlner, The 
Role of Charity in the Ecclesiology of St. Bon a ven ture (Rome: Miscellanea France-
scana, 1965).
 69. As Jay Hammond notes, Bon a ven ture invokes the concept of pax fre-
quently in his works to mean “right order.” See Jay Hammond’s essay “Order 
in the Itinerarium,” in his translation and edition of J. A. Wayne Hellmann’s 
Divine and Created Order in Bon a ven ture’s Theology (St. Bon a ven ture, N.Y.: 
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Franciscan Institute, 2001), 202. Hammond also argues, with respect to the 
Itinerarium, that Bon a ven ture’s “universal analogy” is in fact an affi rmation 
of the univocity of God’s being throughout all creation, a presence which is 
at the same time God’s all-pervading love drawing all things potentially to 
union (Hammond, Order in the Itinerarium, 209).
 70. “Dicitur autem transire fi gura huius mundi non quantum ad destruc-
tionem totalem huius mundi sensibilis sed quia per actionem illius ignis 
omnia elementaria infl ammantis consummentur vegetabilia et animalia, pur-
gabuntur et innovabuntur elementa, maxime aër et terra, purgabuntur iusti et 
adurentur reprobi; quibus factis, cessabit etiam motus caeli, ut sic, completo 
numero electorum, fi at quodam modo innovatio et praemiatio corporum 
mundanorum,” Brev. 7.4 (Quaracchi V.284).
 71. See Cicero’s discussion in De natura deorum 2.118, Loeb Classical 
Library 19, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967). Macrobius also discusses this theory in his Commentarii in Somnium 
Scipionis 2.10, a major source for ancient natural philosophy for twelfth-
 century Latin theologians. On the infl uence of these theories in the thought 
of Origen, see Alan Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: The History of an 
Idea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. 115–17.
 72. Brev. 7.2 (Quaracchi V.282). See also Aelred of Rivaulx’s discussion of 
corporeal fi re in hell (which collects a number of late ancient authorities) in 
Dialogue on the Soul 3.
 73. Brev. 7.6 (Quaracchi V.287), citing Rev 14.11.
 74. “. . . necesse est, illos spiritus evolare, in quibus est caritatis ignis 
sursum levans, et nihil retardans ex parte impuritatis animae vel reatus.” Brev. 
7.2 (Quaracchi V.283).
 75. See, for example, the account of Diogenes Laërtius 7.156–57, trans. 
Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson in The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and 
Testimonials (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008), 57.
 76. See Cicero, De natura deorum 2.118, Loeb Classical Library 268, ed. 
Jeffrey Henderson, trans. H. Rackam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1933): “ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo reno-
vatio mundi fi eret atque idem ornatus oreretur.”
 77. 2 Sent. d. 39, dub. 1 (Quaracchi II.916).
 78. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.594). For further 
discussion of this argument, see Chapter 4.
 79. Brev. 2.9 (Quaracchi V.227).
4. hierarchy and excess in the itinerarium mentis in deum
 1. Itinerarium Prol.2. (Boehner and Hayes, 36).
 2. Itin. Prol.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).
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 3. The Itinerarium is one of a number of treatises dated to within a few 
years of Bon a ven ture’s appointment as Minister General of the Franciscan or-
der in 1257. In the case of the Itinerarium, Bon a ven ture himself provides the 
date. If his dating can be taken literally, then the composition, or at least the 
conception, of the Itinerarium took place in September or October of 1259, 
around the thirty-third anniversary of Francis’s death on October 4, 1226. 
See the excellent recent analysis of evidence for Bon a ven ture’s chronology 
in Jay M. Hammond, “Dating Bon a ven ture’s Inception as Regent Master,” 
Franciscan Studies 67 (2009), 179–226. For a general (though in some cases 
disputed) chronology of Bon a ven ture’s works, see Jacques Bougerol, Introduc-
tion to the Works of Bon a ven ture, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, N.J.: St. An-
thony Guild Press, 1963), 171–82; also Joseph F. Quinn, “The Chronology 
of St. Bon a ven ture (1217–1257),” Franciscan Studies 32 (1972), 168–86. 
Whether or not Bon a ven ture’s own dating of the work is reliable, however, 
it would be a mistake to take it only literally, given its multifaceted allegorical 
signifi cance. The Itinerarium is, in a sense, an exegesis of Francis’s Seraphic 
vision at Mount La Verna and of the stigmata he received with that vision. 
Accordingly, the Christological signifi cance is underscored by the number 
thirty-three, which recalls the traditional age of Jesus at the time of his cruci-
fi xion. Furthermore, the wording, “circa Beati ipsius transitum,” connects the 
death (transitus) of Francis with the “passing over” (also transitus) that is the 
goal and summit of the itinerarium. The dating, then, should be understood 
as part of the strategy of the prologue, which frames the journey described 
in the treatise in a richly signifi cant spiritual time and place, whatever else it 
might indicate about the historical circumstances of the writing.
 4. Bon a ven ture’s account of Francis’s vision at La Verna is in Legenda 
Maior 13 (Quaracchi XIII.543ff ).
 5. On Bon a ven ture’s conception of transitus see Werner Hülsbusch, 
“Die Theologie des Transitus bei Bonaventura,” in S. Bonaventura 1274–1974 
(Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), 4:533–65 and André Ménard, 
“Spiritualité du Transitus,” S. Bonaventura 1274–1974, 4:607–35.
 6. Itin. Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).
 7. On ecstasis and the related term raptus in Bon a ven ture’s writings, see 
Karl Rahner, “Der Begriff der ecstasis bie Bonaventura.” Zeitschrift fur Aszese 
und Mystik 9 (1934), 1–18, and J. Beumer, “Zwei schwierige Begriffe in der 
mystischen Theologie Bonaventuras (‘raptus’ und ‘ecstasis’),” in Franziskani-
sche Studien 56 (1974), 249–62.
 8. Gregory LaNave, “Knowing God through and in All Things: A Pro-
posal for Reading Bon a ven ture’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum,” Franciscan Stud-
ies 67 (2009), 267–99, and Jay Hammond’s “Respondeo” to LaNave’s essay in 
the same volume, 301–21.
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 9. For a comparison of the two works, and a discussion of Richard’s 
infl uence on Bon a ven ture, see Stephen Brown, “Refl ections on the Structural 
Sources of Bon a ven ture’s Itinerarium Mentis in Deum,” in Medieval Philoso-
phy and Modern Times, ed. G. Homström-Hintikka, vol. 1–16 (Netherlands: 
Kluwer, 2000), 1–15.
 10. Karnes, 83.
 11. Itin. Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 38).
 12. Itin. 1.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 44).
 13. Itin. 1.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 44).
 14. Jay Hammond, “An Historical Analysis of the Concept of Peace in 
Bon a ven ture’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum” (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis 
University, 1998), 21. Hammond seeks to place the Itinerarium, and specifi -
cally its call for peace, in the historical context of the rifts developing in 
the Franciscan order during Bon a ven ture’s fi rst years as Minister General. 
Thus “order” resonates as both a political and theological ideal. For more on 
the notion of ordo in the Itinerarium, see also Jay Hammond, “Order in the 
Itinerarium” in J. A. Wayne Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bon a ven-
ture’s Theology, trans. and ed. Jay M. Hammond (St. Bon a ven ture, N.Y.: The 
Franciscan Institute, 2001).
 15. The multivalence of the term mens suggests “soul” as a better transla-
tion than “mind.” At times, Bon a ven ture clearly uses it to mean the higher 
part of the soul—the memory, understanding, and will by which the soul 
is the image of God (see especially Itin. 3). In this usage, the term could be 
translated as “mind.” Yet Bon a ven ture is also clear that the soul as a unity is 
the subject of ascent, and not simply the higher mind alone, making “mind” a 
misleading translation for the subject of the Itinerarium. While Bon a ven ture 
does at times recognize some distinction between mens and anima, it is clear 
that by “mind,” he does not mean the “superior reason” or higher intellect. 
Thus, in order to avoid overemphasizing the cognitive aspects of ascent, and 
to signify that Bon a ven ture’s subject is the entire soul, I have generally fol-
lowed recent scholarly convention in translating mens as “soul,” except where 
context suggests that the term refers restrictively to the higher powers or the 
triad of memory, understanding, and will.
 16. Denys Turner insists rightly that Bon a ven ture’s notion of hierarchy is 
one in which each step contains within it all of the previous stages. However, 
as I will argue later in this chapter, what makes Bon a ven ture’s “hierarchy” 
truly dynamic is the way in which each stage also contains its superior stage. 
See Turner, “Hierarchy Interiorised: Bon a ven ture’s Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum” in The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 102–34.
 17. Itin. Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 38).
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 18. Itin. 7.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 136).
 19. Itin. 1.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 50).
 20. Augustine discusses this triad as the image of God in mens at length 
in De Trinitate Book 10, in a refl ection on the Delphic oracle and Ciceronian 
injunction, nosce te (know thyself ).
 21. Itin. 3.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 82).
 22. Itin. 3.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 88).
 23. “Desiderium autem principaliter est illius quod maxime ipsum movet. 
Maxime autem movet quod maxime amatur; maxime autem amatur esse 
beatum; beatum autem esse non habetur nisi per optimum et fi nem ultimum: 
nihil igitur appetit humanum desiderium nisi quia summum bonum, vel quia 
est ad illud, vel quia habet aliquam effi giem illius,” Itin. 3.4 (Boehner and 
Hayes, 88).
 24. As J. Bougerol explains, desiderium for Bon a ven ture is “more than a 
force or impulsion—it is a tendency,” one that does not require cognitively 
certain judgment regarding the object, but rather only that the soul “taste 
the power, the beauty, and the fruit of the attraction” (“L’aspect original 
de l’Itinerarium mentis in Deum et son infl uence sur la spiritualite de son 
temps,” Antonianum 52 [1977], 311). See also Comm. in Eccl. 7 (Quaracchi 
IV.54): “When something is desired, it is not necessary that a certain cogni-
tion precede it. For desire follows estimation alone” (Quod aliquid desideratur, 
non necesse est, quod praecedat cognitio certitudinis; desiderium enim sequitur solam 
aestimationem). Bon a ven ture makes a similar claim for dilectio in 2 Sent. d. 23, 
a. 2, q. 3, ad. 4 (Quaracchi II.545– 46), in response to the objection that, if 
Adam loved God in Paradise, he must have had a preceding vision of God. 
Refuting this argument, Bon a ven ture cites William of St. Thierry (misiden-
tifi ed as Bernard of Clairvaux) that dilectio “extends itself further than vision,” 
since “dilectio sometimes follows estimation alone.”
 25. Itin. 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
 26. Itin. 2.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 64).
 27. See Brev. 5.6 (Quaracchi V.259).
 28. This point is also made clearly by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa 
Theologiae, I.78.3. The standard critical edition is the Opera Omnia, iussu 
Leonis XIII O.M, edita cura et studio fratrum praedictorum (Rome: 1882–1996), 
vols. 4 –11.
 29. Trans. in Denys Turner, Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis of the Song 
of Songs (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications), 326.
 30. For a more thorough account of Bon a ven ture’s teachings on the 
spiritual senses, see Karl Rahner, “The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in 
the Middle Ages,” in Theological Investigations vol. 16, trans. Cornelius Ernst 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 109–28; and Gregory LaNave, “Bon a ven-
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ture,” ch. 9 of The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity, ed. 
Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 159–73.
 31. STh I.78.3.
 32. Thomas notes, however, that in sensible creatures, the effect an object 
has on the perceiver is never merely natural. That is, it is never entirely with-
out an intellectual response; otherwise the sense of touch would have to be 
extended to even inanimate objects, which are also naturally affected by exter-
nal agents. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock point out that for Thomas, 
touch is the basest of the senses both in being the most bodily and the most 
extensive, and insofar as all sense perception is based on or understood on the 
model of touch. In fact, Milbank and Pickstock understand touch for Thomas 
as not only not opposed to intellect, but also as the mode (or model?) of intel-
ligence, both human and divine. See John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, 
Truth in Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2001), 71.
 33. Itin. 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
 34. Itin. 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
 35. Itin. 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
 36. The same triad appears in Bon a ven ture’s De perfectione vitae ad sorores 
5.6–9. On contemplation and the overthrow of reason in the Beniamin 
Maior, see Stephen Jaeger, “Richard of St. Victor and the Medieval Sublime,” 
in  Stephen Jaeger, ed., Magnifi cence and the Sublime in Medieval Aesthetics: 
Art, Architecture, Literature, Music (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
157–78.
 37. Richard of St. Victor, Beniamin Maior 5.11; trans. Grover A. Zinn 
as The Mystical Ark, in Richard of St. Victor, Classics of Western Spirituality 
(Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1979), 325.
 38. On Bon a ven ture’s elaboration of the Dionysian triad of purifi cation-
illumination-perfection in his Triplex Via, see J. Bougerol, “Le perfection 
chrétienne et la structuration des trois voies,” Etudes Franciscaines 19 (1969), 
397– 409.
 39. Itin. 4.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
 40. Comm. in Luc. 10.62 (Quaracchi VII:271).
 41. Itin. 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 98).
 42. Itin. 4.8 (Boehner and Hayes, 106).
 43. The verb “hierarchizare” and related forms appear in Bon a ven ture’s 
work only later, and most frequently in the Collationes in Hexaemeron, but 
his frequent use of the phrase effi citur hierarchicus in the Itinerarium suggests 
the same: being made into a hierarchy. For a thorough study of the uses and 
senses of hierarchia and related terms, see Romano Guardini and Werner 
Dettloff, Systembildene Elemente in der Theologie Bonaventuras: die Lehren vom 
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lumen mentis, von der gradatio entium, und der infl uentia sensus et motus (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1964), 146–75.
 44. Brev. 2.12 (Quaracchi V.230).
 45. Itin. 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).
 46. See especially Jay Hammond, “Order in the Itinerarium” and “Re-
spondeo.” Note that Steven Brown also sees a correlation in Richard be-
tween sensibilia and vestiges, intelligibilia and images, and intellectibilia and—
rather than similitudes—the divine reality itself. See Brown, “Structural 
Sources,” 5.
 47. See 1 Sent. d. 3, p. 1, art. un., q. 2, ad. 4 (Quaracchi I.72–73), where 
Bon a ven ture distinguishes the umbra as another mode distinct from the 
vestigium.
 48. The term similitudo, and the triad vestigium, imago, and similitudo, 
require, I think, a slightly different elaboration, and will be considered later in 
this chapter.
 49. 1 Sent. d. 3, p. 1, art. un., q. 2 (Quaracchi I:71–74.)
 50. In fact, Bon a ven ture himself seems to take this position in the fi rst 
of his Disputed Questions on the Trinity, 1.2, concl (Quaracchi V.54): “Every 
creature is either only a vestige of God—as is corporeal nature— or an image 
of God, as is the intellectual creature.”
 51. Etienne Gilson, Philosophy of St. Bon a ven ture, 185–214.
 52. Brev. 2.12 (Quaracchi V.230).
 53. In the fi rst chapter, Bon a ven ture refers only to the distinction of 
vestige and image: “In accordance with our condition, the totality of things 
[rerum universitas] is a ladder for ascending to God. And among things, some 
are vestiges, others images; some corporeal, others spiritual; some temporal, 
others, everlasting; some things are outside us, and some within us” (Boehner 
and Hayes, 46).
 54. “Secundus modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in naturalibus, 
et similitudo in gratuitis, qui similiter habet ortum ex illa prima differentia. 
Quia enim imago dicit confi gurationem; et illa attenditur ex parte naturalium 
potentiarum animae, scilicet memoriae, intelligentiae et voluntatis: hinc 
est, quod imago est in naturalibus. Quia vero similitudo dicit convenientiam, 
quae ortum habet a qualitate; et qualitas, in qua anima similatur Deo, haec est 
gratia: ideo similitudo dicitur in gratuitis esse,” 2 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, concl. 
(Quaracchi II.405).
 55. Turner maintains, though in a carefully qualifi ed way, that the passage 
from stages three to four is the hinge of nature and grace in the movement of 
ascent. Here his qualifi cation is that, in keeping with the nature of hierarchia, 
the fourth stage does not exclude the operations of nature as seen in the fi rst 
three stages, but takes them up and transforms them. While I do not disagree 
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with this basic point, I maintain, as noted previously, that the distinction 
between the operations of nature and the operations of grace is complicated 
not only by the non-linear nature of the itinerarium, but by the excess that 
structures each of its stages. See Turner, Darkness of God, 112–13; and Eros 
and Allegory, 145– 49.
 56. Itin. 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).
 57. For an analysis of the temple motif that structures the Itinerarium, see 
Bernard McGinn, “Ascension and Introversion in the Itinerarium Mentis in 
Deum,” in S. Bonaventura 1274–1974, vol. 3 (Rome: Grottaferrata, 1974), 
535–52; Lillian Turney, “The Symbolism of the Temple in St. Bon a ven-
ture’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Fordham 
University, 1968).
 58. Itin. 6.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 126).
 59. Itin. 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).
 60. Itin. Prol.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 34).
 61. Itin. 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).
 62. Itin. Prol.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).
 63. Boehner’s notes to the Itinerarium draw many of these lexical connec-
tions. See Works vol. 2, 146nn6–7.
 64. “Suspendium elegit anima mea, et mortem ossa mea,” Itin., 138.
 65. Bon a ven ture’s last work, Collationes in Hexaemeron, just as frankly 
posits the necessity of death, and its connection to ascent and to love: “quia 
oportet hominem mori per illum amorem, ut sursum agatur,” Col. Hex, 
Princ.2.31 Ed. Ferdinand Delorme, Bibl. Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 
vol. 8 (Ad Claras Aquas: Florentiae ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 
1934). On Bon a ven ture’s conception of mystical death see Alois M. Haas, 
Sermo Mysticus: Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der Deutschen Mystik (Univer-
sitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1979), 406–9. Haas rightly insists that mors for 
Bon a ven ture is not merely metaphorical, but expresses a reality as physical as 
the crucifi ed incarnation of the Word.
 66. Itin. 7.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 138).
 67. “. . . non lucem, sed ignem totaliter infl ammantem et in Deum 
excessivis unctionibus et ardentissimis affectionibus transferentem,” Itin. 7.6 
(Boehner and Hayes, 138).
 68. 2 Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.910).
 69. “In hoc autem transitu, si sit perfectus, oportet quod relinquantur 
omnes intellectuales operationes, et apex affectus totus transferatur et trans-
formetur in Deum,” Itin. 7.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 136).
 70. “sensus desere et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et invisibilia 
et omne non ens et ens, et ad unitatem, ut possibile est, inscius restituere 
ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam.” Itin. 7.5 (Boehner and 
Hayes, 136).
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 71. On this Latin interpretive tradition see, most recently, two comple-
mentary essays: Paul Rorem, “The Early Latin Dionysius: Eriugena and 
Hugh of St. Victor,” and Boyd Coolman, “The Medieval Affective Dionysian 
Tradition,” in Re-thinking Dionysius the Areopagite, ed. Sarah Coakley and 
Charles M. Stang (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 71–84 and 85–102.
 72. On fi re as the active, motive element, see 2 Sent. d. 15 (Quarac-
chi II.379–81).
 73. Itin. 7.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 138). On Bon a ven ture’s use of the term 
passio, see Erich Auerbach, “Excursus: Gloria Passionis,” in Literary Language 
and Its Public in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New York: Pantheon, 1965), 67–81.
 74. See also Thomas Gallus’s account of the hierarchia mentis: “The lowest 
hierarchy of mind consists in its very own nature; the middle in what it can do 
by effort, which incomparably exceeds nature; the highest in ecstasy (exces-
sus mentis). At the lowest, only nature is at work; at the highest, only grace; 
at the middle, both grace and effort work together” (trans. Turner, Eros and 
Allegory, 321).
5. the exemplary bodies of the legenda maior
 1. On the development of the concept of voluntas more generally in 
Latin Christian theology, see Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of the Will in Classi-
cal Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), and N. Gilbert, 
“The Concept of the Will in Early Latin Philosophy,” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 11 (1973), 299–317. On the concept of voluntas and its relation 
to the intellect and free choice in the later middle ages, see Kent, Virtues of 
the Will.
 2. See J. Korolec, “Free Will and Free Choice,” in The Cambridge His-
tory of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 630: “The will itself was defi ned as the 
rational appetite, or the desire for the good apprehended by reason, and not 
in terms of a capacity for choosing between alternatives.” See also discussion 
in Kent, Virtues of the Will, 98. Kent notes, however, that after 1270, though 
liberum arbitrium remained a common topic of inquiry, some masters began 
to discuss the problem of voluntas libera or libertas voluntatis.
 3. The modern association of “rational” with “intellectual” or “cog-
nitive” is also a misleading approach to medieval theological uses of the 
adjective rationalis, whose range of meaning for Bon a ven ture I discuss below. 
Rationalis and intellectualis, though not entirely discrete terms for Bon a ven-
ture, nevertheless are not synonymous, as I will suggest.
 4. “Augustinus de Quinque Responsionibus 4 ‘Cum de libero arbitrio 
loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota’: ergo non tantum-
modo comprehendit cognitivam, immo etiam affectivam,” 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, 
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art. un., q. 3, fund. 1 (Quaracchi II.597). The common defi nition of liberum 
arbitrium as a “faculty of will and reason” was taken from Lombard’s Sentences 
II.25, though it was commonly misattributed to Augustine.
 5. Brev. II.9 (Quaracchi V.226).
 6. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.592); and q. 3, 
concl. (Quaracchi II.598).
 7. “Quod enim obiicitur, quod non comprehendit totam rationem, nec 
totam voluntatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed comprehendit solum 
ipsam potentiam cognitivam, in quantum iuncta est affectivae, et affectivam, 
in quantum iuncta est cognitivae; unde dicit affectum deliberativum, vel 
deliberationem voluntariam. Et propterea, quia ratio nominat ipsam poten-
tiam cognitivam ut ordinatam ad affectivam, et voluntas ipsam affectivam ut 
regulatam et ratiocinatam a cognitiva; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium potius 
dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis quam intellectus et affectus” (2 Sent. 25, 
p. 1, art. un., q. 3, ad 2, 3 [Quaracchi II.599]).
 8. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 3, contr. 3 (Quaracchi II.598).
 9. “Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest 
esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi 
sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et 
qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordi-
natum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur naturalis, quia immutabiliter 
appetitus eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum 
facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contra-
rium inclinari,” 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.566).
 10. Metaphysics IX, 3 and 10.
 11. Thus, free choice can only choose evil insofar as free choice itself is 
defi cient, as Bon a ven ture explains in 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 2, art. un., q. 3, concl. 
(Quaracchi II.614).
 12. See Itin. 3.4, and discussion in previous chapter.
 13. 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.565).
 14. See Richard Sorabji, “The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maxi-
mus the Confessor,” in Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, eds., The Will 
and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 20–22. Sorabji argues that Maximus’s conception of the natural will 
(thelema phusikon) is directly related to this Stoic idea. See also Sorabji, Ani-
mal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
chs. 12 and 13.
 15. 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracci II.566).
 16. 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracci II.566).
 17. Bon a ven ture neither endorses nor refutes the notion of the natural 
will of animals as a self-preservation instinct.
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 18. 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad. 2 (Quaracchi II.566).
 19. “Si autem sic esset determinata ad unum quod nullo modo posset in 
opposita, sicut est potentia calefaciendi et illuminandi in igne, tunc esset pure 
naturalis, et non esset deliberativa sive rationalis,” 2 Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, 
ad 2 (Quaracchi II.566).
 20. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 2, art. un., q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.596).
 21. Brev. II.9 (Quaracchi V.227).
 22. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).
 23. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).
 24. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.594). See also 1 
Sent. 1, dist 37, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 3 (Quaracchi I.658), where in response to 
the question of whether the fact that angels move indicates imperfection, 
Bon a ven ture distinguishes natural and voluntary movements—voluntary 
movements do not indicate any sort of lack in the one moving, whereas 
natural movement is always from lack or imperfection, because perfection 
in nature is a state of rest: “To the objection that all that is moved is moved 
on account of indigence, this must be admitted to be true in natural mo-
tion [in motu naturali], in which a nature moves only through an appetite for 
something. And this appetite stands as an imperfection in that nature, since 
a nature, once it attains its perfection, is at rest. But this is not true in the 
case of voluntary motion [in motu voluntario], in which something is moved 
either for the purpose of acquiring something, or to demonstrate its virtue, 
just as a gladiator is moved in the stadium. Or it must be said that it is true in 
every motion, insofar as ‘indigence’ can be taken generally . . . For in this way 
indigence can be posited either to a being whose privation indicates an imper-
fection, or to a being whose privation is not an imperfection, but a limitation, 
and the latter is case in Angels.”
 25. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).
 26. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).
 27. Liber de Causis XV.124, ed. Adriaan Pattin, in Tijschrift voor fi losofi e 28 
(1966), 90–203 at 167): “Every knower who knows its own essence returns 
to its essence in a complete reversion” (Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est 
rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa).
 28. 2 Sent. d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.592).
 29. Denys Turner makes a similar point in analyzing Pseudo-Dionysius’s 
conception of eros: “Erotic love is necessity lived in the mode of freedom and 
freedom lived in the mode of necessity,” Eros and Allegory, 59.
 30. Note the similarity to the account of reason’s abandonment to ecstasy 
in Richard of St. Victor’s Beniamin Minor.
 31. This paradox of interiority and exteriority is an echo of Dionysius’s 
own understanding of God as ecstatic love, as Perl characterizes it: “In God 
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as Love, therefore, pure interiority coincides with pure exteriority” (Perl, 
Theophany, 46).
 32. Legenda Maior XIII.10 (Quaracchi XIII.545). Translations are my own, 
but I have referred to the translation and notes by Ewert Cousins (Mahwah, 
N.J.: Paulist Press, 1978), 177–327. For an analysis of the major themes and 
structure of the Legenda, see Regis J. Armstrong, “The Spiritual Theology of 
the Legenda Major of Saint Bon a ven ture (PhD dissertation, Fordham Univer-
sity, 1978). Armstrong argues that the entire work is laid out according to the 
threefold pattern of purgation, illumination, and perfection (52–54).
 33. As Ann Astell puts it well, the Itinerarium and the Legenda provide “a 
kind of commentary on one another” (Eating Beauty, 104).
 34. I agree with Richard Emmerson and Ronald Herzmann’s contention 
that a careful reading of the Legenda reveals its “close connection with several 
of Bon a ven ture’s theological works, particularly with those emphasizing 
Christology, mysticism, and the meaning of salvation history.” See Emmer-
son and Herzmann, The Apocalyptic Imagination in Medieval Literature, 44.
 35. In his introduction to the text, Cousins provides a list of the material 
that is original to Bon a ven ture’s Legenda, and gives detailed notes through-
out his translation for Bon a ven ture’s earlier sources (Cousins, Bon a ven ture, 
39n74).
 36. See Cousins’s introduction to his translation for a sketch of the 
historical circumstances of the Legenda’s composition (Cousins, Bon a ven ture, 
37– 42). Some historians in the twentieth century, interested in recovering 
the primitive Franciscan ideal, have criticized Bon a ven ture’s version as unre-
liable, unoriginal, and less a historical document than a political intervention 
in the growing schism within the order. When it was approved as the offi cial 
biography by the General Chapter of Paris in 1266, all earlier vitae were 
suppressed. Astell wryly suggests that the evident failure of the Legenda to 
produce that unity constitutes an argument for its historical veracity (Astell, 
Eating Beauty, 100n4). These debates are important but, for the present study, 
the relation of the Legenda to Bon a ven ture’s other writings is more relevant 
than its relation to the needs of the order in the thirteenth century.
 37. “. . . angelico deputatus offi cio incendioque seraphico totus ignitus et 
ut vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus.” Legenda Prol.1 (Quaracchi 
XIII.504).
 38. Nor are the angelic associations limited to the Dionysian hierarchy. 
In the prologue, Bon a ven ture writes that Francis is symbolized by the “angel 
who ascends from the sunrise bearing the seal of the living God” depicted in 
Rev. 6.12. See analysis of this symbol and its apocalyptic resonances in Em-
merson and Herzman, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 36–75.
 39. Legenda Prol.2 (Quaracchi XIII.504).
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 40. Legenda 1.1 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
 41. Legenda 8.5 (Quaracchi XIII.543). This section is original to Bon a ven-
ture’s vita.
 42. “Pietas vera, quae secundum Apostolum ad omnia valet, adeo cor 
Francisci repleverat ac penetraverat viscera, ut totum videretur virum Dei in 
suum dominium vindicasse. Haec est, quae ipsum per devotionem sursum 
agebat in Deum, per compassionem transformabat in Christum, per conde-
scensionem inclinabat ad proximum et per universalem conciliationem ad 
singula refi gurabat ad innocentiae statum,” Legenda 8.1 (Quaracchi XIII.526).
 43. Legenda 1.5 (Quaracchi XIII.507).
 44. Legenda 5.8 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
 45. Legenda 5.8 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
 46. “. . . nondum didicerat contemplari caelestia nec assueverat degustare 
divina. Et quia spirituali auditui dat intellectum infl icta vexatio, facta est 
super eum manus Domini et immutatio dexterae Excelsi, diutinis languoribus 
ipsius corpus affl igens, ut coaptaret animam ad sancti Spiritus unctionem,” 
Legenda 1.2 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
 47. Legenda 1.2 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
 48. Legenda Prol.4 (Quaracchi XIII.505).
 49. Legenda Prol.3 (Quaracchi XIII.504).
 50. Legenda Prol.3 (Quaracchi XIII.504).
 51. Legenda 2.1 (Quaracchi XIII.507–8).
 52. Legenda 2.1 (Quaracchi XIII.508).
 53. Legenda 3.4 (Quaracchi XIII.510).
 54. Legenda 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).
 55. Legenda 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).
 56. Legenda 10.4 (Quaracchi XIII.534).
 57. Legenda 10.4 (Quaracchi XIII.534).
 58. Legenda 13.2 (Quaracchi XIII.542).
 59. Legenda 13.3 (Quaracchi XIII.543).
 60. Legenda 13.3 (Quaracchi XIII.543). Jill Bennett suggests that this pas-
sage reveals the close association between sensory vision and affective trans-
formation in medieval psychology, “Stigmata and Sense Memory: St. Francis 
and the Affective Image,” Art History 24.1 (February 2001), 1–16.
 61. On Francis as another Christ, and medieval critics of this form of 
veneration, see Lester K. Little, “Imitatio Francisci: The Infl uence of Francis 
of Assisi on Late Medieval Religious Life,” in Defenders and Critics of Fran-
ciscan Life: Essays in Honor of John V. Fleming, ed. Michael F. Cusato and Guy 
Geltner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 195–218 at 196.
 62. By calling Francis’s body a martyr, I intend to draw attention to its 
function as a witness to Francis’s love and as a victim of it. On Francis’s 
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wounds as a visible “index of affectus,” see Bennett, “Stigmata and Sense 
Memory,” 14.
 63. Legenda 6.4 (Quaracchi XIII.520).
 64. Legenda 9.2, 9.4, and 9.6, respectively (Quaracchi XIII.530–32).
 65. Elsewhere, Bon a ven ture characterizes obedience as a matter of being 
moved by grace. See Comm. in Eccl. 2 (Quaracchi VI.25): “It must be said that 
to follow God through being equal to God is not given to any creature. And 
since Satan wanted this, he fell. But one can also follow through subjection 
and obedience, and this is possible for human beings: not whoever wishes, but 
those to whom it is given by God through grace, and whom he draws. And 
thus no one through themselves is able to follow without God’s help.”
 66. “Et quia affectus ad exempla quam ad argumenta, magis ad prom-
issiones quam ad ratiocinationes, magis per devotiones quam per defi ni-
tions . . .” Breviloquium, Prol.5.2. (Quaracchi V.206). That the affect is 
moved both to examples and to promised rewards amounts, according to a 
standard scholastic account of human motivation, to the same thing. In both 
cases, the example and the reward, it is a matter of an end moving the soul 
to act—in the fi rst case, perfect imitation of Francis, which is imitation of 
Christ, is the end to which the example moves the soul. In the second case, 
the promised reward is nothing other than Christ, the beloved with whom 
the soul is united in spiritual perfection. See also Collationes de decem praeceptis 
1.1 (Quaracchi V.507): “And this is the proper order, that the end moves the 
agent, so that agent might work to the proper end.”
 67. Legenda 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).
 68. For a comprehensive study of the animal stories and their context, see 
Edward Armstrong, Saint Francis: Nature Mystic: The Derivation and Signifi -
cance of the Nature Stories in the Franciscan Legend (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1973).
 69. Legenda 8.6 (Quaracchi XIII.527).
 70. Legenda 8.6 (Quaracchi XIII.527).
 71. Legenda 8.10 (Quaracchi XIII.529).
conclusion: a corpus, in sum
 1. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 55.
 2. Legenda 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543).
 3. Legenda 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543). Given the dispossession of Francis 
in Christ through his spiritual martyrdom, these words are anything but a 
straightforward declaration of possession by Francis. In light of the scriptural 
provenance, they can themselves be understood as, paradoxically, an ecstatic 
utterance.
F6909.indb   172 10/7/16   1:41:40 PM
Notes to pages 128–31 173
 4. Legenda 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543).
 5. Legenda 13.8 (Quaracchi XIII.544).
 6. Derrida repeatedly appears to deny this structure of absolute secrecy 
to Christian apophatic discourse, as for example in “How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denials,” trans. Ken Frieden, in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold 
Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1992). The question is 
not so much whether Derrida is right or wrong about the Dionysian tradi-
tion, but rather, whether it is possible to read that tradition otherwise. For 
analysis of this possibility and a convincing attempt to realize it in the text of 
the thirteenth-century beguine Hadewijch, see Amy Hollywood, “Derrida’s 
Noble Unfaith, or What Reading Hadewijch Can Teach You about Reading 
Derrida,” Minnesota Review 80 (2013), 95–105.
 7. Legenda 14.1 (Quaracchi XIII.545).
 8. See, for example, Legenda 5.6 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
 9. Legenda 14.6 (Quaracchi XIII.547).
 10. Legenda 15.3 (Quaracchi XIII.548).
 11. On the agilitas of the glorifi ed resurrection body, see Brev. VII.7, n. 1 
(Quaracchi V.289).
 12. Legenda 15.2 (Quaracchi XIII.547).
 13. Legenda 15.4 (Quaracchi XIII.548). The episode of the knight echoes 
a scene before Francis’s death when a doubting follower put his fi ngers in 
the wounds (Legenda 13.8 [Quaracchi XIII.544]). This suggests, perhaps, that 
Francis’s body should be understood as a resurrection body both before and 
after his literal death, and that this passing is less decisive than the death he 
undergoes in his vision of the Seraph. The post-death appearance of this sec-
ond Thomas fi gure is original to Bon a ven ture’s vita. The addition is consis-
tent with Bon a ven ture’s intensifi cation of biblical patterns in his presentation 
of Francis’s life and death, even as it confi rms, specifi cally, the identifi cation 
of Francis’s corpse with Christ’s resurrection body.
 14. Legenda 15.3 (Quaracchi XIII.548).
 15. Karnes, 112.
 16. Lignum vitae, Prol. 1 (Quaracchi XIII.66).
 17. Lignum vitae, Prol. 1 (Quaracchi XIII.66).
 18. See Karnes, 130–35; Patrick F. O’Connell, “The Lignum vitae of 
Saint Bon a ven ture and the Medieval Devotional Tradition” (unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, Fordham University, 1985).
 19. On the dating, context, and themes of the work, Lezlie S. Knox, Cre-
ating Clare of Assisi: Female Franciscan Identities in Later Medieval Italy (Leiden: 
Brill, 2008), 64 –69.
 20. McNamer, 90–92.
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 21. This consistency has been recognized by scholars. See, for example, 
Knox, 66. On the threefold scheme in Bon a ven ture’s works, see Bougerol, 
“Le perfection chrétienne.”
 22. De perfectione vitae ad sorores 6.1 (Quaracchi VIII.120).
 23. De perfectione 5.5 (Quaracchi XIII.119).
 24. De perfectione 4.10 (Quaracchi XIII.115).
 25. De perfectione 4.10 (Quaracchi XIII.115).
 26. De perfectione 6.2 (Quaracchi XIII.120).
 27. Karnes, on the contrary, reads this passage as emphasizing “not 
sharing Christ’s pain but rising with Christ to bliss,” a journey from Jesus’s 
humanity to Christ in heaven. Yet Bon a ven ture’s language seems to resist any 
such disjunction—the kingdom of God that the meditant enters is, for Bon a-
ven ture, Jesus’s tortured body. See Karnes, 135–37.
 28. De perfectione 6.2 (Quaracchi XIII.120).
 29. I am indebted here to Catherine Keller’s insightful meditation on the 
aporetic nature of mystical writing as an opening toward rethinking embodi-
ment in the medieval Christian via negativa. See “The Cloud of the Impos-
sible: Embodiment and Apophasis,” in Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, 
Incarnation, and Relationality, ed. Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2010).
 30. Dionysius glosses Paul’s words in Galatians 2:20 as the confession of 
the lover in ecstatic union in Divine Names 4 (Lubheid, 82). For an interpreta-
tion of the Dionysian corpus in light of it, see Stang, Apophasis and Pseu do-
nym ity, and especially the analysis of this passage in 161–70.
 31. Stang, 205.
 32. Derrida, The Gift of Death, 92.
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